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CWH, Camping World Holdings

Camping World Holdings offer a Unique and Comprehensive Assortment of RV Products and Services.

Through our Camping World and Good Sam brands, our vision is to make it easy for everyone to enjoy RVing and empower our customers' joy of travel.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CWH · Camping World Holdings

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$6.4B

+4.4% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $6.3B 5-yr avg $6.5B

Gross margin 29% 5-yr avg 32%

Operating margin 2.9% 5-yr avg 5.9%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 19%

Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 30% and operating margin about 4.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.2% to 12% — on a steadier 30% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 30% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.5B	$4.3B	$4.8B	$4.9B	$5.4B	$6.9B	$7.0B	$6.2B	$6.1B	$6.4B	$6.3B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	26%	31%	36%	32%	30%	30%	29%	29%	Gross marginGross mgn
20%	20%	22%	23%	21%	23%	23%	25%	26%	25%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$277M	$356M	$201M	$9M	$476M	$800M	$569M	$267M	$149M	$180M	$181M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
7.9%	8.3%	4.2%	0.2%	8.7%	11.6%	8.2%	4.3%	2.4%	2.8%	2.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$189M	$30M	$10M	($61M)	$122M	$278M	$124M	$33M	($39M)	($90M)	($94M)	Net incomeNet inc.
3%	—	—	—	32%	25%	48%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$216M	($16M)	$136M	$252M	$748M	$154M	$190M	$311M	$245M	($132M)	$35M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$25M	$32M	$49M	$60M	$52M	$66M	$80M	$69M	$81M	$95M	$96M	DepreciationDeprec.
$598K	($83M)	$62M	$239M	$553M	($239M)	($48M)	$185M	$181M	($182M)	($8M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$57M	$81M	$254M	$88M	$85M	$248M	$211M	—	—	—	$211M	CapexCapex
1.6%	1.9%	5.3%	1.8%	1.6%	3.6%	3.0%	—	—	—	3.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$191M	($48M)	$87M	$192M	$696M	$88M	$109M	—	—	—	($61M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.4%	−1.1%	1.8%	3.9%	12.8%	1.3%	1.6%	—	—	—	−1.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$159M	($97M)	($118M)	$164M	$663M	($94M)	($21M)	—	—	—	($176M)	Free cash flowFCF
4.5%	−2.3%	−2.5%	3.3%	12.2%	−1.4%	−0.3%	—	—	—	−2.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$79M	$393M	$99M	$48M	$48M	$100M	$217M	$209M	$72M	$81M	$8M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2M	$22M	$23M	$23M	$61M	$67M	$105M	$67M	$25M	$31M	$24M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	$0	$22M	$156M	$80M	$0	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
54%	23%	9%	1%	32%	47%	20%	16%	7%	6%	6%	ROICROIC
—	59%	23%	—	457%	176%	84%	20%	-12%	-39%	-44%	Return on equityROE
—	15%	−28%	—	229%	134%	12%	−20%	−19%	−53%	−55%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$114M	$224M	$139M	$148M	$166M	$267M	$130M	$40M	$208M	$215M	$200M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$58M	$80M	$86M	$82M	$83M	$102M	$112M	$128M	$120M	$170M	$123M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$903M	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.2B	InventoryInvent.
$69M	$126M	$145M	$107M	$148M	$137M	$128M	$134M	$145M	$148M	$228M	Accounts payablePayables
$893M	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
$868M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.0B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$2.2B	$2.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×	1.4×	1.4×	1.3×	1.4×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	1.4×	1.2×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$153M	$348M	$359M	$387M	$413M	$484M	$622M	$711M	$734M	$749M	$752M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B	$2.6B	$2.8B	$3.4B	$3.3B	$4.4B	$4.8B	$4.9B	$4.9B	$5.0B	$5.1B	Total assetsAssets
$645M	$937M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.4B	Total debtDebt
$531M	$713M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$999M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($30M)	$51M	$45M	($33M)	$27M	$158M	$148M	$168M	$327M	$229M	$215M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.7%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
—	26.6M	88.9M	37.4M	40.0M	—	—	—	—	—	42.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	$160.76	$53.92	$130.98	$136.13	—	—	—	—	—	$146.93	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	$1.12	$0.12	$-1.62	$3.06	—	—	—	—	—	$-2.19	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	$-1.80	$0.98	$5.14	$17.39	—	—	—	—	—	$-1.41	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	$-3.65	$-1.33	$4.38	$16.56	—	—	—	—	—	$-4.09	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	$0.84	$0.26	$0.61	$1.53	—	—	—	—	—	$0.55	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
—	$3.03	$2.86	$2.37	$2.12	—	—	—	—	—	$4.90	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	$1.90	$0.50	$-0.87	$0.67	—	—	—	—	—	$5.01	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.34 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/2.38 into 2019 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−5.4%/yr (3-yr)	−5.4%/yr (3-yr)
EPS	+39.7%/yr (3-yr)	+39.7%/yr (3-yr)
Dividends / share	+22.2%/yr (3-yr)	+22.2%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	−11.2%/yr (3-yr)	−11.2%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	−29.3%/yr (3-yr)	−29.3%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

40Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

6%low FY2019

Gross margin

29%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

12.6×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$109Mowner earningsvs.$124Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2018–FY2022cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2022 the business earned $109M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $80M it takes just to hold its position. It put $130M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($21M).

Reported net income$124M

Owner earnings$109M · 2% of revenue

	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020	FY2019	FY2018
Reported net income	$124M	$278M	$122M	($61M)	$10M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$80M	+$66M	+$52M	+$60M	+$49M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$34M	+$48M	+$21M	+$13M	+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$48M	−$239M	+$553M	+$239M	+$62M
Cash from operations	$190M	$154M	$748M	$252M	$136M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$80M	−$66M	−$52M	−$60M	−$49M
Owner earnings	$109M	$88M	$696M	$192M	$87M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$130M	−$181M	−$33M	−$28M	−$205M
Free cash flow	($21M)	($94M)	$663M	$164M	($118M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	1%	13%	4%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $80M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $130M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $34M), owner earnings is nearer $76M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“In connection with the preparation of our financial statements and the audit of our financial results for 2024, we had identified material weaknesses in our internal controls relating to insufficient technical resources to properly design and operate internal…”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 7.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $215M − debt $1.5B

What this means
Netting $215M of cash and short-term investments against $1.5B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 7.0× a year's operating profit (8.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 169d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 10 + DIO 172 − DPO 12 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range 1%–54%; 6% latest = NOPAT $90M ÷ invested capital $1.5B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -1%–13%; latest ($227M) = operating cash ($132M) − maintenance capex $95M

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 7 years. It chose to put $115M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($343M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $44M of SBC) leaves ($272M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($132M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($90M) · cash from operations ($132M)

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 2.21×

Expanding

Capex $211M ÷ depreciation $95M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.20×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs $435M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −141%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.31/share (latest year $-0.87), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.22/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 3% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 0.2% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +4.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“It is possible that new laws and regulations will be adopted in the United States and in other non-U.S. jurisdictions, or that existing laws and regulations, including competition and antitrust laws, may be interpreted in ways that would limit our ability to use AI Technologies for our business, or require us to change…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.7B

Cash & short-term investments$200M
Receivables$123M
Inventory$2.2B
Other current assets$207M

Current liabilities$2.3B

Debt due within a year$28M
Accounts payable$228M
Other current liabilities$2.1B

Current ratio1.17×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.23×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$390Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$28M due · $200M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($552M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.3B$879M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.5B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$144Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$143M

'27$136M

'28$131M

'29$128M

'30$126M

later$840M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$143Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.5Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.5B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.0B

Total fixed claims on the business$2.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.5B, of which the leases are 41%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2022

Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.0B · 61%
Dividends$303M · 18%
Buybacks$258M · 15%
Retained (debt / cash)$95M · 6%

Returned to owners$560M
43% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $303M as dividends and $258M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $771M and cash and short-term investments rose $86M.
Average price paid for buybacks$34.84
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $258M, about $34.84 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $26.53 (2020) to $39.17 (2021), and 2021, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($156M).
Net change in share count61.3%
The diluted count rose from 27M to 43M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.53/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 22% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained167%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($133M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $221M, so each retained $1 added about 1.67 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$765M15% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.0B of capital spent building

$40M written down across 1 year (2018): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Net income
2021	Marcus A. Lemonis	$20.0M	$20.0M	$278M
2022	Marcus A. Lemonis	$11k	$11k	$124M
2023	Marcus A. Lemonis	$11k	$11k	$33M
2024	Marcus A. Lemonis	$13k	$13k	($39M)
2025	Marcus A. Lemonis	$30.4M	$13.8M	($90M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$44M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Camping World Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?61.3%
Diluted shares grew 61.3% over 2016–2022, even as the company spent $258M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?27% → 37% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $961M to $2.3B while revenue grew 79%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (27% of revenue then, 37% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $152M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MUSAMurphy USA	$19.4B	90%	3.6%	20%	3%
ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc	$18.0B	17%	4.8%	14%	4%
CASYCasey's General	$17.6B	67%	4.3%	11%	4%
SAHSonic Automotive Inc.	$15.2B	15%	2.4%	14%	1%
RUSHARush Enterprises Inc. Common Stock Cl A	$7.1B	16%	4.7%	12%	5%
CWHCamping World Holdings	$6.4B	30%	6.1%	18%	2%
CPRTCopart	$4.6B	89%	36.8%	26%	30%
OPLNOPENLANE Inc.	$1.9B	—	10.2%	8%	11%
Group median	—	30%	4.8%	14%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Camping World Holdings has delivered.

Camping World Holdings’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Camping World Holdings earns about $108M on its 1.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −3.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($108M) Net of stock comp (−$42M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($60M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’22−8%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’22+5%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($176M) on 103M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $1.2B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($211M) runs well above depreciation ($96M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($60M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CWH against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Camping World Holdings (CWH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CWH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CWEN its page in the Manual CWK →

Industry order: ← CVNA the Auto Dealers & Services chapter DRVN →