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CPRT, Copart

We are a leading global provider of online auctions and vehicle remarketing services with operations in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Brazil, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, Spain, Finland, Oman, the Republic of Ireland, and Bahrain.

For example, many of the automobiles sold through our auction platform are purchased for use in developing countries where affordable transportation is a critical enabler of education, health care, and well-being.

For example, we mobilized our people, and engaged with a multitude of service providers to timely retrieve, store, and remarket tens of thousands of flood-damaged vehicles in South Florida in the wake of Hurricanes Helene and Milton in the fall of 2024.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CPRT · Copart

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.6B

+9.7% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $4.6B 5-yr avg $3.8B

Gross margin 95%

Operating margin 36.6% 5-yr avg 38.7%

ROIC 25% 5-yr avg 27%

Owner-earnings margin 32% 5-yr avg 31%

Free cash flow margin 29% 5-yr avg 23%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 89% and operating margin about 37% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (32%–42% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 26%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 30% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.7B	$3.5B	$3.9B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$4.6B	RevenueRevenue
89%	91%	89%	87%	—	—	—	—	—	—	95%	Gross marginGross mgn
11%	10%	10%	9%	9%	8%	7%	6%	8%	9%	9%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$406M	$461M	$584M	$716M	$816M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
32.0%	31.9%	32.4%	35.1%	37.0%	42.2%	39.3%	38.4%	37.1%	36.5%	36.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$270M	$394M	$418M	$592M	$700M	$936M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Net incomeNet inc.
32%	10%	26%	16%	13%	17%	19%	20%	21%	18%	19%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$332M	$492M	$535M	$647M	$918M	$991M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.7B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$49M	$57M	$79M	$85M	$101M	$122M	$138M	$159M	$190M	$216M	$222M	DepreciationDeprec.
($7M)	$20M	$15M	($53M)	$93M	($108M)	($90M)	($73M)	($115M)	($7M)	($128M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$174M	$172M	$288M	$374M	$592M	$463M	$337M	$517M	$511M	$569M	$346M	CapexCapex
13.7%	11.9%	15.9%	18.3%	26.8%	17.2%	9.6%	13.4%	12.1%	12.2%	7.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$284M	$435M	$456M	$562M	$816M	$869M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.5B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
22.4%	30.0%	25.3%	27.5%	37.0%	32.3%	29.7%	31.1%	30.3%	34.1%	31.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$159M	$320M	$247M	$273M	$326M	$528M	$839M	$848M	$962M	$1.2B	$1.3B	Free cash flowFCF
12.5%	22.1%	13.7%	13.4%	14.8%	19.6%	24.0%	21.9%	22.7%	26.5%	28.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$161M	$9M	$745K	$12M	$5M	$107M	$0	—	$1M	$5M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$443M	$0	$0	$365M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
22%	27%	25%	30%	30%	33%	34%	23%	21%	22%	25%	ROICROIC
35%	36%	26%	33%	28%	27%	24%	21%	18%	17%	18%	Return on equityROE
35%	36%	26%	33%	28%	27%	24%	21%	18%	17%	18%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$156M	$210M	$275M	$186M	$478M	$1.0B	$1.4B	$957M	$1.5B	$2.8B	$3.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$266M	$312M	$352M	$367M	$350M	$481M	$579M	$702M	$786M	$763M	$794M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$10M	$10M	$17M	$21M	$20M	$45M	$59M	$40M	$44M	$40M	$50M	InventoryInvent.
$30M	$21M	$65M	$46M	$41M	$40M	$55M	$36M	$24M	$30M	$598M	Accounts payablePayables
$247M	$301M	$303M	$343M	$329M	$486M	$582M	$706M	$806M	$773M	$246M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$499M	$587M	$709M	$687M	$964M	$1.7B	$2.2B	$3.3B	$4.4B	$5.8B	$5.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$279M	$302M	$277M	$282M	$356M	$421M	$441M	$493M	$629M	$683M	$685M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×	1.9×	2.6×	2.4×	2.7×	4.0×	5.0×	6.6×	7.0×	8.4×	7.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$260M	$340M	$337M	$333M	$344M	$356M	$402M	$394M	$514M	$518M	$523M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.6B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$3.5B	$4.6B	$5.3B	$6.7B	$8.4B	$10.1B	$9.6B	Total assetsAssets
$638M	$631M	$400M	$400M	$400M	$400M	$2M	$11M	$0	—	$11M	Total debtDebt
$482M	$421M	$125M	$214M	($78M)	($648M)	($1.4B)	($946M)	($1.5B)	—	($3.3B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
17.2×	19.4×	28.7×	36.2×	40.3×	—	—	—	—	—	83.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$774M	$1.1B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$2.5B	$3.5B	$4.6B	$6.0B	$7.5B	$9.2B	$8.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%	1.4%	1.3%	1.1%	1.1%	1.5%	1.1%	1.0%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
977M	948M	968M	962M	955M	961M	965M	967M	975M	978M	965M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.30	$1.53	$1.87	$2.12	$2.31	$2.80	$3.63	$4.00	$4.35	$4.75	$4.81	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.28	$0.42	$0.43	$0.62	$0.73	$0.97	$1.13	$1.28	$1.40	$1.59	$1.61	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.29	$0.46	$0.47	$0.58	$0.86	$0.90	$1.08	$1.25	$1.32	$1.62	$1.52	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.16	$0.34	$0.26	$0.28	$0.34	$0.55	$0.87	$0.88	$0.99	$1.26	$1.39	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.18	$0.18	$0.30	$0.39	$0.62	$0.48	$0.35	$0.53	$0.52	$0.58	$0.36	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.79	$1.16	$1.63	$1.85	$2.61	$3.67	$4.80	$6.19	$7.72	$9.40	$9.09	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×4 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+15.5%/yr	+15.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+21.0%/yr	+13.6%/yr
EPS	+21.4%/yr	+16.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.1%/yr	−1.3%/yr
Book value / share	+31.6%/yr	+29.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

978Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

22%low FY2024

Gross margin

87%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.6Bowner earningsvs.$1.6Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $216M it takes just to hold its position. It put $353M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.2B.

Reported net income$1.6B

Owner earnings$1.6B · 34% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$936M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$216M	+$190M	+$159M	+$138M	+$122M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$38M	+$35M	+$40M	+$39M	+$41M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$7M	−$115M	−$73M	−$90M	−$108M
Cash from operations	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$991M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$216M	−$190M	−$159M	−$138M	−$122M
Owner earnings	$1.6B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$869M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$353M	−$321M	−$357M	−$199M	−$341M
Free cash flow	$1.2B	$962M	$848M	$839M	$528M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	34%	30%	31%	30%	32%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $216M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $353M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer $1.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Restated past financials

“For further detail on the Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, see Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, Note 9 Long-Term Debt .”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 83.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.7B ÷ interest expense $20M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$2.8B

Net cash

Cash $2.8B − debt $11M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 74d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 60 + DIO 57 − DPO 42 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 25%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

10-yr median, range 21%–34%; 22% latest = NOPAT $1.4B ÷ invested capital $6.4B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 30%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 22%–37%; latest $1.6B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $216M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 30% median across 10 years. It chose to put $353M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.2B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.16×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $1.6B

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $1.6B

What this means
Of $1.6B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.64×

Expanding

Capex $569M ÷ depreciation $216M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 8.42×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $11M vs $5.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +284%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.50/share (latest year $1.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 9 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 32% → 37% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 32% early to 37% lately, median 37% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 27%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +17%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.
Worst year 2017 · 31.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If competitors introduce new services embodying new technologies or if new industry standards and practices emerge such as the increased use of artificial intelligence, machine learning and generative artificial intelligence, our existing websites and proprietary technology and systems may become obsolete.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.2B

Cash & short-term investments$3.4B
Receivables$794M
Inventory$50M
Other current assets$1.0B

Current liabilities$685M

Accounts payable$598M
Other current liabilities$87M

Current ratio7.61×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio7.54×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio4.89×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$4.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters7.0× → 7.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$8.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$4.4BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$112M$101M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$123Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$4.0B · 41%
Buybacks$808M · 8%
Retained (debt / cash)$4.9B · 51%

Returned to owners$808M
9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $808M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $627M and cash and short-term investments rose $3.2B.
Average price paid for buybacks$18.84
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 24M shares were bought for $443M, about $18.84 each.
Net change in share count−1.2%
The diluted count fell from 977M to 965M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($7.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $965M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Adair	$491k	$39.3M	$869M
2022	Mr. Adair	$265k	−$9.5M	$1.0B
2022	Mr. Liaw	$31.0M	$28.9M	$1.0B
2023	Mr. Adair	$385k	$18.1M	$1.2B
2023	Mr. Liaw	$2.0M	$26.4M	$1.2B
2024	Mr. Adair	$845k	$8.7M	$1.3B
2024	Mr. Liaw	$2.1M	$13.3M	$1.3B
2025	Mr. Liaw	$2.1M	−$1.9M	$1.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership9.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio46:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$38M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Copart is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MUSAMurphy USA	$19.4B	90%	3.6%	20%	3%
ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc	$18.0B	17%	4.8%	14%	4%
CASYCasey's General	$17.6B	67%	4.3%	11%	4%
SAHSonic Automotive Inc.	$15.2B	15%	2.4%	14%	1%
RUSHARush Enterprises Inc. Common Stock Cl A	$7.1B	16%	4.7%	12%	5%
CWHCamping World Holdings	$6.4B	30%	6.1%	18%	2%
CPRTCopart	$4.6B	89%	36.8%	26%	30%
OPLNOPENLANE Inc.	$1.9B	—	10.2%	8%	11%
Group median	—	30%	4.8%	14%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Copart has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Copart earns about $1.4B on its 30.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 34.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($1.4B) Net of stock comp (−$38M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($1.5B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+11%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+18%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.3B on 926M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-27; net cash $3.3B. The if-converted diluted count is 965M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($346M) runs well above depreciation ($222M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CPRT against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Copart (CPRT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CPRT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CPRI its page in the Manual CPRX →

Industry order: ← CAR the Auto Dealers & Services chapter CSAN →