Owner Scorecard


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FLEX, Flex Ltd.

Flex is the advanced, end-to-end manufacturing partner of choice that helps a diverse customer base design, build, deliver and manage products that improve the world.

Through the collective strength of a global workforce across approximately 30 countries with responsible, sustainable operations, we deliver technology innovation, supply chain, and manufacturing solutions to diverse industries and end markets.

The Company's full suite of specialized capabilities includes design and engineering, supply chain, manufacturing, and integrated services, plus a portfolio of power and cooling products.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
FLEX · Flex Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$27.9B
+8.1% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $27.9B 5-yr avg $26.7B
Gross margin 9% 5-yr avg 8%
Operating margin 4.9% 5-yr avg 4.0%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 7.0% and operating margin about 3.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 0.7% to 4.9% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$23.9B$25.4B$26.2B$24.2B$24.1B$24.6B$28.5B$26.4B$25.8B$27.9B$27.9BRevenueRevenue
7%7%6%6%7%7%7%8%9%9%9%Gross marginGross mgn
4%4%4%3%3%3%3%3%4%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$479M$644M$182M$415M$795M$890M$1.0B$853M$1.2B$1.4B$1.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.0%2.5%0.7%1.7%3.3%3.6%3.6%3.2%4.5%4.9%4.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$320M$429M$93M$88M$613M$936M$793M$1.0B$838M$880M$880MNet incomeNet inc.
14%18%49%45%14%9%14%18%23%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($3.8B)($3.9B)($3.0B)($1.5B)$144M$1.0B$950M$1.3B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$432M$434M$433M$422M$422M$409M$414M$431M$439M$457M$457MDepreciationDeprec.
($4.7B)($4.8B)($3.6B)($2.1B)($970M)($412M)($390M)($263M)$103M$206M$206MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$525M$562M$726M$462M$351M$443M$635M$530M$438M$633M$633MCapexCapex
2.2%2.2%2.8%1.9%1.5%1.8%2.2%2.0%1.7%2.3%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($4.3B)($4.4B)($3.7B)($2.0B)($207M)$581M$315M$796M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−18.2%−17.4%−14.1%−8.2%−0.9%2.4%1.1%3.0%4.1%3.8%3.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($4.3B)($4.4B)($3.7B)($2.0B)($207M)$581M$315M$796M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BFree cash flowFCF
−18.2%−17.4%−14.1%−8.2%−0.9%2.4%1.1%3.0%4.1%3.8%3.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$189M$268M$13M$1M$0$539M$0$0$405M$40M$40MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$350M$180M$189M$260M$183M$686M$337M$1.3B$1.3B$944MBuybacksBuybacks
10%12%2%15%15%15%14%15%16%16%ROICROIC
12%14%3%3%18%23%15%19%17%17%17%Return on equityROE
12%14%3%3%18%23%15%19%17%17%17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.8B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$2.6B$3.0B$3.2B$2.5B$2.3B$2.4B$2.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.2B$2.5B$2.6B$2.4B$4.0B$3.4B$3.5B$3.0B$3.7B$4.7B$4.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$3.4B$3.8B$3.7B$3.8B$3.9B$6.6B$7.4B$6.2B$5.1B$5.8B$5.8BInventoryInvent.
$4.5B$5.1B$5.1B$5.1B$5.2B$6.3B$5.7B$4.5B$5.1B$8.1B$8.1BAccounts payablePayables
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$2.6B$3.7B$5.1B$4.8B$3.6B$2.5B$2.5BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$8.4B$9.2B$9.1B$9.1B$11.4B$14.3B$16.0B$13.0B$12.8B$16.3B$16.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$6.5B$7.3B$7.6B$7.2B$7.8B$10.7B$10.9B$8.5B$9.8B$12.0B$12.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.5×1.3×1.5×1.5×1.3×1.4×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$985M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$12.6B$13.7B$13.5B$13.7B$15.8B$19.3B$21.4B$18.3B$18.4B$22.1B$22.1BTotal assetsAssets
$3.4B$2.9B$3.1B$2.8B$3.8B$4.2B$3.7B$3.3B$3.7B$3.8B$3.8BTotal debtDebt
$1.6B$1.5B$1.4B$915M$1.1B$1.2B$530M$787M$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.4×5.2×57.6×5.4×4.4×4.1×5.4×6.4×6.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.6B$3.0B$3.0B$2.8B$3.4B$4.1B$5.4B$5.3B$5.0B$5.1B$5.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.5%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
546M537M530M512M506M483M462M441M398M378M378MShares out (diluted)Shares
$43.69$47.41$49.45$47.29$47.68$51.00$61.69$59.90$64.86$73.85$73.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.59$0.80$0.18$0.17$1.21$1.94$1.72$2.28$2.11$2.33$2.33EPS (diluted)EPS
$-7.96$-8.25$-6.98$-3.90$-0.41$1.20$0.68$1.80$2.68$2.78$2.78Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-7.96$-8.25$-6.98$-3.90$-0.41$1.20$0.68$1.80$2.68$2.78$2.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.96$1.05$1.37$0.90$0.69$0.92$1.37$1.20$1.10$1.67$1.67Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.84$5.63$5.61$5.53$6.79$8.55$11.58$12.07$12.57$13.61$13.61Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.0%/yr+9.1%/yr
EPS+16.6%/yr+14.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.4%/yr+19.3%/yr
Book value / share+12.2%/yr+14.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
378Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
16%low FY2019
Gross margin
9%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.3×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.1Bowner earningsvs.$880Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2021FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $880M of profit into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$880M
Owner earnings$1.1B · 4% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$880M$838M$1.0B$793M$936M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$457M+$439M+$431M+$414M+$409M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$142M+$125M+$152M+$133M+$91M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$206M+$103M−$263M−$390M−$412M
Cash from operations$1.7B$1.5B$1.3B$950M$1.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$633M−$438M−$530M−$635M−$443M
Owner earnings$1.1B$1.1B$796M$315M$581M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%4%3%1%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $142M), owner earnings is nearer $910M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $215M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.4B · 1.0× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $2.4B − debt $3.8B
    What this means

    Netting $2.4B of cash and short-term investments against $3.8B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 61 + DIO 84 − DPO 116 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 2%–16%; 16% latest = NOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $6.5B
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $633M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -1%)
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $142M of SBC) leaves $910M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.7B ÷ net income $880M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $944M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B
    What this means

    Of $1.1B Owner Earnings, $944M (90%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $944M buybacks. Net of $142M stock comp, the real buyback was about $802M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.39×
    Expanding
    Capex $633M ÷ depreciation $457M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $27.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.36×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.8B vs $4.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +224%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.48/share (latest year $2.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.04/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 31%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2019 · 0.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −4.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Any reduction in the rate of AI adoption, shifts in customer investment priorities, or technological developments that reduce demand for high-density computing infrastructure would adversely affect demand for our products and services.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$16.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.4B
  • Receivables$4.7B
  • Inventory$5.8B
  • Other current assets$3.4B
Current liabilities$12.0B
  • Accounts payable$8.1B
  • Other current liabilities$4.0B
Current ratio1.36×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.87×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($584M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.5B$714M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.5B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$745Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'27$0
'28$898M
'29$30M
'30$683M
'31$701M
later$1.5B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2031, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$898Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$898Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'27$176M
'28$156M
'29$127M
'30$100M
'31$79M
later$176M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$176Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$814Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$714Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3.8B
Lease obligations (present value)$714M
Total fixed claims on the business$4.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.5B, of which the leases are 16%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Revathi Advaithi$14.4M$16.5M$581M
2023Revathi Advaithi$15.6M$30.3M$315M
2024Revathi Advaithi$15.1M$48.3M$796M
2025Revathi Advaithi$16.4M$26.8M$1.1B
2026Revathi Advaithi$44.4M$169.4M$1.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$142M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Flex Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-0.93×

    Across the record the business reported $6.0B of net income but generated ($5.6B) of operating cash, a -0.93-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?23% → 38% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $5.6B to $10.5B while revenue grew 17%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (23% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$12.6B · 45% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Our ten largest customers during fiscal years 2026 and 2025 accounted for 45% and 44% of net sales, respectively.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMDAdvanced Micro Devices$34.6B45%7.2%6%7%
JBLJabil Inc.$29.8B8%3.2%18%2%
AMATApplied Materials Inc.$28.4B46%27.9%36%22%
FLEXFlex Ltd.$27.9B7%3.3%15%0%
APHAmphenol Corporation$23.1B32%20.4%18%14%
CLSCelestica Inc.$12.4B10%5.2%19%3%
NXPINXP Semiconductors N.V.$12.3B55%24.8%17%21%
SANMSanmina Corporation$8.1B8%3.6%12%3%
Group median21%6.2%17%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Flex Ltd. has delivered.

Flex Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Flex Ltd. earns about $34M on its 0.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+24%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.1B on 366M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-14; net debt $1.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 378M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Flex Ltd. (FLEX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FLEX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FL its page in the Manual FLG →

Industry order: ← FEIM the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter FTV →