Owner Scorecard


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GES, Guess

Textiles & Apparel consumer brand Cyclical

A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GES · Guess
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.0B
+7.9% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $2.6B
Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 42%
Operating margin 3.5% 5-yr avg 6.6%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 47%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 5.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.2% to 12% — on a steadier 37% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMNov 2025
Income statement
$2.2B$2.2B$2.4B$2.6B$2.7B$1.9B$2.6B$2.7B$2.8B$3.0B$3.1BRevenueRevenue
36%34%35%36%38%37%45%43%44%43%42%Gross marginGross mgn
30%31%31%32%32%36%33%33%34%38%38%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$121M$25M$67M$52M$141M($60M)$305M$248M$263M$174M$112MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.6%1.1%2.8%2.0%5.3%−3.2%11.8%9.2%9.5%5.8%3.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$82M$23M($8M)$14M$96M($81M)$171M$150M$198M$60M$80MNet incomeNet inc.
34%55%19%30%20%11%14%1%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$180M$72M$148M$82M$198M$209M$132M$169M$330M$122M$145MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$69M$67M$64M$68M$72M$64M$57M$61M$61M$68M$72MDepreciationDeprec.
$10M($35M)$74M($21M)$5M$208M($118M)($62M)$51M($26M)($30M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$84M$91M$85M$108M$62M$19M$64M$90M$74M$86M$83MCapexCapex
3.8%4.1%3.6%4.1%2.3%1.0%2.5%3.3%2.7%2.9%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$96M$4M$85M$13M$136M$190M$68M$108M$256M$53M$62MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.4%0.2%3.6%0.5%5.1%10.1%2.6%4.0%9.2%1.8%2.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$96M($19M)$64M($26M)$136M$190M$68M$80M$256M$36M$62MFree cash flowFCF
4.4%−0.9%2.7%−1.0%5.1%10.1%2.6%3.0%9.2%1.2%2.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M$2M$5M$6M$0$0$0$0$60M$12MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$77M$77M$76M$74M$42M$16M$37M$52M$63M$185M$61MDividends paidDiv. paid
$44M$4M$50M$24M$288M$39M$51M$187M$64M$61MBuybacksBuybacks
14%2%6%4%19%-14%78%56%66%17%ROICROIC
8%2%-1%2%15%-15%28%28%29%12%16%Return on equityROE
0%−6%−9%−7%8%−18%22%18%20%−25%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$445M$396M$367M$210M$285M$469M$416M$276M$360M$188M$154MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$222M$226M$260M$322M$327M$314M$329M$342M$315M$391M$408MReceivablesReceiv.
$312M$367M$428M$469M$393M$389M$462M$511M$466M$563M$692MInventoryInvent.
$178M$210M$264M$287M$233M$300M$326M$289M$273M$319M$333MAccounts payablePayables
$357M$383M$424M$504M$488M$403M$465M$563M$508M$635M$767MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$327M$345M$468M$543M$638M$763M$818M$763M$792M$831M$832MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.2×3.0×2.4×2.0×1.7×1.6×1.6×1.6×1.5×1.5×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$33M$34M$38M$37M$35M$37M$35M$34M$34M$33M$36MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.5B$1.7B$1.6B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8B$3.0BTotal assetsAssets
$6M$24M$42M$39M$247M$259M$66M$96M$28M$151M$300MTotal debtDebt
($439M)($372M)($325M)($171M)($37M)($210M)($349M)($180M)($332M)($37M)$145MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
62.1×13.1×27.7×15.3×8.7×-2.6×13.3×18.8×12.1×5.8×3.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.0B$969M$917M$837M$640M$544M$623M$534M$685M$505M$508MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%0.8%0.8%0.8%0.9%1.0%0.8%0.8%0.7%0.6%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
84.5M83.8M82.2M81.6M71.7M64.2M65.9M70.1M69.8M68.6M51.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$25.84$26.13$28.76$31.99$37.37$29.24$39.32$38.34$39.79$43.67$61.07Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.97$0.27$-0.10$0.17$1.34$-1.27$2.60$2.13$2.84$0.88$1.56EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.13$0.05$1.03$0.16$1.90$2.96$1.03$1.54$3.67$0.78$1.21Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.13$-0.22$0.78$-0.32$1.90$2.96$1.03$1.14$3.67$0.52$1.21Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.91$0.91$0.93$0.90$0.59$0.24$0.56$0.74$0.90$2.69$1.18Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.99$1.08$1.03$1.33$0.86$0.29$0.96$1.28$1.06$1.26$1.61Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.05$11.56$11.16$10.26$8.93$8.47$9.45$7.62$9.82$7.36$9.88Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.0%/yr+3.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−4.1%/yr−16.3%/yr
EPS−1.0%/yr−8.0%/yr
Dividends / share+12.8%/yr+35.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.6%/yr+7.8%/yr
Book value / share−5.3%/yr−3.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
69Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
66%low FY2021
Gross margin
43%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.7×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$53Mowner earningsvs.$60Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $53M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $68M it takes just to hold its position. It put $18M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $36M.

Reported net income$60M
Owner earnings$53M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$60M$198M$150M$171M($81M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$68M+$61M+$61M+$57M+$64M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$20M+$20M+$21M+$19M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$26M+$51M−$62M−$118M+$208M
Cash from operations$122M$330M$169M$132M$209M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$68M−$74M−$61M−$64M−$19M
Owner earnings$53M$256M$108M$68M$190M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$18M−$28M
Free cash flow$36M$256M$80M$68M$190M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%9%4%3%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $68M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $18M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer $34M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $174M ÷ interest expense $30M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $72M · 0.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $188M − debt $260M
    What this means

    Netting $188M of cash and short-term investments against $260M of debt leaves $72M owed, about 0.4× a year's operating profit (1.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 48 + DIO 121 − DPO 69 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -14%–78%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–10%; latest $53M = operating cash $122M − maintenance capex $68M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves $34M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $122M ÷ net income $60M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $245M ÷ Owner Earnings $53M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $53M of Owner Earnings, $245M (459%) went back to shareholders, $185M dividends, $61M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $19M stock comp, the real buyback was about $41M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.26×
    Expanding
    Capex $86M ÷ depreciation $68M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.50×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $260M vs $418M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +322%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.61/share (latest year $1.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 8% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −3.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Nov 1, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$154M
  • Receivables$408M
  • Inventory$692M
  • Other current assets$99M
Current liabilities$832M
  • Debt due within a year$571K
  • Accounts payable$333M
  • Other current liabilities$498M
Current ratio1.63×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.79×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$521Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$571K due · $154M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Nov 1, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$467Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$978M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$102Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$761M · 46%
  • Dividends$697M · 42%
  • Buybacks$811M · 49%
  • Returned to owners$1.5B

    149% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $697M as dividends and $811M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$627M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $627M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $6M to $300M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $291M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $811M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−39.1%

    The diluted count fell from 85M to 51M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.69/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Alberini$7.2M$13.6M$190M
2022Mr. Alberini$15.7M$14.3M$68M
2023Mr. Alberini$5.1M$10.0M$108M
2024Mr. Alberini$8.2M$7.3M$256M
2025Mr. Alberini$9.4M−$1.8M$53M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Guess is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$6M → $300M

    Debt rose from $6M to $300M while owner earnings went from about $62M to $139M — about 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?24% → 35% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $534M to $1.1B while revenue grew 44%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (24% of revenue then, 35% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $170M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Textiles & Apparel

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LEVILevi Strauss & Co$6.3B58%9.8%23%5%
UAUnder Armour Inc.$5.0B46%2.3%4%2%
COLMColumbia Sportswear$3.4B50%10.7%18%10%
KTBKontoor Brands Inc. Common Stock$3.2B42%12.1%16%12%
GESGuess$3.0B38%5.4%14%4%
GIIIG-III Apparel$3.0B36%6.3%9%4%
CRICarter's$2.9B43%11.0%24%9%
OXMOxford Industries$1.5B59%8.0%14%7%
Group median45%8.9%15%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Guess has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Guess earns about $114M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $62M on 52M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-12-01; net debt $145M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($83M) runs well above depreciation ($72M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $77M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Guess (GES), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GES, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GERN its page in the Manual GETY →

Industry order: ← FIGS the Textiles & Apparel chapter GIII →