Owner Scorecard


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EYE, National Vision Holdings Inc.

Specialty Retail capital-intensive Distress / turnaround

We are one of the largest optical retailers in the United States and a leader in the value segment of the U.S. optical retail industry.

Our range of quality product offerings at multiple price points makes us an attractive destination for consumers of all income levels.

Historically, our business model primarily targeted lower-income consumers with a go-to-market strategy focused on merchandise and messaging of the lowest price.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
EYE · National Vision Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$2.0B
+9.0% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Operating margin 3.9% 5-yr avg 2.4%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 54% and operating margin about 3.2% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.6% to 5.4% — on a steadier 54% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192021’212022’222023’232024’242026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7B$1.6B$1.8B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0BRevenueRevenue
54%54%54%61%Gross marginGross mgn
44%44%45%43%42%51%52%51%51%50%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$64M$64M$42M$74M$87M$53M$24M($10M)$59M$78MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.4%4.7%2.8%4.3%5.1%3.2%1.4%−0.6%3.0%3.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$13M$43M$24M$33M$36M$42M($66M)($28M)$30M$47MNet incomeNet inc.
47%-8%6%27%29%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$98M$90M$107M$165M$235M$119M$173M$134M$146M$176MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$53M$62M$74M$87M$92M$89M$90M$91M$91M$92MDepreciationDeprec.
$27M($20M)($12M)$32M$96M($25M)$129M$54M$2M$14MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$90M$93M$104M$101M$77M$114M$115M$96M$73M$70MCapexCapex
7.5%6.8%6.8%5.9%4.5%6.9%6.5%5.2%3.7%3.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$45M$28M$32M$64M$158M$31M$83M$38M$73M$106MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.8%2.1%2.1%3.7%9.2%1.9%4.7%2.1%3.7%5.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$8M($3M)$2M$64M$158M$6M$58M$38M$73M$106MFree cash flowFCF
0.6%−0.2%0.1%3.7%9.2%0.3%3.3%2.1%3.7%5.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$171M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$188K$0$2M$26M$689K$84M$28M$3M$3MBuybacksBuybacks
3%3%6%7%3%2%-1%4%5%ROICROIC
3%7%3%4%4%5%-8%-3%3%5%Return on equityROE
3%−20%3%4%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5M$4M$17M$39M$374M$229M$150M$74M$39M$68MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$34M$43M$51M$44M$58M$80M$87M$50M$57M$44MReceivablesReceiv.
$87M$91M$116M$128M$111M$123M$120M$94M$89M$108MInventoryInvent.
$39M$36M$44M$41M$65M$65M$68M$54M$79M$87MAccounts payablePayables
$82M$99M$123M$131M$104M$138M$139M$90M$68M$65MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$147M$162M$215M$235M$567M$474M$397M$250M$226M$261MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$200M$211M$212M$273M$329M$344M$398M$468M$412M$418MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.8×1.0×0.9×1.7×1.4×1.0×0.5×0.5×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$797M$793M$778M$778M$778M$778M$718M$698M$701M$701MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0BTotal assetsAssets
$738M$562M$571M$556M$652M$563M$451M$337M$236M$233MTotal debtDebt
$733M$558M$553M$517M$278M$334M$301M$263M$198M$165MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.7×1.2×1.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$400M$655M$743M$776M$907M$901M$829M$816M$870M$898MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%1.4%0.7%0.6%0.8%1.1%0.9%1.2%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
57.0M62.0M79.0M81.7M82.8M80.3M78.6M78.6M80.6M81.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$20.99$22.17$19.44$21.11$20.68$20.48$22.35$23.20$24.67$24.80Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.23$0.70$0.30$0.40$0.44$0.52$-0.84$-0.36$0.37$0.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.79$0.46$0.41$0.78$1.91$0.38$1.06$0.49$0.91$1.30Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.13$-0.05$0.03$0.78$1.91$0.07$0.74$0.49$0.91$1.30Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$2.76$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.58$1.50$1.32$1.24$0.93$1.41$1.46$1.22$0.90$0.86Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.01$10.55$9.40$9.51$10.95$11.22$10.55$10.39$10.79$11.02Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.6%/yr+3.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+1.5%/yr−13.8%/yr
EPS+4.6%/yr−3.5%/yr
Capital spending / share−5.4%/yr−0.5%/yr
Book value / share+4.4%/yr−0.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+9.0%
    “Net sales of services and plans increased $22.7 million, or 6.3%, driven primarily by higher exam revenues of $21.1 million, or 9.0%.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
81Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
4%low FY2024
Gross margin
54%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.7×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$73Mowner earningsvs.$30Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $30M of profit into $73M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$30M
Owner earnings$73M · 4% of revenue
FY2026FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$30M($28M)($66M)$42M$36M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$91M+$91M+$90M+$89M+$92M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$17M+$20M+$14M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2M+$54M+$129M−$25M+$96M
Cash from operations$146M$134M$173M$119M$235M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$73M−$96M−$90M−$89M−$77M
Owner earnings$73M$38M$83M$31M$158M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$25M−$25M
Free cash flow$73M$38M$58M$6M$158M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%2%5%2%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $50M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $59M ÷ interest expense $56M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $198M · 3.4× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $39M − debt $236M
    What this means

    Netting $39M of cash and short-term investments against $236M of debt leaves $198M owed, about 3.4× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 11 + DIO 46 − DPO 40 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -1%–7%; 4% latest = NOPAT $42M ÷ invested capital $1.1B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 2%–9%; latest $73M = operating cash $146M − maintenance capex $73M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $50M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $146M ÷ net income $30M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $3M ÷ Owner Earnings $73M
    What this means

    Of $73M Owner Earnings, $3M (4%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($24M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.80×
    Harvesting
    Capex $73M ÷ depreciation $91M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $236M vs ($187M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −181%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.27/share (latest year $0.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to 1% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −0.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, we must keep up to date with competitive technology trends, including the use of artificial intelligence to automate business processes and improve the customer experience, the use of new or improved technology, creative user interfaces and other e-commerce marketing tools such as paid search and mobile ap…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$261M
  • Cash & short-term investments$68M
  • Receivables$44M
  • Inventory$108M
  • Other current assets$41M
Current liabilities$418M
  • Debt due within a year$13M
  • Accounts payable$87M
  • Other current liabilities$318M
Current ratio0.62×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.37×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($158M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$13M due · $68M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 4, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$190Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$684M$450M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $695M (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$89Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$115M
'27$106M
'28$82M
'29$71M
'30$54M
later$112M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$115Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$540Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$458Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$236M
Lease obligations (present value)$458M
Total fixed claims on the business$695M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $695M, of which the leases are 66%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 3, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$863M · 68%
  • Dividends$171M · 13%
  • Buybacks$148M · 12%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$86M · 7%
  • Returned to owners$319M

    58% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $171M as dividends and $148M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $505M and cash and short-term investments rose $63M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$29.68

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $113M, about $29.68 each.

  • Net change in share count43.0%

    The diluted count rose from 57M to 81M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$708M36% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity81%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 9 years buying other businesses, against $863M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$5.7M$6.7M$158M
2022$4.3M$757k$31M
2023$8.6M$6.8M$83M
2024$5.1M−$819k$38M
2026$5.2M$12.1M$73M
2026$7.3M$22.0M$73M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio172:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 40% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why National Vision Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?43.0%

    Diluted shares grew 43.0% over 2016–2026, even as the company spent $148M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 9 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 9 years, $110M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Does management own its misses?
    1 plain admission in this year's filing
    “We record an impairment charge as the excess of carrying value over estimated fair value.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BLCOBausch + Lomb Corporation$5.1B4.4%1%2%
COOThe Cooper Companies Inc.$4.1B65%16.6%5%15%
ENOVEnovis Corporation$2.2B55%-4.4%-1%1%
ICUIICU Medical$2.2B37%2.0%5%5%
EYENational Vision Holdings Inc.$2.0B54%3.2%3%4%
MSAMSA Safety Incorporated$1.9B45%13.2%13%11%
ITGRInteger Holdings$1.9B27%11.2%6%7%
WRBYWarby Parker Inc.$872M57%-10.7%-67%3%
Group median54%3.8%4%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what National Vision Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, National Vision Holdings Inc. earns about $73M on its 3.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’26−10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’26+38%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $106M on 80M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $165M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "National Vision Holdings Inc. (EYE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EYE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EXTR its page in the Manual EYPT →

Industry order: ← ELA the Specialty Retail chapter FL →