← All companies ← HLIT Manual HLMN → ← GTX Auto Components INVZ →
HLLY, Holley Inc.
An automaker, turning heavy plant and development spend into vehicles sold through the cycle.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.4% to 17% — on a steadier 40% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 29% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $369M | $504M | $693M | $688M | $660M | $602M | $614M | $608M | RevenueRevenue |
| 40% | 41% | 41% | 37% | 39% | 40% | 43% | 43% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 17% | 14% | 17% | 22% | 18% | 22% | 24% | 24% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 6% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $46M | $85M | $78M | $51M | $94M | $15M | $82M | $81M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 12.5% | 16.9% | 11.2% | 7.4% | 14.3% | 2.4% | 13.4% | 13.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $561K | $33M | ($27M) | $74M | $19M | ($23M) | $19M | $24M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 21% | — | 6% | 30% | — | 33% | 30% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $9M | $88M | $22M | $12M | $88M | $47M | $46M | $51M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $9M | $8M | $12M | $10M | $10M | $11M | $10M | $10M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $30K | $48M | $37M | ($72M) | $59M | $60M | $17M | $18M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7M | $9M | $15M | $14M | $6M | $7M | $12M | $13M | CapexCapex |
| 2.0% | 1.9% | 2.2% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 2.0% | 2.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2M | $79M | $10M | $2M | $82M | $40M | $37M | $41M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.5% | 15.7% | 1.5% | 0.3% | 12.5% | 6.7% | 6.0% | 6.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2M | $79M | $6M | ($1M) | $82M | $40M | $34M | $38M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.5% | 15.7% | 0.9% | −0.2% | 12.5% | 6.7% | 5.5% | 6.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $6M | $157M | $119M | $14M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | 8% | — | 5% | 7% | — | 6% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 0% | 14% | -9% | 18% | 4% | -6% | 4% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| 0% | 14% | −9% | 18% | 4% | −6% | 4% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $8M | $322M | $36M | $26M | $41M | $56M | $37M | $283M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $134M | $185M | $234M | $192M | $193M | $206M | $211M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $35M | $46M | $45M | $44M | $45M | $60M | $51M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $99M | $139M | $189M | $149M | $148M | $146M | $211M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $258M | $292M | $325M | $297M | $297M | $316M | $318M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $82M | $92M | $101M | $94M | $95M | $115M | $100M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 3.1× | 3.2× | 3.2× | 3.2× | 3.1× | 2.7× | 3.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $298M | $359M | $411M | $418M | $419M | $372M | $372M | $375M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $655M | $646M | $651M | $584M | $553M | $523M | $537M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $333M | $609M | $624M | $543M | $496M | $485M | $254M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.9× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 0.3× | 1.6× | 1.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $205M | $240M | $304M | $416M | $441M | $421M | $449M | $456M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 67.7M | 67.7M | 90.0M | 117M | 119M | 118M | 120M | 122M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $5.45 | $7.45 | $7.70 | $5.87 | $5.57 | $5.08 | $5.11 | $4.98 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.49 | $-0.30 | $0.63 | $0.16 | $-0.20 | $0.16 | $0.19 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.03 | $1.17 | $0.11 | $0.02 | $0.69 | $0.34 | $0.30 | $0.34 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.03 | $1.17 | $0.07 | $-0.01 | $0.69 | $0.34 | $0.28 | $0.31 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.11 | $0.14 | $0.17 | $0.12 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.10 | $0.11 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.04 | $3.55 | $3.38 | $3.55 | $3.72 | $3.56 | $3.74 | $3.74 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.1%/yr | −7.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +47.5%/yr | −23.6%/yr |
| EPS | +63.7%/yr | −19.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.1%/yr | −5.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.5%/yr | +1.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $37M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $10M it takes just to hold its position. It put $3M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $34M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $19M | ($23M) | $19M | $74M | ($27M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$10M | +$11M | +$10M | +$10M | +$12M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$17M | +$60M | +$59M | −$72M | +$37M |
| Cash from operations | $46M | $47M | $88M | $12M | $22M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$10M | −$7M | −$6M | −$10M | −$12M |
| Owner earnings | $37M | $40M | $82M | $2M | $10M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$3M | — | — | −$3M | −$4M |
| Free cash flow | $34M | $40M | $82M | ($1M) | $6M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 7% | 12% | 0% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $10M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $3M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $82M ÷ interest expense $52M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $485M · 5.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $37M − debt $523M
What this means
Netting $37M of cash and short-term investments against $523M of debt leaves $485M owed, about 5.9× a year's operating profit (6.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $250M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $235M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range 5%–8%; 6% latest = NOPAT $55M ÷ invested capital $934MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 0%–16%; latest $37M = operating cash $46M − maintenance capex $10MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 7 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $46M ÷ net income $19M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.27×ExpandingCapex $12M ÷ depreciation $10M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $614M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.75×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $523M vs $201M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +141%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.04/share (latest year $0.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (10%) sits below the early years (14%), but the latest year (13%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 12% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 2.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +10.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$33M
- Receivables$51M
- Inventory$211M
- Other current assets$23M
- Debt due within a year$7M
- Accounts payable$51M
- Other current liabilities$43M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $313M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$71M · 23%
- Retained (debt / cash)$242M · 77%
- Net change in share count80.3%
The diluted count rose from 68M to 122M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained24%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($95M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $23M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$41M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Holley Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?80.3%
Diluted shares grew 80.3% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Auto Components
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GNTXGentex | $2.5B | 36% | 23.7% | 22% | 21% |
| DORMDorman Products Inc. | $2.1B | 37% | 13.4% | 14% | 7% |
| SMPStandard Motor Products Inc. | $1.8B | 29% | 8.0% | 11% | 5% |
| ATMUAtmus Filtration Technologies Inc. | $1.8B | 27% | 15.3% | 36% | 8% |
| THRMGentherm Inc | $1.5B | 29% | 8.0% | 9% | 6% |
| MLRMiller Industries Inc. | $790M | 12% | 5.7% | 13% | 2% |
| HLLYHolley Inc. | $614M | 40% | 12.5% | 6% | 6% |
| STRTSTRATTEC SECURITY CORPORATION | $565M | 12% | 3.2% | 5% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 29% | 10.3% | 12% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Holley Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Holley Inc. earns about $37M on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $38M on 121M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $254M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($13M) runs well above depreciation ($10M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $42M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← HLIT its page in the Manual HLMN →
Industry order: ← GTX the Auto Components chapter INVZ →