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JBSS, John B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc.

We are one of the leading processors and distributors of tree nuts and peanuts in the United States, and we also manufacture and distribute a complete portfolio of private brand bars.

Our products are sold through three primary distribution channels, including food retailers in the consumer channel, commercial ingredient users and contract manufacturing customers.

We primarily manufacture and distribute private brand products, as well as manufacture and market nut products under the Fisher, Orchard Valley Harvest, Squirrel Brand and Southern Style Nuts brand names.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

JBSS · John B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.1B

+3.8% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $998M

Gross margin 19% 5-yr avg 20%

Operating margin 8.3% 5-yr avg 8.7%

ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 21%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 7.7% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$952M	$847M	$889M	$876M	$880M	$858M	$956M	$1000M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	RevenueRevenue
14%	17%	16%	18%	20%	22%	21%	21%	20%	18%	19%	Gross marginGross mgn
3%	4%	3%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	5%	4%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$53M	$60M	$56M	$59M	$79M	$85M	$87M	$90M	$85M	$85M	$97M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
5.6%	7.1%	6.3%	6.7%	8.9%	9.9%	9.1%	9.0%	8.0%	7.7%	8.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$30M	$36M	$33M	$39M	$54M	$60M	$62M	$63M	$60M	$59M	$67M	Net incomeNet inc.
35%	33%	34%	25%	26%	25%	24%	26%	25%	24%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$89M	$53M	$66M	$83M	$64M	$105M	$20M	$125M	$102M	$31M	$131M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$17M	$16M	$15M	$17M	$18M	$18M	$18M	$21M	$25M	$27M	$28M	DepreciationDeprec.
$40M	($2M)	$15M	$24M	($11M)	$24M	($64M)	$38M	$12M	($60M)	$32M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$15M	$11M	$13M	$15M	$15M	$25M	$18M	$21M	$28M	$51M	$82M	CapexCapex
1.6%	1.3%	1.5%	1.7%	1.7%	2.9%	1.9%	2.1%	2.7%	4.6%	7.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$74M	$42M	$53M	$68M	$49M	$86M	$2M	$104M	$73M	$4M	$103M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.8%	4.9%	6.0%	7.8%	5.5%	10.1%	0.2%	10.4%	6.9%	0.3%	8.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$74M	$42M	$53M	$68M	$49M	$80M	$2M	$104M	$73M	($20M)	$49M	Free cash flowFCF
7.8%	4.9%	6.0%	7.8%	5.5%	9.3%	0.2%	10.4%	6.9%	−1.8%	4.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$22M	—	—	$0	$0	$4M	$59M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$22M	$56M	$28M	$29M	$69M	$57M	$35M	$55M	$35M	$24M	$29M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
12%	15%	13%	16%	23%	25%	23%	22%	20%	17%	17%	ROICROIC
12%	15%	13%	16%	23%	25%	22%	22%	19%	16%	17%	Return on equityROE
3%	−9%	2%	4%	−6%	1%	10%	3%	8%	10%	10%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2M	$2M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$672K	$415K	$2M	$484K	$585K	$1M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$78M	$65M	$65M	$61M	$57M	$66M	$70M	$73M	$85M	$77M	$85M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$157M	$182M	$174M	$157M	$172M	$148M	$205M	$173M	$197M	$255M	$253M	InventoryInvent.
$44M	$50M	$60M	$43M	$36M	$49M	$48M	$43M	$53M	$60M	$73M	Accounts payablePayables
$191M	$197M	$179M	$175M	$193M	$165M	$227M	$203M	$228M	$271M	$265M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$242M	$253M	$248M	$225M	$239M	$225M	$283M	$254M	$294M	$346M	$352M	Current assetsCur. assets
$83M	$110M	$117M	$84M	$112M	$100M	$123M	$86M	$126M	$156M	$153M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×	2.3×	2.1×	2.7×	2.1×	2.2×	2.3×	3.0×	2.3×	2.2×	2.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	$10M	$10M	$10M	$10M	$10M	$12M	$12M	$12M	$12M	GoodwillGoodwill
$391M	$398M	$416M	$391M	$407M	$398M	$447M	$425M	$516M	$598M	$651M	Total assetsAssets
$32M	$29M	$35M	$28M	$20M	$15M	$11M	$8M	$7M	$16M	$45M	Total debtDebt
$30M	$27M	$33M	$26M	$19M	$14M	$11M	$6M	$7M	$15M	$43M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
15.2×	20.8×	16.2×	19.1×	39.2×	59.1×	45.5×	41.8×	33.4×	23.8×	30.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$251M	$235M	$243M	$255M	$238M	$242M	$279M	$292M	$323M	$361M	$388M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
11.3M	11.4M	11.4M	11.5M	11.5M	11.6M	11.6M	11.6M	11.7M	11.7M	11.8M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$84.01	$74.24	$77.64	$76.18	$76.29	$74.27	$82.45	$85.87	$91.28	$94.44	$98.99	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.68	$3.17	$2.84	$3.43	$4.69	$5.17	$5.33	$5.40	$5.15	$5.03	$5.70	EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.55	$3.66	$4.62	$5.95	$4.21	$7.47	$0.16	$8.93	$6.28	$0.31	$8.77	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.55	$3.66	$4.62	$5.95	$4.21	$6.88	$0.16	$8.93	$6.28	$-1.72	$4.16	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.98	$4.95	$2.48	$2.53	$5.96	$4.97	$2.98	$4.72	$2.98	$2.08	$2.48	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.33	$0.95	$1.16	$1.31	$1.30	$2.18	$1.53	$1.78	$2.42	$4.33	$7.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$22.16	$20.65	$21.22	$22.13	$20.65	$20.98	$24.05	$25.10	$27.60	$30.76	$32.96	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.3%/yr	+4.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−28.8%/yr	−40.7%/yr
EPS	+7.2%/yr	+1.4%/yr
Dividends / share	+0.5%/yr	−19.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.0%/yr	+27.1%/yr
Book value / share	+3.7%/yr	+8.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+3.8%
“Sales volume, which is defined as pounds sold to customers, increased 3.4%, also due to the Lakeville Acquisition.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

12Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

17%low FY2016

Gross margin

18%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.2×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$4Mowner earningsvs.$59Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $4M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $27M it takes just to hold its position. It put $24M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($20M).

Reported net income$59M

Owner earnings$4M · 0% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$59M	$60M	$63M	$62M	$60M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$27M	+$25M	+$21M	+$18M	+$18M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$5M	+$4M	+$4M	+$4M	+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$60M	+$12M	+$38M	−$64M	+$24M
Cash from operations	$31M	$102M	$125M	$20M	$105M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$27M	−$28M	−$21M	−$18M	−$18M
Owner earnings	$4M	$73M	$104M	$2M	$86M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$24M	—	—	—	−$7M
Free cash flow	($20M)	$73M	$104M	$2M	$80M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	0%	7%	10%	0%	10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $27M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $24M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer ($908K).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 23.8×

Comfortable

Operating income $85M ÷ interest expense $4M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $42M · 0.5× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $585K − debt $42M

What this means
Netting $585K of cash and short-term investments against $42M of debt leaves $42M owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 104d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 25 + DIO 103 − DPO 24 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 17%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 12%–25%; 16% latest = NOPAT $64M ÷ invested capital $402M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 6%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 0%–10%; latest $4M = operating cash $31M − maintenance capex $27M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put $24M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($20M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves ($908K).
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.52×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops $31M ÷ net income $59M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 675%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $24M ÷ Owner Earnings $4M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $4M of Owner Earnings, $24M (675%) went back to shareholders, $24M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.88×

Expanding

Capex $51M ÷ depreciation $27M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.22×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $42M vs $190M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +84%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.19/share (latest year $5.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 8% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −4%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 5.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 26, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$352M

Cash & short-term investments$1M
Receivables$85M
Inventory$253M
Other current assets$13M

Current liabilities$153M

Accounts payable$73M
Other current liabilities$80M

Current ratio2.30×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.65×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$199Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$372Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$89MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$68M$27M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $736M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$212M · 29%
Dividends$411M · 56%
Retained (debt / cash)$113M · 15%

Returned to owners$411M
74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $411M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Net change in share count3.8%
The diluted count rose from 11M to 12M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$2.08/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($85M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $4M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Jeffrey T. Sanfilippo	$3.5M	$2.8M	$86M
2022	Mr. Jeffrey T. Sanfilippo	$1.8M	$1.9M	$2M
2023	Mr. Jeffrey T. Sanfilippo	$2.8M	$3.6M	$104M
2024	Mr. Jeffrey T. Sanfilippo	$5.3M	$3.6M	$73M
2025	Mr. Jeffrey T. Sanfilippo	$3.9M	$1.4M	$4M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio48:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why John B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.8%
Diluted shares grew 3.8% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$780M · 67% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Sales to our five largest customers represented approximately 67%, 66% and 64% of net sales in fiscal 2025, fiscal 2024 and fiscal 2023, respectively.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Food Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
JJSFJ&J Snack Foods	$1.6B	30%	7.2%	10%	7%
SMPLThe Simply Good Foods Company	$1.5B	39%	15.4%	8%	13%
UTZUtz Brands	$1.4B	29%	1.9%	1%	1%
WESTWestrock Coffee Company	$1.2B	18%	-3.1%	-7%	-6%
FIZZNational Beverage	$1.2B	37%	18.9%	75%	14%
JBSSJohn B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc.	$1.1B	19%	7.8%	18%	6%
FRPTFreshpet	$1.1B	41%	-1.8%	-2%	1%
TRTootsie Roll Industries	$733M	36%	13.6%	9%	14%
Group median	—	33%	7.5%	8%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what John B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, John B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc. earns about $71M on its 6.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($71M) Net of stock comp (−$4M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($104M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $49M on 12M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $43M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($82M) runs well above depreciation ($28M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $104M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh JBSS against another business →

The owners of JBSS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "John B. Sanfilippo & Son Inc. (JBSS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/JBSS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← JBLU its page in the Manual JBT →

Industry order: ← JBS the Food Products chapter JJSF →