← All companies ← GPC Manual GPI → ← GOLD Capital Markets & Asset Management GRAN →
GPGI, GPGI Inc.
A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 30% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −23% to 36% — on a steadier 53% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $243M | $261M | $268M | $378M | $391M | $421M | $60M | $24K | RevenueRevenue |
| 53% | 51% | 54% | 58% | 54% | 52% | 48% | 196% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 17% | 19% | 24% | 28% | 23% | 27% | 71% | n/m | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | n/m | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $87M | $84M | $81M | $115M | $119M | $108M | ($14M) | ($75M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 35.7% | 32.2% | 30.4% | 30.4% | 30.5% | 25.6% | −23.0% | n/m | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $81M | $78M | $3M | $19M | $19M | ($54M) | ($136M) | ($393M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 0% | 0% | — | 19% | 19% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $81M | $87M | $78M | $93M | $104M | $130M | ($23M) | ($78M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $9M | $10M | $10M | $9M | $8M | $9M | $2M | $23K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($11M) | ($3M) | $58M | $54M | $59M | $153M | $107M | $311M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $10M | $8M | $5M | $9M | $11M | $7M | $0 | $0 | CapexCapex |
| 4.0% | 2.9% | 1.8% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $72M | $80M | $73M | $84M | $96M | $122M | ($23M) | ($78M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 29.4% | 30.5% | 27.3% | 22.1% | 24.6% | 29.0% | −38.2% | n/m | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $72M | $80M | $73M | $84M | $93M | $122M | ($23M) | ($78M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 29.4% | 30.5% | 27.3% | 22.1% | 23.9% | 29.0% | −38.2% | n/m | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $9M | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $12M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 281% | — | — | — | — | -8% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $27M | $13M | $22M | $14M | $41M | $77M | $115M | $7M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $9M | $28M | $37M | $40M | $47M | $0 | $0 | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $30M | $26M | $42M | $53M | $45M | $0 | $0 | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $2M | $7M | $7M | $5M | $12M | $922K | $1M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $37M | $47M | $73M | $88M | $81M | ($922K) | ($1M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $53M | $78M | $97M | $139M | $174M | $120M | $23M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $42M | $61M | $47M | $41M | $76M | $19M | $25M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.3× | 1.3× | 2.1× | 3.4× | 2.3× | 6.3× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $81M | $131M | $163M | $201M | $474M | $517M | $3.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $236M | $373M | $358M | $336M | $196M | $0 | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| — | $222M | $351M | $344M | $295M | $118M | ($115M) | ($7M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | 5.4× | 4.3× | 5.3× | -8.1× | -856.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($56M) | ($193M) | ($1.0B) | ($892M) | ($802M) | ($143M) | $243M | $3.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.7% | 0.7% | 2.3% | 3.0% | 4.5% | 5.0% | 7.5% | n/m | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| — | — | 31.5M | 32.6M | 35.3M | 44.0M | 111M | 270M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | $8.50 | $11.63 | $11.06 | $9.56 | $0.54 | $0.00 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | $0.10 | $0.57 | $0.54 | $-1.22 | $-1.23 | $-1.45 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | $2.32 | $2.57 | $2.72 | $2.78 | $-0.21 | $-0.29 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | $2.32 | $2.57 | $2.64 | $2.78 | $-0.21 | $-0.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.20 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | $0.15 | $0.28 | $0.31 | $0.17 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | — | $-32.23 | $-27.41 | $-22.72 | $-3.26 | $2.20 | $11.54 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×2.51 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.44 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $136M loss into ($23M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($136M) | ($54M) | $19M | $19M | $3M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2M | +$9M | +$8M | +$9M | +$10M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$4M | +$21M | +$18M | +$11M | +$6M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$107M | +$153M | +$59M | +$54M | +$58M |
| Cash from operations | ($23M) | $130M | $104M | $93M | $78M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | — | −$7M | −$8M | −$9M | −$5M |
| Owner earnings | ($23M) | $122M | $96M | $84M | $73M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$3M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ($23M) | $122M | $93M | $84M | $73M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -38% | 29% | 25% | 22% | 27% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4M), owner earnings is nearer ($27M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -8.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($14M) ÷ interest expense $2M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $115M − debt $184M
What this means
Netting $115M of cash and short-term investments against $184M of debt leaves $70M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 0 + DIO 0 − DPO 11 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($11M) ÷ invested capital $313M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -58%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -38%–31%; latest ($23M) = operating cash ($23M) − maintenance capex $0Industry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -38% of revenue this year, a 27% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($27M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($23M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($136M) · cash from operations ($23M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.00×HarvestingCapex $0 ÷ depreciation $2M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $60M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 6.33×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $184M vs $101M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −205%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.20/share (latest year $-0.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 33% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 33% early to 11% lately, median 30% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −23.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$7M
- Other current assets$16M
- Accounts payable$1M
- Other current liabilities$24M
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $550M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$49M · 9%
- Dividends$9M · 2%
- Buybacks$12M · 2%
- Retained (debt / cash)$479M · 87%
- Returned to owners$21M
4% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9M as dividends and $12M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $12M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count756.5%
The diluted count rose from 32M to 270M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Wilk | $6.6M | $4.3M | $96M |
| 2024 | Mr. Wilk | $6.5M | $62.8M | $122M |
| 2025 | Mr. Wilk | $6.1M | $22.8M | ($23M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership18.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$4M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GPGI Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.1% vs 29.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 29.1% early in the record and 5.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?756.5%
Diluted shares grew 756.5% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $12M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PWPPerella Weinberg Partners | $751M | — | -7.6% | — | 15% |
| DAVEDave Inc. | $554M | — | -4.2% | -12% | 13% |
| WDWalker & Dunlop | $320M | — | 143.4% | 14% | 149% |
| GEMIGemini Space Station Inc. | $180M | — | -192.5% | -95% | -123% |
| GPGIGPGI Inc. | $60M | 53% | 30.4% | -3% | 27% |
| GREELGreenidge Generation Holdings Inc. | $59M | — | -16.2% | -193% | — |
| FWDIForward Industries Inc. | $18M | 20% | -3.9% | -21% | -1% |
| ASSTStrive Inc. | $4M | — | -404.4% | -104% | -592% |
| Group median | — | — | -5.9% | -21% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GPGI Inc. has delivered.
GPGI Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, GPGI Inc. earns about $16M on its 27.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −38.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($78M) on 290M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-07; net cash $7M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GPC its page in the Manual GPI →
Industry order: ← GOLD the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter GRAN →