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ENR, Energizer Holdings

Household Products capital-intensive Cyclical

Energizer, through its operating subsidiaries, is a global diversified household products leader in batteries, auto care and portable lights.

Energizer is one of the world's largest manufacturers, marketers and distributors of household and specialty batteries; automotive appearance, performance, refrigerant and freshener products; and portable lights.

Energizer is the beneficiary of over 100 years of expertise in the battery and portable lighting products industries and is recognized worldwide for innovation, quality and dependability across its brands which include Energizer , Eveready and Rayovac brands which are marketed and sold around the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ENR · Energizer Holdings

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.0B

+2.3% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.0B 5-yr avg $3.0B

Gross margin 41% 5-yr avg 39%

Operating margin 13.2% 5-yr avg 7.9%

ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 5%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Batteries (76%), Auto Care (21%) and Lights (3%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 39% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.8% and 19% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 22% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Batteries is 76% of revenue, with Auto Care the other meaningful line at 21%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Batteries76%$2.2B
Auto Care21%$620M
Lights3%$85M

By geographyUnited States58%International42%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$1.8B	$1.8B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.0B	RevenueRevenue
46%	46%	40%	39%	38%	37%	38%	38%	42%	41%	Gross marginGross mgn
21%	23%	21%	18%	16%	16%	17%	18%	18%	18%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$326M	$274M	$286M	$123M	$316M	($147M)	$344M	$210M	$438M	$392M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
18.6%	15.2%	11.4%	4.5%	10.5%	−4.8%	11.6%	7.3%	14.8%	13.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$202M	$94M	$51M	($93M)	$161M	($232M)	$141M	$38M	$239M	$195M	Net incomeNet inc.
26%	47%	14%	—	-4%	—	20%	29%	16%	17%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$197M	$229M	$150M	$376M	$180M	$1M	$395M	$430M	$147M	$231M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$50M	$45M	$93M	$112M	$119M	$122M	$123M	$121M	$127M	$127M	DepreciationDeprec.
($79M)	$62M	($22M)	$333M	($110M)	$98M	$110M	$248M	($244M)	($119M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$25M	$24M	$55M	$65M	$65M	$78M	$57M	$98M	$84M	$71M	CapexCapex
1.4%	1.3%	2.2%	2.4%	2.1%	2.6%	1.9%	3.4%	2.8%	2.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$172M	$205M	$94M	$311M	$115M	($77M)	$338M	$332M	$63M	$159M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.8%	11.4%	3.8%	11.3%	3.8%	−2.5%	11.4%	11.5%	2.1%	5.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$172M	$205M	$94M	$311M	$115M	($77M)	$338M	$332M	$63M	$159M	Free cash flowFCF
9.8%	11.4%	3.8%	11.3%	3.8%	−2.5%	11.4%	11.5%	2.1%	5.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$38M	$2.5B	$5M	$67M	$0	$0	$22M	$14M	$14M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$69M	$70M	$83M	$85M	$84M	$85M	$86M	$87M	$87M	$86M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$60M	$70M	$45M	$45M	$96M	$0	$0	$0	$90M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
35%	30%	7%	—	9%	-3%	8%	5%	11%	10%	ROICROIC
237%	382%	9%	-30%	45%	-177%	67%	28%	141%	113%	Return on equityROE
156%	96%	−6%	−58%	22%	−242%	26%	−36%	89%	63%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$378M	$522M	$259M	$460M	$239M	$205M	$223M	$217M	$236M	$173M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$230M	$230M	$340M	$292M	$293M	$422M	$512M	$441M	$404M	$310M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$317M	$323M	$469M	$511M	$728M	$772M	$650M	$657M	$781M	$744M	InventoryInvent.
$219M	$229M	$299M	$378M	$455M	$329M	$371M	$433M	$402M	$393M	Accounts payablePayables
$328M	$325M	$511M	$425M	$566M	$864M	$791M	$666M	$783M	$660M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.0B	$1.2B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.5B	Current assetsCur. assets
$582M	$751M	$1.1B	$1.6B	$946M	$698M	$734M	$820M	$795M	$732M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	1.6×	1.9×	1.3×	1.5×	2.3×	2.1×	1.8×	2.1×	2.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$230M	$244M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B	$3.2B	$5.4B	$5.7B	$5.0B	$4.6B	$4.5B	$4.3B	$4.6B	$4.4B	Total assetsAssets
$983M	$980M	$3.5B	$4.1B	$3.3B	$3.5B	$3.3B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.3B	Total debtDebt
$605M	$458M	$3.2B	$3.7B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
6.1×	2.8×	1.3×	0.6×	2.0×	-0.9×	2.0×	1.3×	2.8×	2.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$85M	$25M	$544M	$309M	$356M	$131M	$211M	$136M	$170M	$173M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%	1.6%	1.1%	0.9%	0.3%	0.4%	0.7%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
62.6M	61.4M	67.3M	69.5M	68.7M	69.9M	72.4M	72.7M	72.0M	69.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$28.05	$29.28	$37.07	$39.49	$43.98	$43.64	$40.88	$39.71	$41.01	$43.07	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.22	$1.52	$0.76	$-1.34	$2.34	$-3.31	$1.94	$0.52	$3.32	$2.82	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.75	$3.33	$1.40	$4.48	$1.67	$-1.10	$4.67	$4.56	$0.88	$2.30	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.75	$3.33	$1.40	$4.48	$1.67	$-1.10	$4.67	$4.56	$0.88	$2.30	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.10	$1.14	$1.23	$1.23	$1.22	$1.21	$1.19	$1.20	$1.21	$1.24	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.40	$0.39	$0.82	$0.94	$0.94	$1.11	$0.78	$1.35	$1.17	$1.03	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.36	$0.40	$8.08	$4.45	$5.18	$1.87	$2.91	$1.87	$2.36	$2.50	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.9%/yr	+0.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−13.3%/yr	−27.8%/yr
EPS	+0.4%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+1.2%/yr	−0.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.2%/yr	+4.4%/yr
Book value / share	+7.1%/yr	−11.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

72Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

11%low FY2022

Gross margin

42%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

50.3×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$63Mowner earningsvs.$239Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $239M of profit but $63M of owner earnings: $176M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$239M

Owner earnings$63M · 2% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$239M	$38M	$141M	($232M)	$161M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$127M	+$121M	+$123M	+$122M	+$119M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$26M	+$23M	+$22M	+$13M	+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$244M	+$248M	+$110M	+$98M	−$110M
Cash from operations	$147M	$430M	$395M	$1M	$180M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$84M	−$98M	−$57M	−$78M	−$65M
Owner earnings	$63M	$332M	$338M	($77M)	$115M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	11%	11%	-3%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $38M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.8×

Adequate

Operating income $438M ÷ interest expense $154M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.2B · 7.3× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $236M − debt $3.4B

What this means
Netting $236M of cash and short-term investments against $3.4B of debt leaves $3.2B owed, about 7.3× a year's operating profit (7.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 130d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 50 + DIO 166 − DPO 85 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median, range -3%–35%; 11% latest = NOPAT $369M ÷ invested capital $3.4B

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -3%–11%; latest $63M = operating cash $147M − maintenance capex $84M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $38M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.62×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $147M ÷ net income $239M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 280%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $177M ÷ Owner Earnings $63M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $63M of Owner Earnings, $177M (280%) went back to shareholders, $87M dividends, $90M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $26M stock comp, the real buyback was about $64M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.66×

Harvesting

Capex $84M ÷ depreciation $127M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.11×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.4B vs $884M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +21%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.03/share (latest year $3.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.48/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 15% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
The recent-years average (11%) sits below the early years (15%), but the latest year (15%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 11% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −4.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We may use artificial intelligence in our business, which could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, and legal liability, and adversely affect our operations. 16 We may leverage artificial intelligence, including generative artificial intelligence and machine learning, in our operations and software programmi…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.5B

Cash & short-term investments$173M
Receivables$310M
Inventory$744M
Other current assets$274M

Current liabilities$732M

Debt due within a year$10M
Accounts payable$393M
Other current liabilities$328M

Current ratio2.05×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.03×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$768Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $173M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 2.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.4B$91M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$551M · 26%
Dividends$737M · 35%
Buybacks$406M · 19%
Retained (debt / cash)$411M · 20%

Returned to owners$1.1B
74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $737M as dividends and $406M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.4B and cash and short-term investments fell $206M.
Average price paid for buybacks$34.96
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 9M shares were bought for $309M, about $34.96 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $22.43 (2025) to $48.64 (2018); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $22.43 ($90M).
Net change in share count10.5%
The diluted count rose from 63M to 69M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.21/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.1B45% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$2.6Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $551M of capital spent building

$128M written down across 2 years (2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Alan S. Hoskins	$6.0M	$4.9M	$115M
2021	—	$3.2M	$1.0M	$115M
2022	Alan S. Hoskins	$9.0M	$4.1M	($77M)
2023	Alan S. Hoskins	$9.6M	$13.6M	$338M
2024	Alan S. Hoskins	$10.8M	$9.9M	$332M
2025	Mark S. LaVigne	$11.0M	$8.7M	$63M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$26M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Energizer Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?10.5%
Diluted shares grew 10.5% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $406M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$983M → $3.3B
Debt rose from $983M to $3.3B while owner earnings went from about $157M to $244M — about 6.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 14 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Household Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ENSEnerSys	$3.8B	31%	12.1%	10%	11%
FNFabrinet	$3.4B	12%	7.9%	17%	7%
ENREnergizer Holdings	$3.0B	39%	11.4%	9%	10%
ATKRAtkore	$2.9B	28%	13.6%	20%	12%
SPBSpectrum Brands Holdings	$2.8B	34%	3.8%	3%	6%
UIUbiquiti Inc.	$2.6B	45%	33.0%	152%	26%
FLNCFluence Energy Inc.	$2.3B	4%	-5.0%	-32%	-6%
NOVTNovanta Inc.	$981M	43%	10.3%	9%	10%
Group median	—	32%	10.9%	10%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Energizer Holdings has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Energizer Holdings earns about $289M on its 9.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($289M) Net of stock comp (−$28M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+80%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $159M on 68M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $3.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ENR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Energizer Holdings (ENR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ENR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ENPH its page in the Manual ENS →

Industry order: ← CLX the Household Products chapter KMB →