Owner Scorecard


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HZO, MarineMax Inc. (FL)

We are the world's largest recreational boat and yacht retailer, marina operator and superyacht services company.

Through our over 70 retail locations in 21 states, we sell new and used recreational boats and related marine products, including engines, trailers, parts, and accessories.

IGY Marinas has created standards for service and quality in nautical tourism.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HZO · MarineMax Inc. (FL)
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.3B
−5.0% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.2B 5-yr avg $2.3B
Gross margin 33% 5-yr avg 33%
Operating margin −0.5% 5-yr avg 7.4%
ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 23%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 5.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.5% to 11% — on a steadier 26% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 34% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 13%, above 15% in 4 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$942M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.5B$2.1B$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$2.3B$2.2BRevenueRevenue
24%25%25%26%26%32%35%35%33%32%33%Gross marginGross mgn
20%21%20%21%19%22%23%26%28%28%30%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$40M$45M$63M$61M$107M$209M$265M$201M$128M$34M($12M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%4.3%5.4%4.9%7.1%10.2%11.5%8.4%5.3%1.5%−0.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M$24M$39M$36M$75M$155M$198M$109M$38M($32M)($64M)Net incomeNet inc.
35%38%26%26%23%25%24%26%29%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$23M$5M$70M($12M)$305M$374M$77M($222M)($26M)$73M$219MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$8M$9M$11M$12M$13M$16M$19M$41M$44M$49M$51MDepreciationDeprec.
($12M)($34M)$14M($67M)$210M$194M($157M)($394M)($132M)$36M$216MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$13M$14M$14M$17M$13M$26M$58M$65M$60M$61M$49MCapexCapex
1.4%1.4%1.2%1.4%0.8%1.3%2.5%2.7%2.5%2.6%2.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$15M($5M)$60M($24M)$292M$358M$57M($263M)($70M)$12M$169MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.6%−0.4%5.1%−1.9%19.3%17.4%2.5%−11.0%−2.9%0.5%7.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$10M($10M)$57M($29M)$292M$348M$18M($288M)($86M)$12M$169MFree cash flowFCF
1.1%−0.9%4.8%−2.4%19.3%16.9%0.8%−12.0%−3.5%0.5%7.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$17M$19M$11M$41M$20M$134M$83M$517M$22M$10M$10MAcquisitionsAcquis.
10%11%15%13%27%37%33%13%8%-1%ROICROIC
7%8%11%10%16%26%25%12%4%-3%-7%Return on equityROE
7%8%11%10%16%26%25%12%4%−3%−7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$39M$42M$49M$39M$155M$222M$228M$201M$224M$170M$189MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$25M$25M$34M$42M$40M$48M$50M$86M$106M$108M$101MReceivablesReceiv.
$322M$401M$377M$477M$298M$231M$454M$813M$907M$867M$845MInventoryInvent.
$10M$26M$23M$34M$37M$26M$34M$72M$54M$56M$63MAccounts payablePayables
$337M$400M$388M$486M$301M$253M$470M$827M$959M$919M$884MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$391M$474M$465M$569M$503M$518M$754M$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$232M$335M$286M$413M$273M$251M$413M$847M$1.1B$985M$983MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.4×1.6×1.4×1.8×2.1×1.8×1.3×1.2×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$10M$26M$27M$64M$84M$196M$236M$560M$592M$527M$526MGoodwillGoodwill
$547M$640M$641M$784M$775M$1.0B$1.4B$2.4B$2.6B$2.5B$2.4BTotal assetsAssets
$0$0$0$0$8M$51M$48M$423M$390M$392M$374MTotal debtDebt
($39M)($42M)($49M)($39M)($148M)($171M)($180M)$222M$165M$221M$185MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.4×6.1×6.4×5.2×11.5×57.2×80.8×3.8×1.7×0.5×-0.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$312M$302M$353M$369M$455M$595M$783M$916M$976M$937M$932MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.6%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.7%0.9%1.0%0.8%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
24.8M24.7M23.0M22.9M22.1M22.9M22.4M22.4M23.0M22.1M22.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$37.95$42.64$51.12$54.07$68.23$90.26$103.04$106.77$105.63$104.72$101.98Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.91$0.95$1.71$1.57$3.37$6.78$8.84$4.87$1.65$-1.43$-2.89EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.60$-0.19$2.59$-1.05$13.19$15.67$2.55$-11.74$-3.05$0.54$7.70Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.40$-0.39$2.46$-1.29$13.19$15.21$0.81$-12.82$-3.74$0.54$7.70Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.52$0.58$0.60$0.75$0.58$1.14$2.61$2.92$2.63$2.76$2.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.59$12.25$15.33$16.12$20.58$26.02$34.94$40.83$42.40$42.50$42.40Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.9%/yr+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.1%/yr−47.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+20.4%/yr+36.7%/yr
Book value / share+14.5%/yr+15.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-5.0%
    “Revenue decreased $121.7 million, or 5.0%, to approximately $2.309 billion for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2025 from $2.431 billion for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2024. The decrease is due to a $48.6 million or 2% decrease in comparable-store sales, in addition to a $73.1 million net decrease from closed stores and manufacturing revenue that are not eligible for inclusion in comparable-store sales.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
22Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
8%low FY2024
Gross margin
32%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
18.5×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$12Mowner earningsvs.($32M)net incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $32M loss into $12M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($32M)$38M$109M$198M$155M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$49M+$44M+$41M+$19M+$16M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$24M+$22M+$16M+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$36M−$132M−$394M−$157M+$194M
Cash from operations$73M($26M)($222M)$77M$374M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$61M−$44M−$41M−$19M−$16M
Owner earnings$12M($70M)($263M)$57M$358M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$16M−$24M−$39M−$11M
Free cash flow$12M($86M)($288M)$18M$348M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%-3%-11%2%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($7M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $34M ÷ interest expense $71M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $221M · 6.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $170M − debt $392M
    What this means

    Netting $170M of cash and short-term investments against $392M of debt leaves $221M owed, about 6.5× a year's operating profit (11.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 17 + DIO 203 − DPO 13 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 8%–37%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -11%–19%; latest $12M = operating cash $73M − maintenance capex $61M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($7M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($32M) · cash from operations $73M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.23×
    Expanding
    Capex $61M ÷ depreciation $49M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.20×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $392M vs $196M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +35%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.75/share (latest year $-1.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $42.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 5% early, 5% lately, median 5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2025 · 1.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$189M
  • Receivables$101M
  • Inventory$845M
  • Other current assets$25M
Current liabilities$983M
  • Debt due within a year$36M
  • Accounts payable$63M
  • Other current liabilities$885M
Current ratio1.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.32×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$178Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$36M due · $189M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−16.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$392Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($337M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$516M$141M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$62Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $666M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$342M · 51%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$323M · 49%
  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $374M and cash and short-term investments rose $151M.

  • Net change in share count−11.4%

    The diluted count fell from 25M to 22M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−20%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($665M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $130M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$542M22% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity56%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$873Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $342M of capital spent building

$69M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021W. Brett McGill$4.0M$8.5M$358M
2022W. Brett McGill$5.5M$2.5M$57M
2023W. Brett McGill$6.0M$5.9M($263M)
2024W. Brett McGill$6.5M$7.1M($70M)
2025W. Brett McGill$6.3M$2.3M$12M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 57% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MarineMax Inc. (FL) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.5% vs 2.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.1% early in the record and −4.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $374M

    Debt rose from $0 to $374M while owner earnings went from about $23M to ($107M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AZOAutoZone Inc.$18.9B53%19.3%60%14%
ORLYO'Reilly Automotive Inc.$17.8B52%19.6%51%15%
AAPAdvance Auto Parts$8.6B44%6.1%13%4%
RUSHARush Enterprises Inc. Common Stock Cl A$7.1B16%4.7%12%5%
CWHCamping World Holdings$6.4B30%6.1%18%2%
CPRTCopart$4.6B89%36.8%26%30%
HZOMarineMax Inc. (FL)$2.3B29%5.3%13%1%
OPLNOPENLANE Inc.$1.9B10.2%8%11%
Group median44%8.1%16%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MarineMax Inc. (FL) has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, MarineMax Inc. (FL) earns about $24M on its 1.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $169M on 22M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net debt $185M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MarineMax Inc. (FL) (HZO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HZO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HYLN its page in the Manual IAC →

Industry order: ← HTZWW the Auto Dealers & Services chapter KMX →