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FI, Fiserv Inc

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive Serial acquirer

A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

FI · Fiserv Inc

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$21.2B

+3.6% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $21.1B 5-yr avg $18.9B

Operating margin 25.3% 5-yr avg 23.5%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin 25% 5-yr avg 22%

Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 60% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 87% and operating margin about 26% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$5.5B	$5.7B	$5.8B	$10.2B	$14.9B	$16.2B	$17.7B	$19.1B	$20.5B	$21.2B	$21.1B	RevenueRevenue
86%	87%	87%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	97%	Gross marginGross mgn
20%	20%	21%	32%	38%	36%	34%	34%	32%	32%	34%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$3.7B	$5.0B	$5.9B	$5.8B	$5.3B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
26.2%	26.9%	30.1%	15.8%	12.5%	14.1%	21.1%	26.3%	28.7%	27.5%	25.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$930M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$893M	$958M	$1.3B	$2.5B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.5B	$3.2B	Net incomeNet inc.
35%	11%	24%	18%	17%	21%	18%	20%	17%	19%	17%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.8B	$4.1B	$4.0B	$4.6B	$5.2B	$6.6B	$6.1B	$6.0B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$421M	$444M	$556M	$1.8B	$3.3B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$589M	$669M	$669M	DepreciationDeprec.
$12M	($270M)	($264M)	($105M)	($437M)	($787M)	($1.4B)	($1.4B)	$2.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$290M	$287M	$360M	$721M	$900M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.9B	CapexCapex
5.3%	5.0%	6.2%	7.1%	6.1%	7.1%	8.3%	7.3%	7.7%	8.3%	8.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$2.1B	$3.2B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.8B	$6.0B	$5.4B	$5.3B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
20.7%	21.0%	20.5%	20.4%	21.9%	17.7%	17.7%	19.8%	29.5%	25.4%	25.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$2.1B	$3.2B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.8B	$5.1B	$4.3B	$4.1B	Free cash flowFCF
20.7%	21.0%	20.5%	20.4%	21.9%	17.7%	17.7%	19.8%	24.7%	20.3%	19.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$265M	$384M	$712M	$15.1B	$139M	$848M	$988M	$13M	$0	$820M	$504M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.9B	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
13%	18%	16%	2%	3%	3%	6%	8%	10%	9%	8%	ROICROIC
37%	46%	52%	3%	3%	4%	8%	10%	12%	13%	12%	Return on equityROE
37%	46%	52%	3%	3%	4%	8%	10%	12%	13%	12%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
—	—	—	$893M	$906M	$835M	$902M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$798M	$829M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$902M	$997M	$1.0B	$2.8B	$2.5B	$2.9B	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.7B	$4.0B	$3.9B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$110M	$80M	$127M	$392M	$437M	$593M	$652M	$449M	$511M	$797M	$930M	Accounts payablePayables
$792M	$917M	$922M	$2.4B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.0B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$17.0B	$16.2B	$18.9B	$27.5B	$34.8B	$23.5B	$24.7B	$24.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$15.7B	$15.6B	$18.3B	$26.5B	$33.6B	$22.2B	$23.9B	$23.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	1.0×	1.1×	1.1×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.0×	1.1×	1.0×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.4B	$5.6B	$5.7B	$36.0B	$36.3B	$36.4B	$36.8B	$37.2B	$36.6B	$37.7B	$37.6B	GoodwillGoodwill
$9.7B	$10.3B	$11.3B	$77.5B	$74.6B	$76.2B	$83.9B	$90.9B	$77.2B	$80.1B	$80.5B	Total assetsAssets
$4.6B	$4.9B	$6.0B	$21.9B	$20.7B	$21.4B	$21.5B	$23.3B	$25.0B	$29.0B	$29.0B	Total debtDebt
$4.6B	$4.9B	$6.0B	$21.0B	$19.8B	$20.5B	$20.6B	$22.1B	$23.8B	$28.2B	$28.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
8.9×	8.7×	9.1×	3.2×	2.6×	3.3×	5.0×	5.0×	4.7×	3.8×	3.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.3B	$33.0B	$32.3B	$31.0B	$30.8B	$29.9B	$27.1B	$25.8B	$26.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.1%	1.3%	2.2%	2.5%	1.5%	1.8%	1.8%	1.8%	1.7%	1.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
448M	431M	414M	523M	683M	672M	648M	616M	582M	549M	535M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$12.29	$13.21	$14.08	$19.49	$21.73	$24.16	$27.38	$31.00	$35.14	$38.60	$39.39	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.08	$2.89	$2.87	$1.71	$1.40	$1.99	$3.90	$4.98	$5.38	$6.34	$5.98	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.55	$2.77	$2.88	$3.97	$4.75	$4.28	$4.84	$6.13	$10.38	$9.82	$9.98	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.55	$2.77	$2.88	$3.97	$4.75	$4.28	$4.84	$6.13	$8.70	$7.83	$7.71	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.65	$0.67	$0.87	$1.38	$1.32	$1.73	$2.28	$2.25	$2.70	$3.21	$3.52	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.67	$6.33	$5.54	$63.11	$47.31	$46.09	$47.58	$48.48	$46.50	$46.98	$48.94	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.6%/yr	+12.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+16.2%/yr	+15.6%/yr
EPS	+13.2%/yr	+35.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+19.5%/yr	+19.5%/yr
Book value / share	+26.5%/yr	−0.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

549Mpeak FY2020

ROIC

9%low FY2019

Gross margin

87%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

5.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$5.4Bowner earningsvs.$3.5Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $5.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $669M it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $4.3B.

Reported net income$3.5B

Owner earnings$5.4B · 25% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$3.5B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$2.5B	$1.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$669M	+$589M	+$3.2B	+$3.2B	+$3.2B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$357M	+$367M	+$342M	+$323M	+$239M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.6B	+$2.5B	−$1.4B	−$1.4B	−$787M
Cash from operations	$6.1B	$6.6B	$5.2B	$4.6B	$4.0B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$669M	−$589M	−$1.4B	−$1.5B	−$1.2B
Owner earnings	$5.4B	$6.0B	$3.8B	$3.1B	$2.9B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$1.1B	−$980M	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$4.3B	$5.1B	$3.8B	$3.1B	$2.9B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	25%	30%	20%	18%	18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $669M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $357M), owner earnings is nearer $5.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.8×

Adequate

Operating income $5.8B ÷ interest expense $1.5B

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $28.2B · 4.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $798M − debt $29.0B

What this means
Netting $798M of cash and short-term investments against $29.0B of debt leaves $28.2B owed, about 4.8× a year's operating profit (5.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -322d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 390 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range 2%–18%; 9% latest = NOPAT $4.7B ÷ invested capital $54.0B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 20%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 18%–30%; latest $5.4B = operating cash $6.1B − maintenance capex $669M

Industry peers: median 22%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 25% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $4.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $357M of SBC) leaves $5.0B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.74×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $6.1B ÷ net income $3.5B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 36%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $1.9B ÷ Owner Earnings $5.4B

What this means
Of $5.4B Owner Earnings, $1.9B (36%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.9B buybacks. Net of $357M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.6B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.64×

Expanding

Capex $1.8B ÷ depreciation $669M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $21.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $29.0B vs $764M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +188%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.05/share (latest year $6.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $48.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 28% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 28% early, 27% lately, median 26%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +19%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 19% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 12.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +2.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$24.8B

Cash & short-term investments$829M
Receivables$3.9B
Other current assets$20.1B

Current liabilities$23.4B

Debt due within a year$1.3B
Accounts payable$930M
Other current liabilities$21.2B

Current ratio1.06×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.06×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$1.3B due · $829M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($21.4B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($29.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$6.1B$761M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$1.1Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $37.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$9.9B · 26%
Buybacks$4.4B · 12%
Retained (debt / cash)$23.6B · 62%

Returned to owners$4.4B
15% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $4.4B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $24.4B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $4.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count19.6%
The diluted count rose from 448M to 535M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained27%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($14.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $3.9B, so each retained $1 added about 0.27 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$47.9B60% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$19.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $9.9B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$20.4M	$10.7M	$2.9B
2022	$17.8M	$21.3M	$3.1B
2023	$27.9M	$59.9M	$3.8B
2024	$23.8M	$70.7M	$6.0B
2025	$70.3M	$20.8M	$5.4B
2025	$26.4M	$273k	$5.4B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$357M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Fiserv Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?19.6%
Diluted shares grew 19.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $4.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4.6B → $29.0B
Debt rose from $4.6B to $29.0B while owner earnings went from about $1.2B to $5.1B — about 3.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $239M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FIFiserv Inc	$21.2B	87%	26.3%	8%	21%
URIUnited Rentals	$16.1B	40%	24.4%	11%	31%
GPNGlobal Payments Inc.	$7.7B	59%	16.0%	4%	25%
EQPTEquipmentShare.com Inc	$4.4B	28%	6.8%	6%	-1%
AKAMAkamai	$4.2B	64%	17.7%	9%	26%
ALLEAllegion	$4.1B	44%	19.4%	23%	15%
CSGPCoStar Group Inc.	$3.2B	79%	17.7%	9%	21%
CTEVClaritev Corporation	$965M	—	9.9%	-1%	22%
Group median	—	59%	17.7%	9%	22%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Fiserv Inc has delivered.

Fiserv Inc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Fiserv Inc earns about $4.4B on its 20.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 25.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($4.4B) Net of stock comp (−$351M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($5.3B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $4.1B on 533M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $28.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.9B) runs well above depreciation ($669M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh FI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Fiserv Inc (FI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FHN its page in the Manual FIBK →

Industry order: ← EXLS the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter FICO →