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HALO, Halozyme

Biotechnology consumer brand Cyclical

Halozyme Therapeutics, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company advancing disruptive solutions to improve patient experiences and outcomes for emerging and established therapies.

As the innovators of ENHANZE drug delivery technology ("ENHANZE") with our proprietary enzyme, rHuPH20, our commercially validated solution is used to facilitate the subcutaneous ("SC") delivery of injected drugs and fluids, with the goal of improving the patient experience with rapid SC delivery and reduced treatment burden.

We license our technology to biopharmaceutical companies to collaboratively develop products that combine ENHANZE with our partners' proprietary compounds.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

HALO · Halozyme

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.4B

+37.6% YoY · 39% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $869M

Gross margin 83% 5-yr avg 81%

Operating margin 33.9% 5-yr avg 46.3%

ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 21%

Owner-earnings margin 44% 5-yr avg 48%

Free cash flow margin 44% 5-yr avg 48%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 82% and operating margin about 34% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −57% and 62% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 39% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$147M	$317M	$152M	$196M	$268M	$443M	$660M	$829M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.5B	RevenueRevenue
77%	90%	93%	77%	84%	82%	79%	77%	84%	84%	83%	Gross marginGross mgn
31%	17%	40%	39%	17%	11%	22%	18%	15%	15%	15%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
103%	48%	99%	72%	13%	8%	10%	9%	8%	6%	6%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($83M)	$81M	($69M)	($68M)	$144M	$276M	$268M	$338M	$551M	$469M	$512M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−56.7%	25.6%	−45.7%	−34.5%	53.9%	62.2%	40.5%	40.7%	54.3%	33.6%	33.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($103M)	$63M	($80M)	($72M)	$129M	$403M	$202M	$282M	$444M	$317M	$349M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	-2%	—	—	0%	—	19%	19%	20%	32%	31%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($50M)	$134M	($50M)	($85M)	$55M	$299M	$240M	$389M	$479M	$652M	$677M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$2M	$2M	$4M	$3M	$3M	$6M	$11M	$10M	$11M	$13M	DepreciationDeprec.
$25M	$38M	($7M)	($52M)	($94M)	($127M)	$7M	$59M	($19M)	$272M	$258M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$1M	$5M	$4M	$3M	$1M	$5M	$15M	$11M	$7M	$10M	CapexCapex
2.1%	0.4%	3.1%	2.1%	0.9%	0.3%	0.7%	1.8%	1.1%	0.5%	0.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($53M)	$133M	($52M)	($89M)	$53M	$298M	$235M	$377M	$468M	$645M	$668M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−36.0%	41.9%	−34.2%	−45.6%	19.8%	67.2%	35.6%	45.5%	46.1%	46.2%	44.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($54M)	$133M	($54M)	($89M)	$53M	$298M	$235M	$373M	$468M	$645M	$668M	Free cash flowFCF
−36.5%	41.9%	−35.7%	−45.6%	19.8%	67.2%	35.6%	45.0%	46.1%	46.2%	44.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$999M	$0	$0	$726M	$726M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$0	$200M	$150M	$350M	$200M	$402M	$250M	$342M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-56%	33%	-17%	-14%	36%	29%	15%	19%	25%	15%	17%	ROICROIC
—	30%	-32%	-79%	85%	204%	119%	336%	122%	649%	159%	Return on equityROE
—	30%	−32%	−79%	85%	204%	119%	336%	122%	649%	159%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$205M	$469M	$355M	$421M	$148M	$119M	$234M	$118M	$116M	$134M	$573M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$16M	$22M	$30M	$59M	$98M	$91M	$231M	$233M	$288M	$426M	$458M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$15M	$5M	$23M	$29M	$61M	$54M	$100M	$128M	$142M	$176M	$155M	InventoryInvent.
$4M	$8M	$4M	$6M	$2M	$2M	$18M	$12M	$10M	$21M	$14M	Accounts payablePayables
$27M	$19M	$49M	$82M	$157M	$143M	$314M	$349M	$420M	$582M	$599M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$257M	$510M	$428M	$543M	$555M	$926M	$739M	$746M	$1.1B	$825M	$1.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$55M	$131M	$149M	$86M	$421M	$117M	$131M	$112M	$139M	$177M	$363M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.7×	3.9×	2.9×	6.3×	1.3×	7.9×	5.7×	6.6×	7.8×	4.7×	2.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$409M	$417M	$417M	$580M	$582M	GoodwillGoodwill
$262M	$520M	$440M	$566M	$580M	$1.1B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.7B	Total assetsAssets
$217M	$202M	$126M	$403M	$397M	$877M	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Total debtDebt
$12M	($267M)	($228M)	($19M)	$250M	$758M	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$2.0B	$1.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.2×	3.7×	-3.8×	-5.8×	7.1×	36.7×	15.8×	18.0×	30.5×	25.9×	26.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($32M)	$208M	$249M	$92M	$151M	$197M	$170M	$84M	$364M	$49M	$220M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
17.4%	9.7%	23.5%	17.7%	6.4%	4.7%	3.7%	4.4%	4.3%	3.7%	3.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
128M	139M	144M	144M	141M	147M	141M	134M	129M	124M	123M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.15	$2.28	$1.06	$1.36	$1.89	$3.02	$4.69	$6.18	$7.84	$11.27	$12.28	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.81	$0.45	$-0.56	$-0.50	$0.91	$2.74	$1.44	$2.10	$3.43	$2.56	$2.84	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.41	$0.95	$-0.36	$-0.62	$0.37	$2.03	$1.67	$2.81	$3.62	$5.20	$5.43	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.42	$0.95	$-0.38	$-0.62	$0.37	$2.03	$1.67	$2.78	$3.62	$5.20	$5.43	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.01	$0.03	$0.03	$0.02	$0.01	$0.03	$0.11	$0.08	$0.06	$0.08	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.25	$1.50	$1.73	$0.64	$1.07	$1.34	$1.21	$0.62	$2.81	$0.39	$1.79	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+28.9%/yr	+42.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+69.3%/yr
EPS	—	+22.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.7%/yr	+26.0%/yr
Book value / share	—	−18.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

124Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

15%low FY2016

Gross margin

84%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.1×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$645Mowner earningsvs.$317Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $317M of profit into $645M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$317M

Owner earnings$645M · 46% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$317M	$444M	$282M	$202M	$403M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$11M	+$10M	+$11M	+$6M	+$3M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$52M	+$43M	+$37M	+$24M	+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$272M	−$19M	+$59M	+$7M	−$127M
Cash from operations	$652M	$479M	$389M	$240M	$299M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$7M	−$11M	−$11M	−$5M	−$1M
Owner earnings	$645M	$468M	$377M	$235M	$298M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	−$4M	—	—
Free cash flow	$645M	$468M	$373M	$235M	$298M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	46%	46%	46%	36%	67%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $52M), owner earnings is nearer $593M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 25.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $469M ÷ interest expense $18M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.7B · 3.6× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $134M + ST investments $301M − debt $2.1B

What this means
Netting $435M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, about 3.6× a year's operating profit (4.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 360d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 111 + DIO 282 − DPO 33 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 15%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range -56%–36%; 15% latest = NOPAT $318M ÷ invested capital $2.1B

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 36%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -46%–67%; latest $645M = operating cash $652M − maintenance capex $7M

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 46% of revenue this year, a 36% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $52M of SBC) leaves $593M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.06×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $652M ÷ net income $317M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 53%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $342M ÷ Owner Earnings $645M

What this means
Of $645M Owner Earnings, $342M (53%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $342M buybacks. Net of $52M stock comp, the real buyback was about $291M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.61×

Harvesting

Capex $7M ÷ depreciation $11M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.66×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $648M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.93/share (latest year $2.67), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −26% → 43% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −26% early to 43% lately, median 34% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 23%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +34%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 34% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · −56.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We are increasing the use of AI tools and technology and intend to integrate AI more broadly in our operations with the goal of increasing operational efficiencies, improve cycle times and improve decision-making, thus strengthening our ability to compete.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B

Cash & short-term investments$573M
Receivables$458M
Inventory$155M

Current liabilities$363M

Debt due within a year$209M
Accounts payable$14M
Other current liabilities$140M

Current ratio2.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.33×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.58×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$640Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$209M due · $573M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+42.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters7.4× → 2.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.1Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$55M · 3%
Buybacks$1.9B · 92%
Retained (debt / cash)$113M · 5%

Returned to owners$1.9B
94% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.9B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.9B and cash and short-term investments rose $368M.
Average price paid for buybacks$42.85
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 30M shares were bought for $1.3B, about $42.85 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $18.91 (2019) to $96.60 (2023), and 2023, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($402M).
Net change in share count−4.0%
The diluted count fell from 128M to 123M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.6B62% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $55M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Helen I Torley	$7.5M	$6.0M	$298M
2022	Helen I Torley	$9.7M	$22.8M	$235M
2023	Helen I Torley	$11.8M	−$3.6M	$377M
2024	Helen I Torley	$12.7M	$20.7M	$468M
2025	Helen I Torley	$23.2M	$39.7M	$645M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$52M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Halozyme is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?21% → 41% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $30M to $613M while revenue grew 928%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (21% of revenue then, 41% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Biotechnology

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NBIXNeurocrine	$2.9B	99%	11.2%	10%	21%
EXELExelixis Inc.	$2.3B	96%	23.9%	18%	34%
MRNAModerna Inc.	$1.9B	55%	-126.4%	-35%	-77%
HALOHalozyme	$1.4B	83%	37.1%	17%	39%
TECHBio-Techne	$1.2B	67%	21.4%	9%	22%
NVAXNovavax Inc.	$1.1B	65%	-117.4%	-128%	-50%
BCRXBioCryst Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$875M	95%	-148.8%	-142%	-128%
RGENRepligen Corporation	$738M	55%	13.4%	4%	12%
Group median	—	75%	12.3%	7%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Halozyme has delivered.

Halozyme’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Halozyme earns about $542M on its 38.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 46.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($542M) Net of stock comp (−$58M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($670M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+20%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+34%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $668M on 119M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.6B. The if-converted diluted count is 123M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($13M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $670M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HALO against another business →

The owners of HALO: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Halozyme (HALO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HALO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HAL its page in the Manual HAS →

Industry order: ← GLUE the Biotechnology chapter IBRX →