Owner Scorecard


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GPGI, GPGI Inc.

A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GPGI · GPGI Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$60M
−85.8% YoY · −25% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $24K 5-yr avg $303M
Operating margin −313879.2% 5-yr avg 18.8%
ROIC −2% 5-yr avg −8%
Owner-earnings margin −327008% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin −327008% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 30% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −23% to 36% — on a steadier 53% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$243M$261M$268M$378M$391M$421M$60M$24KRevenueRevenue
53%51%54%58%54%52%48%196%Gross marginGross mgn
17%19%24%28%23%27%71%n/mSG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%2%2%2%2%n/mR&D / revenueR&D/rev
$87M$84M$81M$115M$119M$108M($14M)($75M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
35.7%32.2%30.4%30.4%30.5%25.6%−23.0%n/mOperating marginOp. mgn
$81M$78M$3M$19M$19M($54M)($136M)($393M)Net incomeNet inc.
0%0%19%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$81M$87M$78M$93M$104M$130M($23M)($78M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$9M$10M$10M$9M$8M$9M$2M$23KDepreciationDeprec.
($11M)($3M)$58M$54M$59M$153M$107M$311MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$10M$8M$5M$9M$11M$7M$0$0CapexCapex
4.0%2.9%1.8%2.4%2.8%1.8%0.0%0.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$72M$80M$73M$84M$96M$122M($23M)($78M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
29.4%30.5%27.3%22.1%24.6%29.0%−38.2%n/mOwner earnings marginOE mgn
$72M$80M$73M$84M$93M$122M($23M)($78M)Free cash flowFCF
29.4%30.5%27.3%22.1%23.9%29.0%−38.2%n/mFree cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$9M$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$12MBuybacksBuybacks
281%-8%-2%ROICROIC
Balance sheet
$27M$13M$22M$14M$41M$77M$115M$7MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$9M$28M$37M$40M$47M$0$0ReceivablesReceiv.
$30M$26M$42M$53M$45M$0$0InventoryInvent.
$2M$7M$7M$5M$12M$922K$1MAccounts payablePayables
$37M$47M$73M$88M$81M($922K)($1M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$53M$78M$97M$139M$174M$120M$23MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$42M$61M$47M$41M$76M$19M$25MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.3×2.1×3.4×2.3×6.3×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$81M$131M$163M$201M$474M$517M$3.4BTotal assetsAssets
$236M$373M$358M$336M$196M$0$0Total debtDebt
$222M$351M$344M$295M$118M($115M)($7M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
5.4×4.3×5.3×-8.1×-856.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($56M)($193M)($1.0B)($892M)($802M)($143M)$243M$3.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.7%2.3%3.0%4.5%5.0%7.5%n/mStock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
31.5M32.6M35.3M44.0M111M270MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.50$11.63$11.06$9.56$0.54$0.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.10$0.57$0.54$-1.22$-1.23$-1.45EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.32$2.57$2.72$2.78$-0.21$-0.29Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.32$2.57$2.64$2.78$-0.21$-0.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.20$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.15$0.28$0.31$0.17$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-32.23$-27.41$-22.72$-3.26$2.20$11.54Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×2.51 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.44 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
111Mpeak FY2025
Gross margin
48%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($23M)owner earningsvs.($136M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $136M loss into ($23M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($136M)($54M)$19M$19M$3M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2M+$9M+$8M+$9M+$10M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$4M+$21M+$18M+$11M+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$107M+$153M+$59M+$54M+$58M
Cash from operations($23M)$130M$104M$93M$78M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$7M−$8M−$9M−$5M
Owner earnings($23M)$122M$96M$84M$73M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$3M
Free cash flow($23M)$122M$93M$84M$73M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-38%29%25%22%27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4M), owner earnings is nearer ($27M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($14M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $115M − debt $184M
    What this means

    Netting $115M of cash and short-term investments against $184M of debt leaves $70M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 0 + DIO 0 − DPO 11 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT ($11M) ÷ invested capital $313M (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median -58%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -38%–31%; latest ($23M) = operating cash ($23M) − maintenance capex $0
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -38% of revenue this year, a 27% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($27M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($136M) · cash from operations ($23M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.00×
    Harvesting
    Capex $0 ÷ depreciation $2M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $60M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.33×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $184M vs $101M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −205%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.20/share (latest year $-0.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 33% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 33% early to 11% lately, median 30% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −23.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$23M
  • Cash & short-term investments$7M
  • Other current assets$16M
Current liabilities$25M
  • Accounts payable$1M
  • Other current liabilities$24M
Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Cash runway0.1 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−100.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.8× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($275M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $550M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$49M · 9%
  • Dividends$9M · 2%
  • Buybacks$12M · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$479M · 87%
  • Returned to owners$21M

    4% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9M as dividends and $12M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $12M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count756.5%

    The diluted count rose from 32M to 270M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Mr. Wilk$6.6M$4.3M$96M
2024Mr. Wilk$6.5M$62.8M$122M
2025Mr. Wilk$6.1M$22.8M($23M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership18.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$4M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why GPGI Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.1% vs 29.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 29.1% early in the record and 5.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?756.5%

    Diluted shares grew 756.5% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $12M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PWPPerella Weinberg Partners$751M-7.6%15%
DAVEDave Inc.$554M-4.2%-12%13%
WDWalker & Dunlop$320M143.4%14%149%
GEMIGemini Space Station Inc.$180M-192.5%-95%-123%
GPGIGPGI Inc.$60M53%30.4%-3%27%
GREELGreenidge Generation Holdings Inc.$59M-16.2%-193%
FWDIForward Industries Inc.$18M20%-3.9%-21%-1%
ASSTStrive Inc.$4M-404.4%-104%-592%
Group median-5.9%-21%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GPGI Inc. has delivered.

GPGI Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, GPGI Inc. earns about $16M on its 27.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −38.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($78M) on 290M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-07; net cash $7M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GPGI Inc. (GPGI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GPGI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GPC its page in the Manual GPI →

Industry order: ← GOLD the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter GRAN →