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FL, Foot Locker
A retailer, earning thin margins on high volume, where inventory turns, unit economics and scale decide the outcome.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 32% and operating margin about 7.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.3% to 13% — on a steadier 32% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 6 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMAug 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $7.8B | $7.8B | $7.9B | $8.0B | $7.6B | $9.0B | $8.8B | $8.2B | $8.0B | $7.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 34% | 32% | 32% | 32% | 29% | 34% | 32% | 28% | 29% | 29% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 19% | 19% | 20% | 21% | 21% | 21% | 22% | 23% | 24% | 24% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $1.0B | $571M | $699M | $649M | $309M | $870M | $581M | $142M | $103M | ($203M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 12.9% | 7.3% | 8.8% | 8.1% | 4.1% | 9.7% | 6.6% | 1.7% | 1.3% | −2.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $664M | $284M | $541M | $491M | $323M | $893M | $342M | ($330M) | $12M | ($385M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 34% | 51% | 24% | 27% | 35% | 28% | 34% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $844M | $813M | $781M | $696M | $1.1B | $666M | $173M | $91M | $345M | $221M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $158M | $173M | $178M | $179M | $176M | $197M | $208M | $199M | $202M | $202M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $0 | $341M | $40M | $8M | $548M | ($453M) | ($408M) | $209M | $110M | $383M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $266M | $274M | $187M | $187M | $159M | $209M | $285M | $242M | $240M | $215M | CapexCapex |
| 3.4% | 3.5% | 2.4% | 2.3% | 2.1% | 2.3% | 3.3% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 2.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $578M | $539M | $594M | $509M | $903M | $457M | ($112M) | ($151M) | $105M | $6M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.4% | 6.9% | 7.5% | 6.4% | 12.0% | 5.1% | −1.3% | −1.8% | 1.3% | 0.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $578M | $539M | $594M | $509M | $903M | $457M | ($112M) | ($151M) | $105M | $6M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.4% | 6.9% | 7.5% | 6.4% | 12.0% | 5.1% | −1.3% | −1.8% | 1.3% | 0.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $0 | — | — | $1.1B | $14M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $147M | $157M | $158M | $164M | $73M | $101M | $150M | $113M | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $432M | $467M | $375M | $335M | $37M | $348M | $129M | $0 | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 37% | 16% | 30% | 28% | 17% | 22% | 12% | 4% | 2% | -6% | ROICROIC |
| 25% | 11% | 22% | 20% | 12% | 28% | 10% | -11% | 0% | -15% | Return on equityROE |
| 19% | 5% | 15% | 13% | 9% | 24% | 6% | −15% | 0% | −15% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $1.0B | $849M | $891M | $1.0B | $2.0B | $1.6B | $1.2B | $449M | $516M | $414M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $101M | $106M | $87M | $100M | $124M | $134M | $160M | $160M | $156M | $156M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $923M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| $249M | $258M | $387M | $333M | $402M | $596M | $492M | $366M | $378M | $542M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $1.2B | $1.1B | $969M | $975M | $645M | $804M | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $612M | $616M | $764M | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.3× | 4.1× | 3.3× | 2.0× | 1.7× | 1.4× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $155M | $160M | $157M | $156M | $159M | $797M | $785M | $768M | $759M | $655M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.8B | $4.0B | $3.8B | $6.6B | $7.0B | $8.1B | $7.9B | $6.9B | $6.7B | $6.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $127M | $125M | $124M | $122M | $110M | $457M | $452M | $447M | $446M | $446M | Total debtDebt |
| ($919M) | ($724M) | ($767M) | ($927M) | ($1.9B) | ($1.1B) | ($714M) | ($2M) | ($70M) | $32M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 135M | 128M | 116M | 109M | 105M | 104M | 95.5M | 94.2M | 95.5M | 95.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $57.48 | $60.84 | $68.38 | $73.37 | $71.87 | $86.40 | $91.72 | $86.71 | $83.64 | $82.39 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.91 | $2.22 | $4.66 | $4.50 | $3.07 | $8.60 | $3.58 | $-3.50 | $0.13 | $-4.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.28 | $4.21 | $5.12 | $4.67 | $8.59 | $4.40 | $-1.17 | $-1.60 | $1.10 | $0.06 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.28 | $4.21 | $5.12 | $4.67 | $8.59 | $4.40 | $-1.17 | $-1.60 | $1.10 | $0.06 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.09 | $1.23 | $1.36 | $1.50 | $0.69 | $0.97 | $1.57 | $1.20 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.97 | $2.14 | $1.61 | $1.71 | $1.51 | $2.01 | $2.98 | $2.57 | $2.51 | $2.25 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $20.06 | $19.70 | $21.58 | $22.67 | $26.41 | $31.24 | $34.48 | $30.68 | $30.46 | $27.02 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.8%/yr | +2.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −15.6%/yr | −25.1%/yr |
| EPS | −36.8%/yr | −51.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.1%/yr | +8.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.4%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $12M of profit into $105M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $12M | ($330M) | $342M | $893M | $323M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$202M | +$199M | +$208M | +$197M | +$176M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$21M | +$13M | +$31M | +$29M | +$15M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$110M | +$209M | −$408M | −$453M | +$548M |
| Cash from operations | $345M | $91M | $173M | $666M | $1.1B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$240M | −$242M | −$285M | −$209M | −$159M |
| Owner earnings | $105M | ($151M) | ($112M) | $457M | $903M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | -2% | -1% | 5% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $21M), owner earnings is nearer $84M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 51.5×ComfortableOperating income $103M ÷ interest expense $2M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $45M · 0.4× operating profitModest net debtCash $401M − debt $446M
What this means
Netting $401M of cash and short-term investments against $446M of debt leaves $45M owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (4.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $115M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $70M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 7 + DIO 98 − DPO 24 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle9-yr median, range 2%–37%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -2%–12%; latest $105M = operating cash $345M − maintenance capex $240MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $21M of SBC) leaves $84M.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 28.75×Cash-backedCash from ops $345M ÷ net income $12M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $105M
What this means
Of $105M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.19×MaintainingCapex $240M ÷ depreciation $202M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $8.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.70×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $446M vs $929M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 8 of 9 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −98%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.08/share (latest year $0.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 10% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to 3% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −24%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2025 · 1.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −4.2%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Aug 2, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$299M
- Receivables$156M
- Inventory$1.7B
- Other current assets$208M
- Accounts payable$542M
- Other current liabilities$947M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $5.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.0B · 37%
- Dividends$1.1B · 19%
- Buybacks$2.1B · 39%
- Retained (debt / cash)$236M · 4%
- Returned to owners$3.2B
93% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.1B as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−29.4%
The diluted count fell from 135M to 95M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Ms. Dillon | $11.9M | $19.7M | $903M |
| 2022 | Ms. Dillon | $14.5M | $20.1M | $457M |
| 2023 | Ms. Dillon | $9.3M | $11.6M | ($112M) |
| 2023 | Ms. Dillon | $13.0M | $13.3M | ($112M) |
| 2024 | Ms. Dillon | $14.7M | −$1.8M | ($151M) |
| 2025 | Ms. Dillon | $12.5M | $3.1M | $105M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$21M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 20% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Foot Locker is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.6% vs 7.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.3% early in the record and −0.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$127M → $446M
Debt rose from $127M to $446M while owner earnings went from about $570M to ($53M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?18% → 24% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.4B to $1.9B while revenue grew 1%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (18% of revenue then, 24% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 9 years, $458M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Specialty Retail
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLFoot Locker | $8.0B | 32% | 7.3% | 17% | 6% |
| VSCOVictoria's Secret | $6.6B | 36% | 4.1% | 17% | 4% |
| URBNUrban Outfitters | $6.2B | 33% | 7.9% | 16% | 7% |
| AEOAmerican Eagle | $5.5B | 37% | 6.7% | 21% | 5% |
| ANFAbercrombie & Fitch | $5.3B | 73% | 3.5% | 12% | 6% |
| DBIDesigner Brands Inc. | $2.9B | 30% | 3.0% | 18% | 3% |
| GCOGenesco Inc. | $2.4B | 48% | 3.6% | 6% | 4% |
| BOOTBoot Barn Holdings | $2.3B | 35% | 10.8% | 17% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 36% | 5.4% | 17% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Foot Locker has delivered.
Through the cycle, Foot Locker earns about $508M on its 6.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $6M on 96M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-08-30; net debt $32M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← FIZZ its page in the Manual FLEX →
Industry order: ← EYE the Specialty Retail chapter FND →