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HLMN, Hillman Solutions Corp.

Hillman Solutions Corp. are one of the largest providers of hardware-related products and related merchandising services to retail markets in North America.

Hillman sells its products to hardware stores, home centers, mass merchants, pet supply stores, and other retail outlets principally in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Product lines include thousands of small parts such as fasteners and related hardware items; threaded rod and metal shapes; keys; builder's hardware; personal protective equipment, such as gloves and eye-wear; rope and chain; and identification items, such as tags and letters, numbers, and signs.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

HLMN · Hillman Solutions Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.6B

+5.4% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.6B 5-yr avg $1.5B

Operating margin 6.8% 5-yr avg 4.2%

ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 2%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Hardware and Protective Solutions (77%), Robotics and Digital Solutions (14%) and Canada (9%).
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 4.1% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.6% to 7.3% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 29% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Hardware and Protective Solutions is 77% of revenue, with Robotics and Digital Solutions the other meaningful segment at 14%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Hardware and Protective Solutions77%$1.2B
Robotics and Digital Solutions14%$220M
Canada9%$138M

By geographyUnited States90%Canada9%Mexico1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	RevenueRevenue
31%	29%	31%	32%	31%	33%	32%	32%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$8M	$66M	$10M	$40M	$61M	$89M	$114M	$106M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.6%	4.8%	0.7%	2.7%	4.1%	6.0%	7.3%	6.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($85M)	($24M)	($38M)	($16M)	($10M)	$17M	$40M	$36M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	35%	29%	30%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$52M	$92M	($110M)	$119M	$238M	$183M	$105M	$86M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$125M	$127M	$121M	$120M	$122M	$130M	$141M	$144M	DepreciationDeprec.
$10M	($15M)	($208M)	$2M	$114M	$23M	($90M)	($108M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$58M	$45M	$52M	$70M	$66M	$85M	$70M	$64M	CapexCapex
4.8%	3.3%	3.6%	4.7%	4.5%	5.8%	4.5%	4.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($5M)	$47M	($162M)	$49M	$172M	$98M	$35M	$22M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.4%	3.4%	−11.3%	3.3%	11.7%	6.7%	2.3%	1.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($5M)	$47M	($162M)	$49M	$172M	$98M	$35M	$22M	Free cash flowFCF
−0.4%	3.4%	−11.3%	3.3%	11.7%	6.7%	2.3%	1.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M	$800K	$39M	$3M	$2M	$58M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$12M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
2%	3%	0%	2%	3%	3%	4%	4%	ROICROIC
-23%	-7%	-3%	-1%	-1%	1%	3%	3%	Return on equityROE
−23%	−7%	−3%	−1%	−1%	1%	3%	3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$0	$22M	$15M	$31M	$39M	$45M	$27M	$28M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$121M	$107M	$87M	$103M	$110M	$115M	$139M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$392M	$534M	$489M	$383M	$404M	$486M	$483M	InventoryInvent.
$0	$201M	$186M	$132M	$140M	$139M	$142M	$140M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$311M	$455M	$445M	$346M	$374M	$459M	$482M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$0	$554M	$668M	$632M	$548M	$573M	$646M	$670M	Current assetsCur. assets
$0	$312M	$277M	$215M	$223M	$254M	$258M	$227M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.8×	2.4×	2.9×	2.5×	2.3×	2.5×	2.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$816M	$825M	$824M	$825M	$829M	$831M	$830M	GoodwillGoodwill
$0	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.4B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.5B	$946M	$919M	$761M	$719M	$693M	$738M	Total debtDebt
—	$1.5B	$931M	$888M	$722M	$674M	$666M	$710M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$374M	$365M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.4%	1.1%	0.9%	0.8%	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
134M	135M	135M	194M	195M	199M	199M	197M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$9.05	$10.15	$10.59	$7.65	$7.58	$7.40	$7.78	$7.95	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.64	$-0.18	$-0.28	$-0.08	$-0.05	$0.09	$0.20	$0.18	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.04	$0.35	$-1.20	$0.25	$0.88	$0.49	$0.18	$0.11	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.04	$0.35	$-1.20	$0.25	$0.88	$0.49	$0.18	$0.11	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.43	$0.34	$0.38	$0.36	$0.34	$0.43	$0.35	$0.33	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.79	$2.70	$8.54	$5.95	$5.93	$5.94	$6.16	$6.18	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−2.5%/yr	−5.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share	—	−12.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	−3.3%/yr	+0.9%/yr
Book value / share	+14.1%/yr	+17.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

199Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

4%low FY2021

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

19.0×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$35Mowner earningsvs.$40Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $40M of profit but $35M of owner earnings: $5M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$40M

Owner earnings$35M · 2% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$40M	$17M	($10M)	($16M)	($38M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$141M	+$130M	+$122M	+$120M	+$121M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$14M	+$13M	+$12M	+$14M	+$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$90M	+$23M	+$114M	+$2M	−$208M
Cash from operations	$105M	$183M	$238M	$119M	($110M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$70M	−$85M	−$66M	−$70M	−$52M
Owner earnings	$35M	$98M	$172M	$49M	($162M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	7%	12%	3%	-11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $21M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $666M · 5.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $27M − debt $693M

What this means
Netting $27M of cash and short-term investments against $693M of debt leaves $666M owed, about 5.8× a year's operating profit (6.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range 0%–4%; 4% latest = NOPAT $81M ÷ invested capital $1.9B

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $35M = operating cash $105M − maintenance capex $70M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 3%)

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $21M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.61×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $105M ÷ net income $40M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 35%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $12M ÷ Owner Earnings $35M

What this means
Of $35M Owner Earnings, $12M (35%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $12M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($14M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.50×

Harvesting

Capex $70M ÷ depreciation $141M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.51×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $693M vs $389M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.08/share (latest year $0.21), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.26/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 6% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +21%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 0.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$670M

Cash & short-term investments$28M
Receivables$139M
Inventory$483M
Other current assets$20M

Current liabilities$227M

Accounts payable$140M
Other current liabilities$87M

Current ratio2.95×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.82×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$443Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 2.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($145M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($475M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$797M$83M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $680M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$445M · 66%
Buybacks$12M · 2%
Retained (debt / cash)$222M · 33%

Returned to owners$12M
5% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $12M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$9.07
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $12M, about $9.07 each.
Net change in share count46.6%
The diluted count rose from 134M to 197M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B58% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity68%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$108Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $445M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$3.3M	$8.2M	($162M)
2022	$2.6M	−$2.6M	$49M
2023	$3.6M	$6.7M	$172M
2024	$4.4M	$4.5M	$98M
2025	$3.7M	$3.2M	$35M
2025	$3.4M	$2.6M	$35M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio84:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$14M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hillman Solutions Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?46.6%
Diluted shares grew 46.6% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $12M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$672M · 43% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“We sell our products to a large volume of customers, the top two of which accounted for approximately $674.3 million, or approximately 43% of our total revenues in 2025.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SNASnap-on	$4.7B	53%	25.8%	17%	17%
SSDSimpson Manufacturing	$2.3B	46%	19.4%	19%	13%
MTRNMaterion Corporation	$1.8B	19%	5.1%	7%	4%
CXTCrane NXT Co.	$1.7B	40%	14.4%	14%	11%
AZZAZZ Inc.	$1.7B	24%	13.1%	7%	10%
PKOHPark-Ohio Holdings Corp.	$1.6B	16%	5.0%	7%	1%
HLMNHillman Solutions Corp.	$1.6B	—	4.1%	3%	3%
MWAMueller Water Products	$1.4B	33%	12.6%	11%	8%
Group median	—	—	12.9%	9%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hillman Solutions Corp. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Hillman Solutions Corp. earns about $52M on its 3.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($52M) Net of stock comp (−$15M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+21%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $22M on 196M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $710M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh HLMN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hillman Solutions Corp. (HLMN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HLMN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HLLY its page in the Manual HLNE →

Industry order: ← GFF the Building Products chapter IBP →