Owner Scorecard


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FRPT, Freshpet

Food Products consumer brand

We price our products to be accessible to the average consumer, providing us with broad demographic appeal and allowing us to penetrate multiple classes of retail, including grocery, mass, international, digital, pet specialty, and club.

We position our brand to benefit from mainstream trends of growing pet humanization and consumer focus on health and wellness.

Consumers are increasingly purchasing fresh, natural and organic food products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FRPT · Freshpet
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
+13.0% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $773M
Gross margin 41% 5-yr avg 37%
Operating margin 8.1% 5-yr avg −1.5%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg −0%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg −0%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg −29%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −1.8% through the cycle on a 41% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Capital spending runs about 23% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$130M$152M$193M$246M$319M$425M$595M$767M$975M$1.1B$1.1BRevenueRevenue
47%48%47%46%42%38%31%33%41%41%41%Gross marginGross mgn
48%49%49%47%42%44%40%37%37%34%33%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($2M)($3M)($5M)($253K)($2M)($25M)($52M)($30M)$38M$76M$92MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−1.7%−1.8%−2.5%−0.1%−0.6%−5.8%−8.7%−4.0%3.9%6.9%8.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($3M)($4M)($5M)($1M)($3M)($30M)($59M)($34M)$47M$139M$200MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$13M$10M$19M$16M$21M$647K($43M)$76M$154M$161M$196MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$13M$14M$16M$21M$29M$34M$58M$69M$86M$89MDepreciationDeprec.
$2M($3M)$3M($6M)($7M)($24M)($44M)$26M($14M)($79M)($108M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$30M$13M$16M$71M$135M$322M$230M$239M$187M$148M$149MCapexCapex
23.1%8.5%8.4%28.7%42.2%75.7%38.6%31.2%19.2%13.4%13.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3M($3M)$2M$717K$388K($29M)($78M)$18M$85M$74M$107MOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.2%−1.8%1.2%0.3%0.1%−6.8%−13.0%2.3%8.7%6.7%9.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($17M)($3M)$2M($54M)($113M)($321M)($273M)($163M)($33M)$12M$47MFree cash flowFCF
−13.2%−1.8%1.2%−22.1%−35.6%−75.5%−45.9%−21.3%−3.4%1.1%4.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-2%-2%-3%-0%-0%-3%-5%-2%3%6%7%ROICROIC
-3%-4%-4%-1%-1%-4%-6%-4%4%12%16%Return on equityROE
−3%−4%−4%−1%−1%−4%−6%−4%4%12%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4M$2M$8M$9M$67M$73M$153M$297M$269M$278M$381MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$9M$13M$12M$19M$18M$35M$58M$57M$68M$64M$65MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$10M$9M$13M$19M$36M$58M$63M$81M$77M$81MInventoryInvent.
$7M$9M$9M$19M$16M$43M$55M$36M$39M$42M$35MAccounts payablePayables
$7M$14M$12M$12M$21M$28M$61M$84M$110M$98M$110MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$19M$27M$31M$54M$109M$150M$262M$427M$437M$436M$542MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$19M$17M$18M$42M$33M$59M$90M$89M$99M$79M$88MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.6×1.7×1.3×3.3×2.6×2.9×4.8×4.4×5.5×6.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$126M$134M$140M$236M$434M$784M$1.1B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$1.8BTotal assetsAssets
$54M$0$0$393M$395M$397M$398MTotal debtDebt
$45M($67M)($153M)$96M$127M$119M$17MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.2×-3.0×-16.5×-0.3×-1.6×-8.6×-10.0×-2.2×3.1×5.4×6.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$108M$117M$121M$131M$394M$720M$1.0B$953M$1.1B$1.2B$1.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
3.2%2.9%3.5%3.2%3.4%5.9%4.4%3.3%5.3%1.3%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
33.7M34.5M35.3M36.0M39.8M42.9M46.2M48.2M50.3M56.0M56.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.85$4.42$5.47$6.84$8.02$9.91$12.89$15.92$19.40$19.67$20.27Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.09$-0.12$-0.15$-0.04$-0.08$-0.69$-1.29$-0.70$0.93$2.48$3.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.09$-0.08$0.07$0.02$0.01$-0.67$-1.68$0.37$1.69$1.32$1.90Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.51$-0.08$0.07$-1.51$-2.85$-7.49$-5.92$-3.39$-0.65$0.22$0.83Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.89$0.38$0.46$1.96$3.38$7.50$4.98$4.96$3.72$2.64$2.66Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.20$3.39$3.44$3.65$9.91$16.77$22.33$19.80$21.00$21.57$22.51Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+19.9%/yr+19.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+35.4%/yr+167.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.9%/yr−4.8%/yr
Book value / share+23.6%/yr+16.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income+99.1%
    “Income from Operations As a result of the factors discussed above, income from operations increased by $37.7 million to $75.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 as compared to $38.0 million in the prior year.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
56Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
6%low FY2022
Gross margin
41%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$74Mowner earningsvs.$139Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $74M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $86M it takes just to hold its position. It put $62M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $12M.

Reported net income$139M
Owner earnings$74M · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$139M$47M($34M)($59M)($30M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$86M+$69M+$58M+$34M+$29M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$14M+$52M+$25M+$26M+$25M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$79M−$14M+$26M−$44M−$24M
Cash from operations$161M$154M$76M($43M)$647K
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$86M−$69M−$58M−$34M−$29M
Owner earnings$74M$85M$18M($78M)($29M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$62M−$118M−$181M−$196M−$293M
Free cash flow$12M($33M)($163M)($273M)($321M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%9%2%-13%-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $86M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $62M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $60M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $76M ÷ interest expense $14M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $119M · 1.6× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $278M − debt $397M
    What this means

    Netting $278M of cash and short-term investments against $397M of debt leaves $119M owed, about 1.6× a year's operating profit (5.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 21 + DIO 43 − DPO 24 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -5%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT $76M ÷ invested capital $1.3B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $74M = operating cash $161M − maintenance capex $86M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. It chose to put $62M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $12M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $60M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $161M ÷ net income $139M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $256K ÷ Owner Earnings $74M
    What this means

    Of $74M Owner Earnings, $256K (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $256K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($14M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.72×
    Expanding
    Capex $148M ÷ depreciation $86M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.54×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $397M vs $357M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.03/share (latest year $2.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −2% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 2% lately, median −2% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +113%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 113% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −8.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +5.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$542M
  • Cash & short-term investments$381M
  • Receivables$65M
  • Inventory$81M
  • Other current assets$14M
Current liabilities$88M
  • Debt due within a year$73M
  • Accounts payable$35M
Current ratio6.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio5.26×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio4.35×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$454Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$73M due · $381M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.5× → 6.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($35M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$205M$67M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$227Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $427M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.4B · 325%
  • Buybacks$256K · 0%
  • Returned to owners$256K

    0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $256K as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$964M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $964M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $256K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count66.5%

    The diluted count rose from 34M to 56M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained127%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($46M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $58M, so each retained $1 added about 1.27 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Cyr$765k−$7.1M($29M)
2022Mr. Cyr$915k−$2.7M($78M)
2023Mr. Cyr$1.6M$6.5M$18M
2024Mr. Cyr$2.3M$9.7M$85M
2025Mr. Cyr$12.5M$5.5M$74M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 18% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Freshpet is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?66.5%

    Diluted shares grew 66.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $256K on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$284M · 25% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “In 2025, our largest distributor by net sales accounted for less than 10% of our net sales and our largest customers, Walmart and Costco, accounted for 25% and 10% of our net sales, respectively.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Food Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
JJSFJ&J Snack Foods$1.6B30%7.2%10%7%
SMPLThe Simply Good Foods Company$1.5B39%15.4%8%13%
UTZUtz Brands$1.4B29%1.9%1%1%
WESTWestrock Coffee Company$1.2B18%-3.1%-7%-6%
FIZZNational Beverage$1.2B37%18.9%75%14%
JBSSJohn B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc.$1.1B19%7.8%18%6%
FRPTFreshpet$1.1B41%-1.8%-2%1%
VITLVital Farms$759M34%6.0%19%5%
Group median32%6.6%9%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Freshpet has delivered.

Freshpet’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Freshpet earns about $8M on its 0.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $47M on 49M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $17M. The if-converted diluted count is 56M, 14% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($149M) runs well above depreciation ($89M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $110M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Freshpet (FRPT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FRPT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FRPH its page in the Manual FRSH →

Industry order: ← FLO the Food Products chapter GIS →