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GOLD, Gold.com Inc.
This acquisition expanded the Company's operations into the collectible coin and currency market and was followed by two complementary acquisitions.
A-Mark, also referred to (together with its subsidiaries) as "we", "us", and the "Company", is a fully integrated precious metals company that offers an array of gold, silver, platinum, palladium, and copper bullion, numismatic coins, and related products to wholesale and retail customers via a portfolio of channels.
Sales & Ancillary Services also provides customized financing programs, secure storage, and turn-key logistic services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Wholesale Sales (79%) and Direct To Consumer (21%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 1.2% and operating margin about 1.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 0.4% to 2.8% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 4 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →The largest slice of sales is Wholesale Sales at 79%, but the profit engine is Secured Lending: 0% of revenue and 100% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Wholesale Sales ran a $93M operating loss; Direct To Consumer ran a $101M operating loss.
- Wholesale Sales79%$8.7Bloss of $93M
- Direct To Consumer21%$2.3Bloss of $101M
- Secured Lending0%$0100% of profit
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $6.8B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $4.8B | $5.5B | $7.6B | $8.2B | $9.3B | $9.7B | $11.0B | $11.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 2% | — | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | $20M | $56M | $211M | $188M | $234M | $122M | $69M | $165M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| — | — | — | 0.4% | 1.0% | 2.8% | 2.3% | 2.5% | 1.3% | 0.6% | 1.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| — | — | — | $2M | $31M | $160M | $133M | $156M | $69M | $17M | $81M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 31% | 17% | 17% | 20% | 23% | 17% | 24% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($56M) | ($10M) | $8M | ($15M) | $48M | ($53M) | ($89M) | ($30M) | $61M | $152M | $220M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $11M | $27M | $13M | $11M | $23M | $33M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| — | — | — | ($21M) | $14M | ($224M) | ($251M) | ($201M) | ($21M) | $111M | $104M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1M | $2M | $1M | $490K | $836K | $2M | $3M | $5M | $7M | $11M | $13M | CapexCapex |
| 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($58M) | ($11M) | $6M | ($15M) | $47M | ($55M) | ($92M) | ($35M) | $54M | $142M | $207M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −0.8% | −0.2% | 0.1% | −0.3% | 0.9% | −0.7% | −1.1% | −0.4% | 0.6% | 1.3% | 1.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($58M) | ($12M) | $6M | ($15M) | $47M | ($55M) | ($92M) | ($35M) | $54M | $142M | $207M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.8% | −0.2% | 0.1% | −0.3% | 0.9% | −0.7% | −1.1% | −0.4% | 0.6% | 1.3% | 1.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $3M | $10M | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | $32M | $115M | $65M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $0 | — | $21M | $23M | $37M | $42M | $19M | $21M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $10M | $22M | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | 9% | 33% | 50% | 28% | 32% | 13% | 6% | 16% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | — | 3% | 30% | 44% | 27% | 26% | 11% | 3% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | 3% | — | 38% | 22% | 20% | 4% | −0% | 7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $17M | $13M | $6M | $8M | $52M | $101M | $38M | $39M | $49M | $78M | $144M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $43M | $39M | $36M | $27M | $49M | $89M | $97M | $35M | $37M | $138M | $168M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $186M | $149M | $166M | $198M | $247M | $257M | $458M | $646M | $579M | $795M | $1.3B | InventoryInvent. |
| $47M | $42M | $46M | $62M | — | — | — | $21M | $12M | $13M | $72M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $182M | $147M | $156M | $163M | $296M | $346M | $555M | $661M | $604M | $920M | $1.4B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $418M | $447M | $707M | $669M | $714M | $964M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $3.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $367M | $404M | $666M | $541M | $557M | $710M | $837M | $924M | $884M | $1.1B | $3.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $5M | $9M | $9M | $9M | $9M | $101M | $101M | $101M | $200M | $229M | $244M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $437M | $479M | $743M | $705M | $758M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $4.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $0 | $0 | $92M | $93M | $93M | $94M | $0 | $245M | $345M | $98M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($13M) | ($6M) | $84M | $40M | ($8M) | $56M | ($39M) | $196M | $267M | ($46M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | 1.2× | 3.0× | 10.6× | 8.5× | 7.4× | 3.1× | 1.5× | 2.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $63M | $70M | $66M | $70M | $101M | $363M | $489M | $599M | $608M | $650M | $847M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 7.1M | 7.1M | 7.0M | 7.1M | 7.1M | 17.9M | 24.3M | 24.6M | 24.1M | 24.4M | 26.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $952.77 | $981.48 | $1081.75 | $675.08 | $771.29 | $424.25 | $335.36 | $376.76 | $402.10 | $449.18 | $430.72 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | — | $0.31 | $4.31 | $8.90 | $5.45 | $6.34 | $2.84 | $0.71 | $3.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-8.09 | $-1.59 | $0.90 | $-2.12 | $6.65 | $-3.05 | $-3.78 | $-1.42 | $2.23 | $5.80 | $7.82 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-8.09 | $-1.69 | $0.90 | $-2.12 | $6.65 | $-3.05 | $-3.78 | $-1.42 | $2.23 | $5.80 | $7.82 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.24 | $0.30 | $0.24 | $0.00 | — | $1.18 | $0.93 | $1.52 | $1.73 | $0.77 | $0.78 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.21 | $0.32 | $0.19 | $0.07 | $0.12 | $0.12 | $0.12 | $0.19 | $0.30 | $0.44 | $0.50 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $8.89 | $9.77 | $9.34 | $9.83 | $14.27 | $20.21 | $20.08 | $24.31 | $25.19 | $26.57 | $32.04 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.53 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −8.0%/yr | −10.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −2.7%/yr |
| EPS | +14.5%/yr (6-yr) | −30.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +14.1%/yr | −10.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +8.7%/yr | +29.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.9%/yr | +13.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $17M of profit into $142M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $17M | $69M | $156M | $133M | $160M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$23M | +$11M | +$13M | +$27M | +$11M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$2M | +$2M | +$2M | +$2M | +$1M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$111M | −$21M | −$201M | −$251M | −$224M |
| Cash from operations | $152M | $61M | ($30M) | ($89M) | ($53M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$11M | −$7M | −$5M | −$3M | −$2M |
| Owner earnings | $142M | $54M | ($35M) | ($92M) | ($55M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 1% | 0% | -1% | -1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer $140M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $69M ÷ interest expense $46M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $267M · 3.9× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $78M − debt $345M
What this means
Netting $78M of cash and short-term investments against $345M of debt leaves $267M owed, about 3.9× a year's operating profit (5.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 5 + DIO 27 − DPO 0 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle7-yr median, range 6%–50%; 6% latest = NOPAT $53M ÷ invested capital $917MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $142M = operating cash $152M − maintenance capex $11M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -0%)Industry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a -0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves $140M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $152M ÷ net income $17M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $41M ÷ Owner Earnings $142M
What this means
Of $142M Owner Earnings, $41M (29%) went back to shareholders, $19M dividends, $22M buybacks. Net of $2M stock comp, the real buyback was about $21M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.47×HarvestingCapex $11M ÷ depreciation $23M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $11.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $345M vs $629M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +26%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.84/share (latest year $0.61), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 7
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 1% early, 1% lately, median 1%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2019 · 0.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$144M
- Receivables$168M
- Inventory$1.3B
- Other current assets$2.0B
- Debt due within a year$4M
- Accounts payable$72M
- Other current liabilities$3.0B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $16M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$34M · 210%
- Dividends$147M · 907%
- Buybacks$32M · 197%
- Returned to owners$180M
$147M as dividends and $32M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$197M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $197M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$27.85
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $32M, about $27.85 each.
- Net change in share count271.4%
The diluted count rose from 7M to 26M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.77/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained19%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($388M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $74M, so each retained $1 added about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Roberts | $2.0M | $8.6M | ($55M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Roberts | $1.7M | $4.6M | ($92M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Roberts | $1.5M | $1.8M | ($35M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Roberts | $7.0M | $4.6M | $54M |
| 2025 | Mr. Roberts | $1.3M | −$910k | $142M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership23.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$2M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Gold.com Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?271.4%
Diluted shares grew 271.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $32M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.13×
Across the record the business reported $567M of net income but generated $75M of operating cash, a 0.13-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?3% → 13% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $229M to $1.5B while revenue grew 68%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (3% of revenue then, 13% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$1.1B · 10% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“For the year ended June 30, 2025, we had one customer that comprised more than 10% of our revenues.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INGMIngram Micro Holding Corporation | $52.6B | 7% | 1.8% | 10% | 0% |
| GOLDGold.com Inc. | $11.0B | 2% | 1.3% | 28% | -0% |
| CNXNPC Connection Inc. | $2.9B | 16% | 3.4% | 12% | 2% |
| PLUSePlus inc. | $2.4B | 25% | 6.3% | 18% | 11% |
| DXPEDXP Enterprises Inc. | $2.0B | 28% | 5.6% | 10% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 3.4% | 12% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gold.com Inc. has delivered.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $207M on 28M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $46M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($13M) runs well above depreciation ($33M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $209M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GOGO its page in the Manual GOLF →
Industry order: ← GLXY the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter GPGI →