Owner Scorecard


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FICO, Fair Isaac

Fair Isaac Corporation is a global analytics software leader.

Today, FICO's software and the widely used FICO Score operationalize analytics, enabling thousands of businesses in more than 80 countries to uncover new opportunities, make timely decisions that matter, and execute them at scale.

Most leading banks and credit card issuers rely on our solutions, as do insurers, retailers, telecommunications providers, automotive lenders, consumer reporting agencies, public agencies, and organizations in other industries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FICO · Fair Isaac
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.0B
+15.9% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.3B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Gross margin 84% 5-yr avg 79%
Operating margin 50.4% 5-yr avg 41.9%
ROIC 66% 5-yr avg 51%
Owner-earnings margin 40% 5-yr avg 35%
Free cash flow margin 40% 5-yr avg 35%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Scores (59%) and Software (41%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 72% and operating margin about 23% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 18% to 46% — on a steadier 72% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 7.5% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 35%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 29% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Scores at 59%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Scores59%$1.2B
  • Software41%$822M
By geographyAmericas87%EMEA8%Asia Pacific5%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$881M$935M$1.0B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$2.0B$2.3BRevenueRevenue
70%69%69%71%72%75%78%79%80%82%84%Gross marginGross mgn
37%36%38%36%33%30%28%26%27%26%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
12%12%13%13%13%13%11%11%10%9%9%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$170M$182M$175M$254M$296M$505M$542M$643M$734M$925M$1.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.2%19.5%17.5%21.9%22.9%38.4%39.4%42.5%42.7%46.5%50.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$109M$133M$126M$192M$236M$392M$374M$429M$513M$652M$760MNet incomeNet inc.
24%15%19%11%8%17%21%22%20%19%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$210M$226M$223M$260M$365M$424M$509M$469M$633M$779M$907MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$32M$36M$30M$32M$30M$26M$20M$15M$14M$15M$16MDepreciationDeprec.
$14M($5M)($8M)($46M)$4M($106M)$89K($99M)($43M)($45M)($32M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$22M$20M$31M$24M$22M$8M$6M$4M$9M$9M$6MCapexCapex
2.5%2.1%3.1%2.1%1.7%0.6%0.4%0.3%0.5%0.4%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$188M$206M$192M$236M$343M$416M$503M$465M$624M$770M$901MOwner earningsOwner earn.
21.4%22.0%19.2%20.4%26.5%31.6%36.6%30.7%36.3%38.7%39.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$188M$206M$192M$236M$343M$416M$503M$465M$624M$770M$901MFree cash flowFCF
21.4%22.0%19.2%20.4%26.5%31.6%36.6%30.7%36.3%38.7%39.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M$0$0$16M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2M$1M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$138M$188M$343M$229M$235M$874M$1.1B$406M$822M$1.4BBuybacksBuybacks
13%16%15%22%27%44%47%48%53%64%66%ROICROIC
23%29%44%66%71%Return on equityROE
22%28%44%66%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$87M$119M$108M$127M$183M$227M$158M$170M$196M$189M$294MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$168M$169M$267M$297M$334M$312M$322M$388M$427M$529M$620MReceivablesReceiv.
$23M$20M$20M$23M$23M$21M$17M$19M$22M$32M$36MAccounts payablePayables
$145M$149M$246M$274M$311M$291M$305M$369M$404M$497M$584MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$268M$311M$396M$456M$534M$551M$485M$556M$617M$705M$901MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$246M$327M$474M$491M$415M$559M$331M$368M$380M$849M$405MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.0×0.8×0.9×1.3×1.0×1.5×1.5×1.6×0.8×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$798M$804M$801M$804M$812M$788M$761M$773M$783M$783M$781MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0BTotal assetsAssets
$571M$605M$764M$825M$834M$1.3B$1.9B$1.9B$2.2B$3.1B$3.6BTotal debtDebt
$484M$485M$656M$698M$652M$1.0B$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.9B$3.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.4×7.1×5.6×6.4×7.0×12.6×7.9×6.7×6.9×6.9×7.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$481M$466M$287M$290M$331M($111M)($802M)($688M)($963M)($1.7B)($2.1B)Shareholders’ equityEquity
6.3%6.5%7.5%7.2%7.2%8.5%8.4%8.2%8.7%7.9%7.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
32.3M32.2M31.2M30.3M29.9M29.3M26.3M25.4M25.1M24.6M23.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$27.28$29.00$32.08$38.29$43.25$44.99$52.27$59.67$68.48$81.06$94.57Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.39$4.14$4.06$6.34$7.90$13.40$14.18$16.93$20.45$26.54$31.85EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.83$6.38$6.15$7.80$11.46$14.23$19.11$18.32$24.88$31.35$37.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.83$6.38$6.15$7.80$11.46$14.23$19.11$18.32$24.88$31.35$37.77Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08$0.04$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.68$0.61$1.00$0.79$0.73$0.26$0.23$0.17$0.35$0.36$0.27Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.90$14.46$9.22$9.57$11.06$-3.79$-30.44$-27.12$-38.39$-71.08$-88.10Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.9%/yr+13.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+20.6%/yr+22.3%/yr
EPS+25.7%/yr+27.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−6.7%/yr−13.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
25Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
64%low FY2016
Gross margin
82%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.7×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$770Mowner earningsvs.$652Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $652M of profit into $770M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$652M
Owner earnings$770M · 39% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$652M$513M$429M$374M$392M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$15M+$14M+$15M+$20M+$26M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$157M+$149M+$124M+$115M+$112M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$45M−$43M−$99M+$89K−$106M
Cash from operations$779M$633M$469M$509M$424M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$9M−$9M−$4M−$6M−$8M
Owner earnings$770M$624M$465M$503M$416M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue39%36%31%37%32%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $157M), owner earnings is nearer $613M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $925M ÷ interest expense $134M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.9B · 3.1× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $134M + ST investments $22M − debt $3.1B
    What this means

    Netting $156M of cash and short-term investments against $3.1B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 3.1× a year's operating profit (3.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $55M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $2.8B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 97 + DIO 0 − DPO 33 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 13%–64%; 64% latest = NOPAT $751M ÷ invested capital $1.2B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 64% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 19%–39%; latest $770M = operating cash $779M − maintenance capex $9M
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 39% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $157M of SBC) leaves $613M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $779M ÷ net income $652M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $770M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $770M of Owner Earnings, $1.4B (184%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.4B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $157M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.3B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.60×
    Harvesting
    Capex $9M ÷ depreciation $15M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.83×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.1B vs ($144M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +332%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $22.91/share (latest year $28.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-75.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 44% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 19% early to 44% lately, median 23% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · 17.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$901M
  • Cash & short-term investments$241M
  • Receivables$620M
  • Other current assets$39M
Current liabilities$405M
  • Accounts payable$36M
  • Other current liabilities$369M
Current ratio2.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$495Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+38.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.7B$27M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$185Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$155M · 4%
  • Dividends$4M · 0%
  • Buybacks$5.8B · 140%
  • Returned to owners$5.8B

    146% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4M as dividends and $5.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$1.8B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.8B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $571M to $3.6B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $5.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−26.2%

    The diluted count fell from 32M to 24M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$783M42% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$22Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $155M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Lansing$19.4M$18.4M$416M
2022Mr. Lansing$18.9M$29.5M$503M
2023Mr. Lansing$66.3M$155.2M$465M
2024Mr. Lansing$35.6M$268.0M$624M
2025Mr. Lansing$36.0M−$38.9M$770M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio368:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$157M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Fair Isaac is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$571M → $3.6B

    Debt rose from $571M to $3.6B while owner earnings went from about $195M to $620M — about 2.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 27% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $168M to $620M while revenue grew 156%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 27% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FOURShift4 Payments$4.2B23%1.9%-1%9%
CARTMaplebear Inc.$3.7B74%2.4%21%18%
MSCIMSCI Inc.$3.1B80%52.3%38%46%
ETSYEtsy Inc.$2.9B70%10.5%24%26%
ZZillow Group Inc. Class C Capital Stock$2.6B78%-8.9%-3%10%
EXLSExlService$2.1B86%12.5%14%12%
FICOFair Isaac$2.0B73%30.6%35%29%
HQYHealthEquity$1.3B60%14.0%5%24%
Group median74%11.5%18%21%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Fair Isaac has delivered.

Fair Isaac’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Fair Isaac earns about $569M on its 28.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 38.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $901M on 23M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net debt $3.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Fair Isaac (FICO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FICO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FIBK its page in the Manual FIG →

Industry order: ← FI the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter FIS →