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GTM, ZoomInfo Technologies Inc

Software asset-light

ZoomInfo is a global leader in modern go-to-market software, data, and intelligence for sales, marketing, operations, and recruiting teams.

Our go-to-market intelligence platform empowers businesses with AI-ready insights, trusted data, agent-assisted selling and advanced automation providing sales, marketing, operations, and recruiting professionals accurate information and insights on the organizations and professionals they target.

ZoomInfo is the modern go-to-market intelligence platform, consisting of three distinct layers that build upon each other: Our Intelligence Layer is the foundation of our data-driven strategy.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

GTM · ZoomInfo Technologies Inc

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.2B

+2.9% YoY · 21% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.1B

Operating margin 18.6% 5-yr avg 15.6%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 4%

Owner-earnings margin 34% 5-yr avg 34%

Free cash flow margin 30% 5-yr avg 32%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 15% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Stock-based pay runs about 12% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 34% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$144M	$293M	$476M	$747M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	RevenueRevenue
14%	12%	13%	12%	11%	14%	24%	17%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	10%	11%	16%	19%	15%	16%	15%	14%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$27M	$36M	$37M	$113M	$176M	$260M	$97M	$226M	$233M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
18.4%	12.3%	7.8%	15.2%	16.0%	20.9%	8.0%	18.1%	18.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$0	$0	($4M)	$117M	$63M	$107M	$29M	$124M	$127M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	5%	—	—	7%	36%	36%	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$44M	$44M	$170M	$299M	$417M	$435M	$369M	$465M	$461M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3M	$6M	$9M	$14M	$18M	$20M	$26M	$30M	$32M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	$13M	$43M	$76M	$144M	$140M	$176M	$195M	$190M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$5M	$14M	$17M	$24M	$29M	$27M	$65M	$76M	$85M	CapexCapex
3.2%	4.6%	3.5%	3.2%	2.6%	2.1%	5.3%	6.1%	6.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$41M	$38M	$161M	$286M	$399M	$415M	$344M	$435M	$429M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
28.6%	13.1%	33.7%	38.2%	36.4%	33.5%	28.3%	34.8%	34.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$39M	$31M	$153M	$276M	$388M	$408M	$305M	$389M	$376M	Free cash flowFCF
27.2%	10.5%	32.1%	36.9%	35.3%	32.9%	25.1%	31.2%	29.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$9M	$723M	$66M	$684M	$144M	$0	$500K	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$0	$0	$400M	$566M	$411M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	3%	1%	4%	3%	4%	—	5%	6%	ROICROIC
—	—	-0%	6%	3%	5%	2%	8%	9%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−0%	6%	3%	5%	2%	8%	9%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$9M	$41M	$300M	$327M	$546M	$529M	$140M	$180M	$175M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$87M	$121M	$187M	$223M	$272M	$246M	$226M	$184M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$8M	$9M	$16M	$36M	$34M	$17M	$31M	$21M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$79M	$113M	$171M	$187M	$238M	$230M	$194M	$163M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$148M	$440M	$546M	$832M	$864M	$451M	$454M	$410M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$242M	$321M	$508M	$573M	$638M	$652M	$633M	$599M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.6×	1.4×	1.1×	1.5×	1.4×	0.7×	0.7×	0.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$446M	$967M	$1.0B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.6B	$2.3B	$6.9B	$7.1B	$6.9B	$6.5B	$6.4B	$6.4B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.2B	$745M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Total debtDebt
—	$1.2B	$445M	$906M	$690M	$703M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.5×	0.4×	0.5×	2.6×	3.7×	5.7×	2.5×	5.3×	5.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
—	($214M)	$940M	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.1B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
22.7%	8.6%	25.5%	12.4%	17.5%	13.5%	11.4%	9.3%	8.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
—	—	—	403M	403M	397M	362M	324M	302M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	—	$1.85	$2.72	$3.12	$3.35	$3.86	$4.15	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	—	$0.29	$0.16	$0.27	$0.08	$0.38	$0.42	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	—	$0.71	$0.99	$1.04	$0.95	$1.34	$1.42	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	—	$0.68	$0.96	$1.03	$0.84	$1.20	$1.24	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	$0.06	$0.07	$0.07	$0.18	$0.23	$0.28	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	—	$4.95	$5.63	$5.33	$4.68	$4.66	$4.87	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+20.1%/yr (4-yr)	+20.1%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+17.3%/yr (4-yr)	+17.3%/yr (4-yr)
EPS	+7.3%/yr (4-yr)	+7.3%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	+41.5%/yr (4-yr)	+41.5%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share	−1.5%/yr (4-yr)	−1.5%/yr (4-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income+131.7%
“Income from operations was $225.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $128.3 million, or 132%, as compared to $97.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily due to an increase in revenue and lower operating expenses, primarily driven by decreases in charges related to lease restructuring activities, charges incurred related to the Class Actions, as well as the prior year impact of the revision to reserves for uncollectible accounts receivable.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Net income+326.8%
“Net income was $124.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of $95.1 million or 327%, as compared to $29.1 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily due to the increase in revenue and lower operating expense, primarily driven by decreases in charges related to lease restructuring activities, charges incurred related to the Class Actions, as well as the prior year impact of the revision to reserves for uncollectible accounts receivable.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

324Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

5%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.6×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$435Mowner earningsvs.$124Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $435M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $30M it takes just to hold its position. It put $46M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $389M.

Reported net income$124M

Owner earnings$435M · 35% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$124M	$29M	$107M	$63M	$117M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$30M	+$26M	+$20M	+$18M	+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$116M	+$138M	+$168M	+$192M	+$93M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$195M	+$176M	+$140M	+$144M	+$76M
Cash from operations	$465M	$369M	$435M	$417M	$299M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$30M	−$26M	−$20M	−$18M	−$14M
Owner earnings	$435M	$344M	$415M	$399M	$286M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$46M	−$39M	−$7M	−$11M	−$10M
Free cash flow	$389M	$305M	$408M	$388M	$276M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	35%	28%	34%	36%	38%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $30M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $46M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $116M), owner earnings is nearer $319M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $226M ÷ interest expense $43M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.1B · 5.1× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $176M + ST investments $4M − debt $1.3B

What this means
Netting $180M of cash and short-term investments against $1.3B of debt leaves $1.1B owed, about 5.1× a year's operating profit (5.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range 1%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT $144M ÷ invested capital $2.7B

Industry peers: median -32%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 34%

High through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 13%–38%; latest $435M = operating cash $465M − maintenance capex $30M

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 35% of revenue this year, a 34% median across 8 years. It chose to put $46M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $389M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $116M of SBC) leaves $319M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.75×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $465M ÷ net income $124M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 94%

Returns most of it

Dividends + buybacks $411M ÷ Owner Earnings $435M

What this means
Of $435M Owner Earnings, $411M (94%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $411M buybacks. Net of $116M stock comp, the real buyback was about $295M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.51×

Expanding

Capex $76M ÷ depreciation $30M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.72×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.3B vs ($179M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.29/share (latest year $0.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 13% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 13% early to 16% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +39%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 39% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 7.8% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −3.1%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, the rapid advancement and widespread adoption of LLMs and generative AI technologies could result in new competitors in our industry.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$410M

Cash & short-term investments$175M
Receivables$184M
Other current assets$51M

Current liabilities$599M

Debt due within a year$6M
Accounts payable$21M
Other current liabilities$571M

Current ratio0.69×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.69×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.29×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($189M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$6M due · $175M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($424M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($4.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.6B$247M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$479Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$6M

'27$6M

'28$106M

'29$656M

'30$559M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$6Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$12Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$656Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$1.3Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $1.3B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$175M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$435M

Together, against $6M due next year103.4×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $610M against the $6M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 103 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$255M · 11%
Buybacks$1.4B · 61%
Retained (debt / cash)$612M · 27%

Returned to owners$1.4B
65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.4B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$12.53
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 110M shares were bought for $1.4B, about $12.53 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $10.16 (2025) to $17.68 (2023); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $12.09 ($566M).
Net change in share count−25.0%
The diluted count fell from 403M to 302M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.9B30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.6Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $255M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Schuck	$1.3M	$12.2M	$286M
2022	Mr. Schuck	$835k	−$9.3M	$399M
2023	Mr. Schuck	$5.0M	$2.3M	$415M
2024	Mr. Schuck	$6.3M	$1.0M	$344M
2025	Mr. Schuck	$33.3M	$35.3M	$435M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership9.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio209:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$116M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 9% of revenue, equal to 51% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ZoomInfo Technologies Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 8 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 8 years, $90M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PCORProcore Technologies	$1.3B	82%	-22.7%	-21%	5%
RBRKRubrik Inc.	$1.3B	73%	-46.2%	-118%	1%
ZETAZeta Global Holdings Corp.	$1.3B	62%	-6.8%	-82%	10%
GTMZoomInfo Technologies Inc	$1.2B	—	15.6%	3%	34%
KVYOKlaviyo Inc. Series A	$1.2B	75%	-11.6%	-44%	17%
GWREGuidewire Software	$1.2B	55%	-2.8%	-1%	16%
CVLTCommvault Systems	$1.2B	83%	0.3%	-1%	18%
BOXBox, Inc.	$1.2B	73%	-4.0%	—	18%
Group median	—	—	-5.4%	-21%	16%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ZoomInfo Technologies Inc has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, ZoomInfo Technologies Inc earns about $420M on its 33.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($420M) Net of stock comp (−$112M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($431M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+39%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $376M on 295M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($85M) runs well above depreciation ($32M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $431M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh GTM against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ZoomInfo Technologies Inc (GTM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GTM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GTLS its page in the Manual GTN →

Industry order: ← GTLB the Software chapter GWRE →