Owner Scorecard


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FSBC, Five Star Bancorp

Banks financial

Five Star Bancorp provides a broad range of banking products and services to small and medium-sized businesses, professionals, and individuals primarily in Northern California through nine branch offices.

The Bank opened a full-service branch in Walnut Creek in September 2025.

The Bank's loans and deposits are primarily within Northern California, and the Bank's primary funding source is deposits from customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FSBC · Five Star Bancorp
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$158M
+25.6% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $158M 5-yr avg $120M
Return on equity 14% 5-yr avg 16%
Return on tangible equity 14% 5-yr avg 16%
Efficiency ratio 41% 5-yr avg 41%
Equity / assets 9.4% 5-yr avg 8.8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has run high across the record (median 17%, above 12% in 5 of 6 years). It runs at a 41% efficiency ratio, lean. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
$75M$85M$110M$118M$126M$158MRevenueRevenue
$65M$78M$103M$111M$120M$152MNet interest incomeNet int.
$9M$7M$7M$8M$6M$7MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$9M$2M$7M$4M$7M$10MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$36M$42M$45M$48M$46M$62MNet incomeNet inc.
4%10%29%28%29%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.8%1.7%1.4%1.3%1.1%1.3%Return on assetsROA
27%18%18%17%12%14%Return on equityROE
−4%12%12%7%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
27%18%18%17%12%14%Return on tangible equityROTCE
38%42%37%40%43%41%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$2.0B$2.6B$3.2B$3.6B$4.1B$4.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.8B$2.3B$2.8B$3.0B$3.6B$4.2BDepositsDeposits
$134M$235M$253M$286M$397M$446MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
10.1M15.0M17.2M17.2M20.2M21.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.57$2.83$2.61$2.78$2.26$2.90EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.46$0.89$0.75$0.80$0.80Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$13.29$15.67$14.73$16.63$19.63$20.96Book value / shareBVPS
$13.29$15.67$14.73$16.63$19.63$20.96Tangible book / shareTBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.49 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.1%/yr+0.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−7.9%/yr−7.9%/yr
EPS−4.1%/yr−4.1%/yr
Dividends / share−30.6%/yr (4-yr)−30.6%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share−7.4%/yr−7.4%/yr
Book value / share+9.5%/yr+9.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
21Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$158Mlow FY2020
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Strong
    Net income $62M ÷ equity $446M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Solid
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $0 − intangibles $0)
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Low cost ratio (<58%)
    Noninterest expense $65M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 62%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 9.4%
    Adequate
    Equity $446M ÷ assets $4.8B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $4.2B ÷ assets $4.8B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 6%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $10M ÷ net interest income $152M
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership21.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$1M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
CIVBCivista Bancshares Inc.$173M10%13%66%3.2%
FBIZFirst Business Financial Services Inc.$169M12%13%65%3.3%
MVBFMVB Financial Corp.$168M8%9%80%3.0%
FCBCFirst Community Bankshares Inc. (VA)$168M10%14%58%3.6%
FSBCFive Star Bancorp$158M17%17%41%3.1%
MCBSMetroCity Bankshares Inc.$156M18%18%40%3.4%
BSRRSierra Bancorp$155M11%12%61%3.2%
CWBCCommunity West Bancshares$147M9%12%62%3.3%
Group median10%13%61%3.3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Five Star Bancorp’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered9%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity17%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $446M on 21M shares, a 17% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Five Star Bancorp (FSBC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FSBC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FRT its page in the Manual FSBW →

Industry order: ← FRST the Banks chapter FSBW →