Owner Scorecard


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SPB, Spectrum Brands Holdings

Electrical Equipment capital-intensive Cyclical

Spectrum Brands Holdings manufactures, markets and distributes its products globally across regions including the North America, Europe, Middle East & Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacific regions through a variety of trade channels, including retailers, wholesalers and distributors.

The terms "the Company," "we," "our," and "SBH" as used in this report, refer to Spectrum Brands Holdings, Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries, unless otherwise indicated.

Copies will also be provided to any stockholder upon written request to Spectrum Brands, Inc. at 3001 Deming Way, Middleton, Wisconsin 53562 or via electronic mail at investorrelations@spectrumbrands.com, or by telephone at (314) 253-5923.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SPB · Spectrum Brands Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.8B
−5.2% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $3.0B
Gross margin 37% 5-yr avg 34%
Operating margin 4.7% 5-yr avg 1.4%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 1%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg −0%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg −0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is HPC (41%), GPC (39%) and H&G (20%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 3.2% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −7.0% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest HPC at 41%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • HPC41%$1.2B
  • GPC39%$1.1B
  • H&G20%$573M
By geographyUnited States56%Europe31%Latin America8%Asia Pacific3%North America - Other2%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.0B$3.7B$3.8B$2.4B$2.6B$3.0B$3.1B$2.9B$3.0B$2.8B$2.8BRevenueRevenue
32%32%37%37%37%Gross marginGross mgn
1%1%1%1%2%2%32%30%32%31%32%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$335M$288M$224M($152M)$9M$97M$23M($206M)$171M$125M$131MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.0%7.8%5.9%−6.2%0.3%3.2%0.7%−7.0%5.8%4.4%4.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
($199M)$106M$768M$495M$98M$190M$72M$1.8B$125M$100M$126MNet incomeNet inc.
22%-3%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$913M$840M$343M$1M$290M$288M($54M)($410M)$163M$204M$331MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$120M$147M$125M$147M$115M$117M$99M$91M$102M$98M$99MDepreciationDeprec.
$921M$533M($562M)($685M)$46M($47M)($235M)($2.3B)($82M)($15M)$85MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$61M$82M$76M$40M$44M$44M$64M$59M$44M$38M$41MCapexCapex
2.0%2.2%2.0%1.7%1.7%1.5%2.0%2.0%1.5%1.4%1.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$852M$758M$267M($39M)$246M$245M($118M)($469M)$119M$165M$290MOwner earningsOwner earn.
28.1%20.5%7.0%−1.6%9.4%8.2%−3.8%−16.1%4.0%5.9%10.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$852M$758M$267M($39M)$246M$245M($118M)($469M)$119M$165M$290MFree cash flowFCF
28.1%20.5%7.0%−1.6%9.4%8.2%−3.8%−16.1%4.0%5.9%10.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$289M$0$0$17M$430M$272M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$132M$25M$22M$86M$75M$72M$69M$67M$51M$48M$45MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$269M$240M$126M$134M$35M$483M$326MBuybacksBuybacks
5%4%-4%0%3%1%-6%5%5%2%ROICROIC
-31%14%49%29%7%13%6%72%6%5%7%Return on equityROE
−52%11%47%24%2%8%0%69%3%3%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$465M$270M$553M$627M$532M$188M$244M$1.9B$369M$124M$125MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$483M$266M$317M$357M$300M$248M$247M$477M$635M$522M$561MReceivablesReceiv.
$741M$496M$584M$548M$319M$563M$781M$463M$462M$446M$487MInventoryInvent.
$983M$373M$585M$457M$363M$389M$453M$397M$397M$284M$349MAccounts payablePayables
$240M$389M$316M$448M$256M$423M$575M$543M$700M$684M$699MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$30.0B$4.0B$1.7B$1.7B$2.9B$3.2B$2.9B$1.6B$1.2B$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$27.6B$1.4B$1.1B$945M$1.2B$1.2B$765M$687M$523M$554MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×2.8×1.5×1.8×2.5×2.7×3.8×2.3×2.3×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.1B$1.5B$1.5B$626M$627M$867M$953M$855M$865M$867M$865MGoodwillGoodwill
$33.6B$35.8B$7.8B$5.2B$5.1B$5.3B$5.8B$5.3B$3.8B$3.4B$3.5BTotal assetsAssets
$5.5B$5.9B$4.7B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$3.2B$1.6B$578M$581M$5.9BTotal debtDebt
$5.1B$5.6B$4.2B$1.9B$1.9B$2.4B$3.0B($283M)$209M$458M$5.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.8×0.8×0.2×-1.8×2.9×4.2×4.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$638M$758M$1.6B$1.7B$1.4B$1.5B$1.3B$2.5B$2.1B$1.9B$1.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
2.3%1.5%0.3%1.8%1.2%1.0%0.3%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$11M$116M$111MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
32.0M32.2M37.0M50.7M44.7M43.2M40.9M39.5M30.5M25.9M23.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$94.95$115.11$102.94$48.25$58.66$69.40$76.59$73.89$97.18$108.46$120.47Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-6.21$3.29$20.76$9.75$2.19$4.39$1.75$45.61$4.09$3.86$5.38EPS (diluted)EPS
$26.63$23.55$7.23$-0.78$5.51$5.67$-2.88$-11.87$3.89$6.38$12.39Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$26.63$23.55$7.23$-0.78$5.51$5.67$-2.88$-11.87$3.89$6.38$12.39Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$4.13$0.78$0.61$1.69$1.68$1.66$1.68$1.68$1.66$1.86$1.91Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.91$2.54$2.05$0.80$0.99$1.01$1.56$1.49$1.44$1.48$1.74Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.94$23.54$42.74$33.94$31.49$34.07$30.89$63.74$70.19$73.73$81.23Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.5%/yr+13.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−14.7%/yr+3.0%/yr
EPS+12.0%/yr
Dividends / share−8.5%/yr+2.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.8%/yr+8.4%/yr
Book value / share+15.6%/yr+18.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
26Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
5%low FY2023
Gross margin
37%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.8×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$165Mowner earningsvs.$100Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $100M of profit into $165M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$100M
Owner earnings$165M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$100M$125M$1.8B$72M$190M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$98M+$102M+$91M+$99M+$117M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$21M+$18M+$17M+$10M+$29M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$15M−$82M−$2.3B−$235M−$47M
Cash from operations$204M$163M($410M)($54M)$288M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$38M−$44M−$59M−$64M−$44M
Owner earnings$165M$119M($469M)($118M)$245M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%4%-16%-4%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $21M), owner earnings is nearer $145M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $125M ÷ interest expense $30M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.7B · 46.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $124M − debt $5.9B
    What this means

    Netting $124M of cash and short-term investments against $5.9B of debt leaves $5.7B owed, about 46.0× a year's operating profit (47.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 68 + DIO 92 − DPO 58 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -6%–5%; 2% latest = NOPAT $125M ÷ invested capital $7.7B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -16%–28%; latest $165M = operating cash $204M − maintenance capex $38M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $21M of SBC) leaves $145M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $204M ÷ net income $100M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $375M ÷ Owner Earnings $165M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $165M of Owner Earnings, $375M (227%) went back to shareholders, $48M dividends, $326M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $21M stock comp, the real buyback was about $306M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.39×
    Harvesting
    Capex $38M ÷ depreciation $98M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.9B vs $661M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +200%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $29.12/share (latest year $4.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $82.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 1% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −18%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 18% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −7.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$125M
  • Receivables$561M
  • Inventory$487M
  • Other current assets$99M
Current liabilities$554M
  • Debt due within a year$12M
  • Accounts payable$349M
  • Other current liabilities$194M
Current ratio2.29×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.42×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$718Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$12M due · $125M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$121Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($301M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$726M$138M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$0
'28$0
'29$350M
'30$18M
later$128M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$350Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$496Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$552M · 21%
  • Dividends$646M · 25%
  • Buybacks$1.6B · 62%
  • Returned to owners$2.3B

    111% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $646M as dividends and $1.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$231M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $231M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5.5B to $5.9B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $340M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$60.90

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 26M shares were bought for $1.6B, about $60.90 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $38.68 (2020) to $95.71 (2022); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $65.23 ($483M).

  • Net change in share count−26.9%

    The diluted count fell from 32M to 23M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.86/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−53%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $688M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.53 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.8B53% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity45%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $552M of capital spent building

$238M written down across 3 years (2016, 2019, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 24% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$8.6M$21.9M$245M
2022$6.8M−$9.9M($118M)
2023$7.4M$15.2M($469M)
2024$10.6M$14.7M$119M
2025$8.8M−$1.8M$165M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio107:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$21M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 16% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Spectrum Brands Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−2.1% vs 18.5%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 18.5% early in the record and −2.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.73×

    Across the record the business reported $3.6B of net income but generated $2.6B of operating cash, a 0.73-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $623M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electrical Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ENSEnerSys$3.8B31%12.1%10%11%
ENREnergizer Holdings$3.0B39%11.4%9%10%
ATKRAtkore$2.9B28%13.6%20%12%
SPBSpectrum Brands Holdings$2.8B34%3.8%3%6%
UIUbiquiti Inc.$2.6B45%33.0%152%26%
LFUSLittelfuse Inc.$2.4B38%13.0%10%14%
FLNCFluence Energy Inc.$2.3B4%-5.0%-32%-6%
NOVTNovanta Inc.$981M43%10.3%9%10%
Group median36%11.8%10%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Spectrum Brands Holdings has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Spectrum Brands Holdings earns about $181M on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+22%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $290M on 23M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $5.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Spectrum Brands Holdings (SPB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SOUNW its page in the Manual SPCE →

Industry order: ← SLDP the Electrical Equipment chapter UCAR →