← All companies ← NBHC Manual NBR → ← MYGN Biotechnology NEOG →

NBIX, Neurocrine

Biotechnology consumer brand Cyclical

Neurocrine Biosciences is a neuroscience-focused, biopharmaceutical company with a simple purpose: to relieve suffering for people with great needs.

Importantly, a larger sales force and enhanced infrastructure also position us for potential upcoming product launches from our diversified pipeline, which includes late-stage candidates in major depressive disorder (osavampator) and schizophrenia (direclidine).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NBIX · Neurocrine

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.9B

+21.4% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $1.9B

Operating margin 25.4% 5-yr avg 17.0%

ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 12%

Owner-earnings margin 27% 5-yr avg 23%

Free cash flow margin 27% 5-yr avg 22%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 99% and operating margin about 9.2% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −982% to 24% — on a steadier 99% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 10% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$15M	$162M	$451M	$788M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$2.4B	$2.9B	$3.1B	RevenueRevenue
100%	99%	99%	—	99%	99%	98%	98%	99%	98%	98%	Gross marginGross mgn
454%	105%	55%	45%	41%	51%	51%	47%	43%	40%	39%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
629%	75%	36%	—	26%	29%	31%	30%	31%	36%	34%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($147M)	($131M)	$37M	$72M	$163M	$103M	$249M	$251M	$571M	$619M	$789M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−982.5%	−81.3%	8.2%	9.2%	15.6%	9.0%	16.7%	13.3%	24.2%	21.6%	25.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($141M)	($143M)	$21M	$37M	$407M	$90M	$155M	$250M	$341M	$479M	$669M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	3%	20%	—	12%	28%	25%	30%	32%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($106M)	($94M)	$101M	$147M	$229M	$257M	$339M	$390M	$595M	$783M	$864M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1M	$2M	$4M	$7M	$9M	$11M	$15M	$18M	$24M	$26M	$27M	DepreciationDeprec.
$5M	$3M	$18M	$27M	($287M)	$22M	($3M)	($72M)	$35M	$60M	($54M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M	$7M	$25M	$15M	$11M	$23M	$17M	$28M	$38M	$34M	$32M	CapexCapex
27.4%	4.3%	5.5%	1.9%	1.0%	2.1%	1.1%	1.5%	1.6%	1.2%	1.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($108M)	($97M)	$97M	$140M	$220M	$246M	$323M	$372M	$572M	$757M	$831M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−717.6%	−59.8%	21.6%	17.7%	21.0%	21.7%	21.7%	19.7%	24.3%	26.5%	26.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($110M)	($101M)	$77M	$132M	$218M	$233M	$323M	$362M	$557M	$749M	$831M	Free cash flowFCF
−735.3%	−62.7%	17.0%	16.8%	20.8%	20.6%	21.7%	19.2%	23.7%	26.2%	26.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$43M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$300M	$168M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-50%	-21%	5%	11%	13%	7%	12%	10%	17%	17%	17%	ROICROIC
-45%	-38%	4%	6%	36%	7%	9%	11%	13%	15%	20%	Return on equityROE
−45%	−38%	4%	6%	36%	7%	9%	11%	13%	15%	20%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$351M	$763M	$867M	$970M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$562M	$251M	$233M	$713M	$936M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$0	$31M	$57M	$127M	$157M	$186M	$350M	$439M	$479M	$687M	$768M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$1M	$11M	$17M	$28M	$31M	$35M	$38M	$57M	$69M	$65M	InventoryInvent.
$5M	$6M	$14M	$141M	$169M	$226M	$348M	$449M	$462M	$674M	$773M	Accounts payablePayables
($5M)	$27M	$54M	$3M	$16M	($10M)	$38M	$29M	$75M	$82M	$60M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$310M	$555M	$738M	$831M	$1.0B	$973M	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$2.5B	$2.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$30M	$54M	$88M	$565M	$187M	$246M	$538M	$655M	$508M	$743M	$832M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
10.2×	10.2×	8.4×	1.5×	5.4×	4.0×	2.7×	2.5×	3.4×	3.4×	2.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$5M	$6M	$6M	—	$6M	GoodwillGoodwill
$365M	$818M	$993M	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.4B	$3.3B	$3.7B	$4.6B	$4.9B	Total assetsAssets
$0	$370M	$388M	$0	$318M	$335M	$0	—	—	—	$170M	Total debtDebt
($351M)	($394M)	($478M)	($970M)	($710M)	($937M)	($562M)	—	—	—	($767M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	-6.7×	1.2×	2.3×	5.0×	4.0×	35.1×	54.5×	—	—	171.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$315M	$372M	$481M	$637M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$3.3B	$3.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
189.8%	26.3%	12.9%	9.6%	9.6%	11.8%	11.6%	10.3%	8.3%	7.6%	7.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
86.7M	88.1M	95.4M	95.7M	97.8M	97.9M	98.9M	101M	104M	103M	103M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.17	$1.83	$4.73	$8.24	$10.69	$11.58	$15.05	$18.68	$22.71	$27.91	$30.00	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.63	$-1.62	$0.22	$0.39	$4.16	$0.92	$1.56	$2.47	$3.29	$4.67	$6.47	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.24	$-1.10	$1.02	$1.46	$2.25	$2.51	$3.26	$3.68	$5.51	$7.38	$8.04	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.27	$-1.15	$0.80	$1.38	$2.22	$2.38	$3.26	$3.58	$5.37	$7.30	$8.04	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05	$0.08	$0.26	$0.15	$0.11	$0.24	$0.17	$0.28	$0.37	$0.33	$0.31	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.63	$4.23	$5.04	$6.66	$11.52	$14.03	$17.27	$22.10	$24.97	$31.74	$32.95	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+75.9%/yr	+21.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	+26.8%/yr
EPS	—	+2.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+24.1%/yr	+24.4%/yr
Book value / share	+27.2%/yr	+22.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

103Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

17%low FY2016

Gross margin

98%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$757Mowner earningsvs.$479Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $757M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $26M it takes just to hold its position. It put $8M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $749M.

Reported net income$479M

Owner earnings$757M · 26% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$479M	$341M	$250M	$155M	$90M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$26M	+$24M	+$18M	+$15M	+$11M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$218M	+$196M	+$194M	+$173M	+$134M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$60M	+$35M	−$72M	−$3M	+$22M
Cash from operations	$783M	$595M	$390M	$339M	$257M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$26M	−$24M	−$18M	−$17M	−$11M
Owner earnings	$757M	$572M	$372M	$323M	$246M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$8M	−$15M	−$11M	—	−$13M
Free cash flow	$749M	$557M	$362M	$323M	$233M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	26%	24%	20%	22%	22%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $26M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $8M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $218M), owner earnings is nearer $539M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 134.6×

Comfortable

Operating income $619M ÷ interest expense $5M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$1.1B

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $713M + ST investments $371M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.1B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $299M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $1.4B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -4153d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 88 + DIO 483 − DPO 4724 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -50%–17%; 17% latest = NOPAT $420M ÷ invested capital $2.5B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 21%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -718%–26%; latest $757M = operating cash $783M − maintenance capex $26M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $218M of SBC) leaves $539M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.64×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $783M ÷ net income $479M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 22%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $168M ÷ Owner Earnings $757M

What this means
Of $757M Owner Earnings, $168M (22%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $168M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($218M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.31×

Expanding

Capex $34M ÷ depreciation $26M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.39×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $1.8B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.55/share (latest year $4.76), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $32.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −352% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −352% early to 20% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 46%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Worst year 2016 · −982.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.9%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we are unable to use generative AI, it could make our business less efficient and result in competitive disadvantages.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.4B

Cash & short-term investments$637M
Receivables$768M
Inventory$65M
Other current assets$967M

Current liabilities$832M

Accounts payable$773M
Other current liabilities$59M

Current ratio2.93×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.85×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.77×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+42.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.2× → 2.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$3.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$937MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$464M$464M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $471M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$11Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$57M

'27$59M

'28$60M

'29$60M

'30$61M

later$307M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$57Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$603Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$471Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$0

Lease obligations (present value)$471M

Total fixed claims on the business$471M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $471M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$202M · 8%
Buybacks$468M · 18%
Retained (debt / cash)$2.0B · 75%

Returned to owners$468M
19% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $468M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $468M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count19.2%
The diluted count rose from 87M to 103M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained59%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $603M, so each retained $1 added about 0.59 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Kevin C. Gorman, Ph.D	$14.1M	$4.5M	$246M
2022	Kevin C. Gorman, Ph.D	$11.9M	$21.9M	$323M
2023	Kevin C. Gorman, Ph.D	$15.8M	$12.3M	$372M
2024	Kevin C. Gorman, Ph.D	$16.0M	$16.7M	$572M
2024	Kyle W. Gano, Ph.D	$8.5M	$7.1M	$572M
2025	Kyle W. Gano, Ph.D	$13.4M	$10.9M	$757M
2025	—	$6.9M	$6.0M	$757M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership4.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio49:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$218M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 35% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Neurocrine is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?19.2%
Diluted shares grew 19.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $468M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$2.8B · 90% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In the aggregate, four of these customers across our INGREZZA and CRENESSITY distribution arrangements represent over 90% of our total gross product sales.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Biotechnology

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BMRNBioMarin	$3.2B	78%	-1.7%	-1%	1%
AMRXAmneal Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$3.0B	37%	7.9%	3%	9%
NBIXNeurocrine	$2.9B	99%	11.2%	10%	21%
QDELQuidelOrtho	$2.7B	—	4.6%	24%	2%
EXELExelixis Inc.	$2.3B	96%	23.9%	18%	34%
MRNAModerna Inc.	$1.9B	55%	-126.4%	-35%	-77%
HALOHalozyme	$1.4B	83%	37.1%	17%	39%
TECHBio-Techne	$1.2B	67%	21.4%	9%	22%
Group median	—	78%	9.6%	10%	15%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Neurocrine has delivered.

Neurocrine’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Neurocrine earns about $617M on its 21.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($617M) Net of stock comp (−$222M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($838M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+24%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+38%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $831M on 101M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $767M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($32M) runs well above depreciation ($27M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $838M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NBIX against another business →

The owners of NBIX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Neurocrine (NBIX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NBIX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NBHC its page in the Manual NBR →

Industry order: ← MYGN the Biotechnology chapter NEOG →