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HIMS, Hims & Hers Health

Health Care Providers & Services capital-intensive Distress / turnaround

Hims & Hers platform offers a streamlined, personalized patient and clinician experience that includes access to consistent follow-up care, facilitated by proprietary algorithms and a customizable and integrated technology stack.

The Hims & Hers platforms (collectively, our "platform") include access to a highly-qualified and technologically-innovative provider network, an electronic medical record system designed to support providers and customers, digital prescriptions, cloud pharmacy fulfillment, and personalization capabilities.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

HIMS · Hims & Hers Health

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.3B

+59.0% YoY · 74% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.4B 5-yr avg $1.1B

Gross margin 72% 5-yr avg 78%

Operating margin −1.3% 5-yr avg −10.0%

ROIC −2% 5-yr avg −6%

Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −10% through the cycle on a 75% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −33 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −9%, above 15% in 1 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$83M	$149M	$272M	$527M	$872M	$1.5B	$2.3B	$2.4B	RevenueRevenue
54%	74%	75%	78%	82%	79%	74%	72%	Gross marginGross mgn
68%	44%	68%	19%	15%	11%	12%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($74M)	($15M)	($115M)	($69M)	($29M)	$62M	$106M	($31M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−90.1%	−10.2%	−42.3%	−13.0%	−3.4%	4.2%	4.5%	−1.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($72M)	($18M)	($108M)	($66M)	($24M)	$126M	$128M	($13M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
($75M)	($2M)	($34M)	($27M)	$73M	$251M	$300M	$280M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$260K	$1M	$4M	$7M	$10M	$17M	$55M	$68M	DepreciationDeprec.
($11M)	$9M	$2M	($11M)	$21M	$16M	($18M)	$78M	Working capital & otherWC & other
—	—	—	$7M	$27M	$53M	$243M	$220M	CapexCapex
—	—	—	1.4%	3.0%	3.6%	10.3%	9.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
—	—	—	($34M)	$64M	$234M	$246M	$212M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
—	—	—	−6.4%	7.3%	15.8%	10.5%	9.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
—	—	—	($34M)	$47M	$198M	$57M	$60M	Free cash flowFCF
—	—	—	−6.4%	5.4%	13.4%	2.4%	2.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$46M	$0	$0	$15M	$145M	$278M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$0	$0	$0	$2M	$83M	$90M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-35%	-20%	-9%	24%	8%	-2%	ROICROIC
—	—	-32%	-21%	-7%	26%	24%	-3%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−32%	−21%	−7%	26%	24%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$2M	$27M	$72M	$47M	$97M	$221M	$229M	$222M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$1M	$4M	$4M	$7M	$6M	$32M	$150M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$4M	$14M	$22M	$22M	$64M	$80M	$79M	InventoryInvent.
$18K	$8M	$20M	$32M	$43M	$91M	$143M	$307M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($3M)	($2M)	($7M)	($14M)	($21M)	($31M)	($78M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2M	$113M	$270M	$217M	$265M	$396M	$768M	$1.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$979K	$15M	$79M	$48M	$88M	$221M	$404M	$619M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	7.4×	3.4×	4.5×	3.0×	1.8×	1.9×	1.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$0	$111M	$111M	$111M	$113M	$278M	$343M	GoodwillGoodwill
$205M	$119M	$421M	$366M	$441M	$708M	$2.2B	$2.3B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$973M	$974M	Total debtDebt
—	—	—	—	—	($221M)	$744M	$752M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($140M)	($147M)	$335M	$312M	$344M	$477M	$541M	$446M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
9.7%	3.9%	24.7%	8.1%	7.6%	6.3%	5.8%	6.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
34.8M	35.4M	187M	205M	209M	237M	258M	228M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.38	$4.21	$1.46	$2.58	$4.17	$6.24	$9.09	$10.38	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.07	$-0.51	$-0.58	$-0.32	$-0.11	$0.53	$0.50	$-0.06	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	—	$-0.16	$0.31	$0.99	$0.95	$0.93	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	—	$-0.16	$0.22	$0.84	$0.22	$0.26	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	$0.04	$0.13	$0.22	$0.94	$0.96	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-4.02	$-4.15	$1.79	$1.52	$1.64	$2.01	$2.09	$1.95	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×5.28 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+25.1%/yr	+16.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+198.8%/yr (3-yr)	+198.8%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

258Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

8%low FY2021

Gross margin

74%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$246Mowner earningsvs.$128Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2023FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $246M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $55M it takes just to hold its position. It put $188M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $57M.

Reported net income$128M

Owner earnings$246M · 10% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$128M	$126M	($24M)	($66M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$55M	+$17M	+$10M	+$7M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$135M	+$92M	+$66M	+$43M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$18M	+$16M	+$21M	−$11M
Cash from operations	$300M	$251M	$73M	($27M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$55M	−$17M	−$10M	−$7M
Owner earnings	$246M	$234M	$64M	($34M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$188M	−$36M	−$17M	—
Free cash flow	$57M	$198M	$47M	($34M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	10%	16%	7%	-6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $55M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $188M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $135M), owner earnings is nearer $110M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $744M · 7.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $229M − debt $973M

What this means
Netting $229M of cash and short-term investments against $973M of debt leaves $744M owed, about 7.0× a year's operating profit (9.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -33d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 5 + DIO 48 − DPO 85 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -9%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -35%–24%; 8% latest = NOPAT $106M ÷ invested capital $1.3B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

4-yr median margin, range -6%–16%; latest $246M = operating cash $300M − maintenance capex $55M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 4 years. It chose to put $188M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $57M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $135M of SBC) leaves $110M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.34×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $300M ÷ net income $128M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 37%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $90M ÷ Owner Earnings $246M

What this means
Of $246M Owner Earnings, $90M (37%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $90M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($135M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 4.45×

Expanding

Capex $243M ÷ depreciation $55M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.90×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $973M vs $363M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.34/share (latest year $0.56), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −48% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −48% early to 2% lately, median −10% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +151%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 151% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · −90.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Any technological breakthroughs in monitoring, treatment, or prevention of medical conditions, including through disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, that we are unable to similarly leverage could reduce the potential market for our offerings, which could significantly reduce our revenue and our pot…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B

Cash & short-term investments$222M
Receivables$150M
Inventory$79M
Other current assets$594M

Current liabilities$619M

Accounts payable$307M
Other current liabilities$312M

Current ratio1.69×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.56×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.36×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$427Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 1.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($158M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($776M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$158M$158M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$165Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $598M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$329M · 55%
Buybacks$175M · 29%
Retained (debt / cash)$94M · 16%

Returned to owners$175M
34% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $175M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $175M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $175M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count11.7%
The diluted count rose from 205M to 228M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$474M22% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity51%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$207Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $329M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Andrew Dudum	$15.2M	$26.8M	—
2022	Andrew Dudum	$10.8M	$10.7M	($34M)
2023	Andrew Dudum	$14.4M	$21.4M	$64M
2024	Andrew Dudum	$24.6M	$110.3M	$234M
2025	Andrew Dudum	$23.0M	$159.7M	$246M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership8.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$135M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 128% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hims & Hers Health is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.7%
Diluted shares grew 11.7% over 2022–2025, even as the company spent $175M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ENSGEnsign Group	$5.0B	20%	7.7%	17%	5%
ACHCAcadia Healthcare Company Inc.	$3.3B	—	13.1%	5%	11%
AHCOAdaptHealth Corp.	$3.2B	18%	6.6%	4%	7%
BKDBrookdale Senior Living Inc.	$3.2B	—	-1.3%	-1%	-1%
HIMSHims & Hers Health	$2.3B	75%	-10.2%	-9%	9%
RDNTRadNet	$2.0B	13%	4.9%	4%	5%
NHCNational HealthCare Corporation	$1.5B	—	5.3%	6%	7%
SHCSotera Health	$1.2B	55%	25.2%	7%	13%
Group median	—	20%	6.0%	5%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hims & Hers Health has delivered.

Hims & Hers Health’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Hims & Hers Health earns about $209M on its 8.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($209M) Net of stock comp (−$147M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($226M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25+168%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $60M on 228M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $752M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($220M) runs well above depreciation ($68M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $226M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HIMS against another business →

The owners of HIMS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hims & Hers Health (HIMS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HIMS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HII its page in the Manual HIPO →

Industry order: ← HCSG the Health Care Providers & Services chapter INNV →