Owner Scorecard


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HIPO, Hippo Holdings Inc.

Hippo Holdings Inc. is a technology-native insurance holding company that, through its subsidiaries, delivers a broad range of insurance products to customers via its owned and partner MGAs which generated $1.1 billion of gross written premium in 2025.

Hippo Holdings Inc. offers its services primarily in the United States as of December 31, 2025.

Hippo had $436.1 million of stockholders' equity at year-end 2025, operates as a multi-carrier platform and strives to be the carrier of choice for leading MGAs.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HIPO · Hippo Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$469M
+25.9% YoY · 55% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $480M 5-yr avg $252M
Combined ratio 93% 5-yr avg 127%
Return on equity 25% 5-yr avg −34%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
It underwrites at a profit, about a 93% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 7% of premiums before investing the float). The float runs about 1.1× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$52M$91M$120M$210M$372M$469M$480MRevenueRevenue
$17M$39M$43M$108M$273M$380M$392MPremiums earnedPremiums
$1M$300K$9M$23M$24M$25M$26MInvestment incomeInv. inc.
($142M)($371M)($333M)($273M)($41M)$58M$113MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($65M)($125M)($162M)($92M)$48M$9M$53MOperating cash flowOp. cash
($66M)($125M)($166M)($112M)$47M$9M$53MOwner earningsOwner earn.
≈ 147%≈ 107%≈ 93%Combined ratioCombined
-43%-57%-72%-11%13%25%Return on equityROE
−43%−57%−72%−11%13%25%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$105M$261M$294M$323M$350M$420M$483MFloat (reserves)Float
$979M$1.6B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.9B$2.1BTotal assetsAssets
$452M$776M$195M$142M$198M$218M$275MCash & investmentsCash+inv
($200M)$860M$590M$378M$362M$436M$449MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
10.9M10.9M22.7M23.6M24.7M26.0M26.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$-13.03$-34.11$-14.66$-11.58$-1.64$2.22$4.27EPS (diluted)EPS
$-6.06$-11.51$-7.32$-4.76$1.91$0.35$2.02Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-18.38$78.96$25.93$16.03$14.66$16.77$17.03Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×2.09 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+30.6%/yr+30.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−36.4%/yr−36.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Net income+242.5%
    “Net Income (Loss) Attributable to Hippo For the year ended December 31, 2025, net income attributable to Hippo was $57.7 million, an increase of $98.2 million compared to $40.5 million loss for the year ended December 31, 2024 due to the factors described above.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
26Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$469Mlow FY2020
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Combined ratio ≈ 107%
    Underwriting loss
    Total benefits, losses and expenses $405M ÷ premiums earned $380M
    Industry peers: median 96%
    What this means

    The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.

  • Solid
    Net income $58M ÷ equity $436M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 1.0× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $420M, 1.0× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • 6.0% on the float
    Net investment income $25M, 6.0% on the float
    What this means

    What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI Technologies into their products more quickly or more successfully than us, which could impair our ability to compete effectively.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Jun 30, 2021

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$901K
  • Cash & short-term investments$275M
  • Receivables$282M
Current liabilities$1M
  • Accounts payable$89K
  • Other current liabilities$1M
Current ratio0.69×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio212.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($397K)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$435Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$14M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$84Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $36M of capital spent building

$54M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 63% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Richard McCathron$2.7M$2.0M($112M)
2024Richard McCathron$2.8M$6.5M$47M
2025Richard McCathron$6.0M$6.2M$9M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$29M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 50% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
GLREGreenlight Capital Re Ltd.$730M105%71%4%
JRVRJames River Group Holdings Inc.$688M106%74%5%
BOWBowhead Specialty Holdings Inc.$552M96%64%12%
HIPOHippo Holdings Inc.$469M107%-43%
GBLIGlobal Indemnity Group, LLC$451M59%4%
ASICAtegrity Specialty Insurance Company Holdings$424M91%59%12%
ACICAmerican Coastal Insurance Corporation$335M62%2%
AMSFAMERISAFE Inc.$317M84%57%18%
Group median101%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Hippo Holdings Inc.’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered−30%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity−48%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $435M on 26M shares, a −48% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hippo Holdings Inc. (HIPO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HIPO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HIMS its page in the Manual HIVE →

Industry order: ← HIG the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter HMN →