Owner Scorecard


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FIBK, First Interstate BancSystem

Banks financial

Interstate Bank, we deliver a comprehensive range of banking products and services—including online and mobile banking—to individuals, businesses, government entities, and others throughout our market areas.

Our current strategy emphasizes disciplined organic growth by deepening and expanding full client relationships across deposits, lending and fee-based services.

In furtherance of our strategic plan focused on organic growth and relationship banking, we are prioritizing investment into existing market areas where we have brand density and are well positioned to serve the needs of our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FIBK · First Interstate BancSystem
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
+5.9% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $966M
Return on equity 9% 5-yr avg 8%
Return on tangible equity 13% 5-yr avg 12%
Efficiency ratio 60% 5-yr avg 64%
Equity / assets 12.9% 5-yr avg 10.9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 8%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 60% efficiency ratio, about average. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
$416M$492M$571M$638M$654M$639M$1.1B$1.0B$1000M$1.1BRevenueRevenue
$280M$350M$433M$495M$498M$489M$943M$879M$822M$825MNet interest incomeNet int.
$137M$142M$139M$143M$156M$150M$163M$147M$178M$233MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$10M$11M$9M$14M$56M($15M)$83M$32M$68M$27MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$96M$107M$160M$181M$161M$192M$202M$258M$226M$302MNet incomeNet inc.
34%32%22%23%23%22%21%24%23%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.1%0.9%1.2%1.2%0.9%1.0%0.6%0.8%0.8%1.1%Return on assetsROA
10%7%9%9%8%10%7%8%7%9%Return on equityROE
6%4%6%5%2%5%1%2%1%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
12%11%14%13%12%15%11%13%11%13%Return on tangible equityROTCE
63%66%62%61%59%63%69%64%64%60%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$9.1B$12.2B$13.3B$14.6B$17.6B$19.7B$32.3B$30.7B$29.1B$26.6BTotal assetsAssets
$7.4B$9.9B$10.7B$11.7B$14.2B$16.3B$25.1B$23.3B$23.0B$22.1BDepositsDeposits
$213M$445M$547M$622M$622M$622M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$983M$1.4B$1.7B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$3.1B$3.2B$3.3B$3.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
44.9M51.9M58.2M63.9M63.7M61.7M103M104M103M103MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.13$2.05$2.75$2.83$2.53$3.11$1.96$2.48$2.19$2.94EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.88$0.94$1.10$1.24$2.02$1.65$1.76$1.88$1.90$1.89Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$21.88$27.51$29.10$31.52$30.75$32.18$29.74$31.10$32.02$33.52Book value / shareBVPS
$17.14$18.94$19.71$21.79$21.00$21.44$18.15$19.71$20.70$22.30Tangible book / shareTBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.67 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.2%/yr+0.1%/yr
EPS+3.6%/yr+3.0%/yr
Dividends / share+8.9%/yr−1.3%/yr
Book value / share+4.9%/yr+1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
103Mpeak FY2023
Revenue
$1.1Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $302M ÷ equity $3.4B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Solid
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $1.1B − intangibles $53M)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Efficient (<65%)
    Noninterest expense $640M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 57%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 12.9%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $3.4B ÷ assets $26.6B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $22.1B ÷ assets $26.6B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 3%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $27M ÷ net interest income $825M
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our success in the competitive environment in which we operate requires consistent investment of capital and human resources in innovation and technology, particularly in light of the current "FinTech" environment, in which financial institutions are investing significantly in new technologies, such as AI, machine lear…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$100K
'27$200K
'28$200K
'29$4M
'30$0
later$142M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$100Kthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$300Kthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$4Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$146Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$1.2B
Together, against $100K due next year12087.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $1.2B against the $100K due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 12087 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Kevin P. Riley$3.2M$2.3M$192M
2022Kevin P. Riley$4.6M$4.2M$202M
2023Kevin P. Riley$3.4M$2.0M$258M
2024James A. Reuter$2.5M$2.7M$226M
2024Kevin P. Riley$4.9M$4.3M$226M
2025James A. Reuter$4.6M$4.7M$302M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$13M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
GBFHGBank Financial Holdings Inc.$1.2B13%13%59%3.7%
ABCBAmeris Bancorp$1.2B10%14%55%3.2%
HOMBHome BancShares$1.1B11%17%42%3.7%
UCBUnited Community Banks Inc.$1.1B9%12%57%3.0%
FIBKFirst Interstate BancSystem$1.1B8%13%63%2.9%
GBCIGlacier Bancorp$1.0B10%13%59%3.1%
CBCCentral Bancompany Inc.$1.0B10%11%49%3.8%
RNSTRenasant Corporation$986M7%12%65%3.0%
Group median10%13%58%3.1%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what First Interstate BancSystem’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered1%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity13%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $2.3B on 97M shares, a 13% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "First Interstate BancSystem (FIBK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FIBK, data as of 2026-07-09.

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