Owner Scorecard


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LEVI, Levi Strauss & Co

Textiles & Apparel consumer brand Cyclical

Under our Levi's , Dockers , Levi Strauss Signature , Denizen and Beyond Yoga brands, we design, market and sell directly or through third parties and licensees products that include jeans, casual and dress pants, activewear, tops, shorts, skirts, dresses, jackets and related accessories for men, women and children around the world.

From our California Gold Rush beginnings, we have grown into one of the world's largest brand-name apparel companies.

A history of responsible business practices, rooted in our core values, has helped us build our brands and engender consumer trust around the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LEVI · Levi Strauss & Co
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$6.3B
+4.1% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.6B 5-yr avg $6.0B
Gross margin 62% 5-yr avg 59%
Operating margin 10.6% 5-yr avg 8.7%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 21%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 58% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −1.9% to 12% — on a steadier 58% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 23%, above 15% in 6 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

57% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • International57%$3.6B
  • United States43%$2.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$4.9B$5.6B$5.8B$4.5B$5.8B$6.2B$5.8B$6.0B$6.3B$6.6BRevenueRevenue
52%54%54%53%58%58%58%61%62%62%Gross marginGross mgn
42%44%44%53%46%47%50%51%51%51%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$480M$540M$567M($85M)$686M$647M$354M$263M$678M$699MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.8%9.7%9.8%−1.9%11.9%10.5%6.1%4.4%10.8%10.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$281M$283M$395M($127M)$554M$569M$250M$211M$578M$639MNet incomeNet inc.
19%43%17%5%12%6%3%19%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$526M$420M$412M$470M$737M$228M$436M$898M$530M$774MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$117M$120M$124M$142M$143M$159M$165M$193M$206M$220MDepreciationDeprec.
$101M($1M)($162M)$404M($20M)($561M)($54M)$432M($336M)($162M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$119M$159M$175M$130M$167M$267M$314M$228M$221M$215MCapexCapex
2.4%2.9%3.0%2.9%2.9%4.3%5.4%3.8%3.5%3.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$407M$300M$288M$339M$570M$69M$270M$671M$308M$559MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.3%5.4%5.0%7.6%9.9%1.1%4.6%11.1%4.9%8.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$407M$261M$237M$339M$570M($39M)$122M$671M$308M$559MFree cash flowFCF
8.3%4.7%4.1%7.6%9.9%−0.6%2.1%11.1%4.9%8.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$55M$391M$0$12M$34M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$70M$90M$114M$64M$104M$174M$191M$199M$213M$218MDividends paidDiv. paid
$25M$27M$3M$56M$86M$176M$8M$90M$31MBuybacksBuybacks
34%31%29%-5%35%23%12%11%22%17%ROICROIC
40%43%25%-10%33%30%12%11%25%28%Return on equityROE
30%29%18%−15%27%21%3%1%16%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$634M$713M$1.0B$1.6B$902M$500M$399M$690M$849M$978MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$485M$534M$783M$540M$708M$697M$753M$710M$775M$586MReceivablesReceiv.
$759M$884M$884M$818M$898M$1.4B$1.3B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BInventoryInvent.
$290M$351M$360M$375M$525M$657M$568M$663M$598M$599MAccounts payablePayables
$955M$1.1B$1.3B$982M$1.1B$1.5B$1.5B$1.2B$1.4B$1.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.0B$2.3B$2.9B$3.1B$2.7B$2.8B$2.6B$2.9B$3.2B$3.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$879M$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.9B$2.0B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0B$1.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×2.2×2.5×2.0×1.4×1.4×1.5×1.4×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$237M$236M$236M$265M$387M$366M$304M$278M$281M$282MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.4B$3.5B$4.2B$5.6B$5.9B$6.0B$6.1B$6.4B$6.8B$6.6BTotal assetsAssets
$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.6B$1.0B$996M$1.0B$1000M$1.0B$1.8BTotal debtDebt
$444M$339M($612K)($29M)$125M$496M$623M$310M$190M$854MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.0×9.8×8.6×-1.0×9.4×25.2×7.7×6.3×13.9×13.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$697M$660M$1.6B$1.3B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.3%1.0%1.1%1.0%1.0%1.3%1.0%1.3%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$12M$75M$42M$3MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
384M389M408M397M410M404M402M402M400M392MShares out (diluted)Shares
$12.76$14.35$14.11$11.21$14.07$15.27$14.54$14.99$15.71$16.86Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.73$0.73$0.97$-0.32$1.35$1.41$0.62$0.52$1.45$1.63EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.06$0.77$0.71$0.85$1.39$0.17$0.67$1.67$0.77$1.43Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.06$0.67$0.58$0.85$1.39$-0.10$0.30$1.67$0.77$1.43Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.18$0.23$0.28$0.16$0.25$0.43$0.47$0.49$0.53$0.56Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.31$0.41$0.43$0.33$0.41$0.66$0.78$0.57$0.55$0.55Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.81$1.70$3.83$3.27$4.06$4.71$5.09$4.90$5.70$5.79Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.6%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.9%/yr−2.0%/yr
EPS+8.9%/yr
Dividends / share+14.4%/yr+27.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.6%/yr+11.0%/yr
Book value / share+15.4%/yr+11.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
400Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
22%low FY2020
Gross margin
62%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.6×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$308Mowner earningsvs.$578Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $578M of profit but $308M of owner earnings: $270M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$578M
Owner earnings$308M · 5% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$578M$211M$250M$569M$554M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$206M+$193M+$165M+$159M+$143M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$82M+$63M+$74M+$61M+$60M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$336M+$432M−$54M−$561M−$20M
Cash from operations$530M$898M$436M$228M$737M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$221M−$228M−$165M−$159M−$167M
Owner earnings$308M$671M$270M$69M$570M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$148M−$108M
Free cash flow$308M$671M$122M($39M)$570M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%11%5%1%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $82M), owner earnings is nearer $227M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $678M ÷ interest expense $49M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $190M · 0.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $758M + ST investments $91M − debt $1.0B
    What this means

    Netting $849M of cash and short-term investments against $1.0B of debt leaves $190M owed, about 0.3× a year's operating profit (1.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 45 + DIO 188 − DPO 91 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -5%–35%; 22% latest = NOPAT $552M ÷ invested capital $2.6B
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 1%–11%; latest $308M = operating cash $530M − maintenance capex $221M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $82M of SBC) leaves $227M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $530M ÷ net income $578M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $243M ÷ Owner Earnings $308M
    What this means

    Of $308M Owner Earnings, $243M (79%) went back to shareholders, $213M dividends, $31M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($82M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.07×
    Maintaining
    Capex $221M ÷ depreciation $206M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.0B vs $1.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +8%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.89/share (latest year $1.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    The recent-years average (7%) sits below the early years (10%), but the latest year (11%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 10% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −1.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.5%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, we compete with other companies in the apparel industry on the basis of investments in technology and adapting to changes in technology, including the successful use of data analytics, artificial intelligence and machine learning.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$978M
  • Receivables$586M
  • Inventory$1.2B
  • Other current assets$245M
Current liabilities$1.9B
  • Debt due within a year$789M
  • Accounts payable$599M
  • Other current liabilities$465M
Current ratio1.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.98×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$789M due · $978M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$1.3B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.4B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$0
'28$0
'29$0
'30$551M
later$500M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$551Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Nov 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$318M
'27$273M
'28$227M
'29$177M
'30$144M
later$406M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$318Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.0B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.3B
Total fixed claims on the business$2.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.4B, of which the leases are 56%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Nov 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.8B · 38%
  • Dividends$1.2B · 26%
  • Buybacks$502M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 25%
  • Returned to owners$1.7B

    53% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $502M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $755M and cash and short-term investments rose $344M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$20.39

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 20M shares were bought for $416M, about $20.39 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $16.20 (2023) to $25.26 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $20.20 ($176M).

  • Net change in share count2.1%

    The diluted count rose from 384M to 392M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.53/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $85M, so each retained $1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$475M7% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity12%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$492Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $1.8B of capital spent building

$131M written down across 4 years (2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 27% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Charles (“Chip”) V. Bergh$16.3M$33.8M$570M
2022Charles (“Chip”) V. Bergh$15.9M−$5.5M$69M
2023Charles (“Chip”) V. Bergh$15.6M$10.9M$270M
2024Charles (“Chip”) V. Bergh$3.1M$7.0M$671M
2024Michelle Gass$13.7M$16.1M$671M
2025Michelle Gass$16.1M$26.9M$308M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$82M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Levi Strauss & Co is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.1B → $1.8B

    Debt rose from $1.1B to $1.8B while owner earnings went from about $332M to $416M — about 3.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 9 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 9 years, $311M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Textiles & Apparel

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LULUlululemon athletica inc.$11.1B56%20.6%58%14%
PVHPVH Corp.$9.0B56%8.0%8%7%
RLRalph Lauren Corporation$8.1B65%9.9%20%10%
LEVILevi Strauss & Co$6.3B58%9.8%23%5%
UAUnder Armour Inc.$5.0B46%2.3%4%2%
COLMColumbia Sportswear$3.4B50%10.7%18%10%
GIIIG-III Apparel$3.0B36%6.3%9%4%
CRICarter's$2.9B43%11.0%24%9%
Group median53%9.9%19%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Levi Strauss & Co has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Levi Strauss & Co earns about $338M on its 5.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $559M on 388M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $854M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Levi Strauss & Co (LEVI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LEVI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LEU its page in the Manual LFMDP →

Industry order: ← LANV the Textiles & Apparel chapter LULU →