Owner Scorecard


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GOGO, Gogo Inc.

Telecom Operators capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Gogo Inc. is the only multi-orbit, multi-band in-flight connectivity provider offering connectivity technology purpose-built for business and military/government aviation.

By leveraging our multi-orbit, multi-band in-flight connectivity solutions, our global footprint, including a mature sales force and technical support, we can provide our customers with essential market access, speed, bandwidth, greater reliability, redundancy, and responsiveness that they need around the world.

Our connectivity solutions are used by business and military/government aviation customers in over 100 countries, many of which view our products and services as critical to their daily operations and integral to their communications and business infrastructure.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GOGO · Gogo Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$910M
+104.7% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $907M 5-yr avg $499M
Gross margin 93% 5-yr avg 85%
Operating margin 12.2% 5-yr avg 25.3%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 19%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 28% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −9.2% and 36% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 2 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

26% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States74%$671M
  • International26%$239M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$597M$699M$290M$309M$270M$336M$404M$398M$445M$910M$907MRevenueRevenue
14%13%20%18%20%15%14%14%28%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%11%6%8%9%7%7%9%10%6%5%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($27M)($64M)$82M$97M$76M$121M$142M$124M$51M$114M$111MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−4.5%−9.2%28.4%31.2%28.3%35.9%35.2%31.2%11.5%12.5%12.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($125M)($172M)($162M)($146M)($250M)$153M$92M$146M$14M$13M$14MNet incomeNet inc.
13%24%52%52%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$65M$60M($82M)$64M$5M$67M$103M$79M$41M$124M$85MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$106M$145M$14M$17M$14M$15M$13M$17M$19M$60M$61MDepreciationDeprec.
$66M$67M$57M$185M$233M($115M)($20M)($105M)($12M)$27M($14M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$148M$252M$3M$1M$2M$4M$44M$16M$14M$59M$82MCapexCapex
24.9%36.1%0.9%0.5%0.7%1.3%10.9%4.1%3.0%6.5%9.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($41M)($85M)($85M)$63M$3M$62M$91M$63M$28M$65M$24MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−6.8%−12.2%−29.3%20.3%1.0%18.6%22.5%15.8%6.3%7.2%2.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($83M)($192M)($85M)$63M$3M$62M$59M$63M$28M$65M$2MFree cash flowFCF
−14.0%−27.5%−29.3%20.3%1.0%18.6%14.7%15.8%6.3%7.2%0.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$333M$2M$2MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$18M$5M$33M$0BuybacksBuybacks
-3%-8%28%25%5%6%ROICROIC
358%20%13%12%Return on equityROE
358%20%13%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$456M$409M$223M$170M$435M$42M$175M$139M$42M$125M$104MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$74M$118M$134M$42M$40M$38M$54M$48M$112M$113M$115MReceivablesReceiv.
$50M$46M$193M$35M$28M$34M$49M$63M$98M$99M$102MInventoryInvent.
$32M$27M$24M$5M$11M$17M$14M$16M$67M$93M$82MAccounts payablePayables
$92M$136M$303M$72M$57M$55M$90M$95M$142M$119M$135MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$605M$593M$586M$425M$512M$250M$324M$315M$323M$432M$430MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$251M$316M$300M$253M$438M$189M$84M$72M$182M$269M$259MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×1.9×2.0×1.7×1.2×1.3×3.8×4.4×1.8×1.6×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$600K$600K$600K$600K$600K$600K$620K$620K$185M$193M$193MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$674M$648M$760M$782M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3BTotal assetsAssets
$801M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$804M$697M$595M$834M$836M$837MTotal debtDebt
$345M$592M$801M$931M$734M$763M$522M$456M$792M$711M$733MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.3×-0.6×0.7×0.7×0.6×1.8×3.7×3.8×1.3×1.7×1.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($40M)($192M)($269M)($399M)($641M)($320M)($102M)$41M$69M$101M$118MShareholders’ equityEquity
3.0%2.8%2.9%2.8%2.9%4.0%4.7%5.4%4.7%2.6%2.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
118M119M120M121M123M127M134M133M131M137M137MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.04$5.87$2.42$2.55$2.19$2.64$3.02$2.98$3.38$6.67$6.62Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.05$-1.44$-1.35$-1.21$-2.03$1.20$0.69$1.09$0.10$0.09$0.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.34$-0.72$-0.71$0.52$0.02$0.49$0.68$0.47$0.21$0.48$0.17Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.70$-1.61$-0.71$0.52$0.02$0.49$0.44$0.47$0.21$0.48$0.02Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.25$2.12$0.02$0.01$0.01$0.03$0.33$0.12$0.10$0.43$0.60Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.34$-1.61$-2.24$-3.29$-5.20$-2.52$-0.76$0.31$0.53$0.74$0.86Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.2%/yr+25.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+85.3%/yr
Capital spending / share−11.1%/yr+96.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
137Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
5%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.9×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$65Mowner earningsvs.$13Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $13M of profit into $65M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$13M
Owner earnings$65M · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$13M$14M$146M$92M$153M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$60M+$19M+$17M+$13M+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$21M+$21M+$19M+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$27M−$12M−$105M−$20M−$115M
Cash from operations$124M$41M$79M$103M$67M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$59M−$14M−$16M−$13M−$4M
Owner earnings$65M$28M$63M$91M$62M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$31M
Free cash flow$65M$28M$63M$59M$62M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%6%16%22%19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $41M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $114M ÷ interest expense $68M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $711M · 6.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $125M − debt $836M
    What this means

    Netting $125M of cash and short-term investments against $836M of debt leaves $711M owed, about 6.2× a year's operating profit (7.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 45 + DIO 534 − DPO 500 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -8%–28%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median -0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -29%–22%; latest $65M = operating cash $124M − maintenance capex $59M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $41M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $124M ÷ net income $13M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $65M
    What this means

    Of $65M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.99×
    Maintaining
    Capex $59M ÷ depreciation $60M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $910M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.60×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $836M vs $163M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.42/share (latest year $0.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.75/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 18% lately, median 28% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2017 · −9.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +6.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Investments in technology systems and data analytics capabilities, including AI tools, may not deliver the benefits or perform as expected or may be replaced or become obsolete more quickly than expected, and we may not implement or use new technologies in the most effective way, which could result in operational diffi…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$430M
  • Cash & short-term investments$104M
  • Receivables$115M
  • Inventory$102M
  • Other current assets$110M
Current liabilities$259M
  • Debt due within a year$24M
  • Accounts payable$82M
  • Other current liabilities$154M
Current ratio1.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.27×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$171Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$24M due · $104M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−95.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.9× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($309M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($733M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$903M$67M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$62Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $526M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$544M · 103%
  • Buybacks$56M · 11%
  • Returned to owners$56M

    35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $56M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$74M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $74M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $801M to $837M, and cash and short-term investments drew down $352M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $56M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count15.6%

    The diluted count rose from 118M to 137M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$442M34% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$334Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $544M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$3.3M$7.9M$62M
2022$3.2M$4.7M$91M
2023$3.6M$2.9M$63M
2024$3.3M$1.4M$28M
2024$18.1M$18.1M$28M
2025$9.0M$741k$65M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership25.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio56:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$24M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Gogo Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?15.6%

    Diluted shares grew 15.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $56M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$263M · 29% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Our top ten customers accounted for approximately 29% of our 2025 service revenue (excluding service revenue earned under a network sharing agreement with Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
IDTIDT Corporation$1.2B24%2.8%75%2%
GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc.$1.0B-33.2%-12%12%
LBRDALiberty Broadband$1.0B100%-54.0%-0%-40%
CALXCalix$1.0B50%-0.8%-2%3%
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.$976M57%16.1%17%14%
GOGOGogo Inc.$910M93%28.4%5%7%
IRDMIridium Communications Inc$872M95%10.5%2%35%
GSATGlobalstar Inc.$273M96%-47.3%-6%10%
Group median93%1.0%1%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gogo Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Gogo Inc. earns about $61M on its 6.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2M on 135M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $733M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($82M) runs well above depreciation ($61M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $25M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gogo Inc. (GOGO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GOGO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GO its page in the Manual GOLD →

Industry order: ← ECHO the Telecom Operators chapter GSAT →