Owner Scorecard


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TRMB, Trimble Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments consumer brand Serial acquirer

Trimble is a leading technology solutions and platform provider, enabling office professionals and field workers to connect their workflows and industry lifecycles, driving a more productive, efficient, and sustainable future.

With a focus on the industries that build, maintain, and move the world, the comprehensive depth and breadth of our solutions are transforming the way the world works, making it easier for Trimble customers to focus on what matters—getting the job done right.

We innovate at the intersection of the digital and physical worlds with solutions that span the world's foundational industries, including building, civil and infrastructure construction, geospatial, natural resources, utilities, and transportation.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
TRMB · Trimble Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$3.6B
−2.6% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.7B 5-yr avg $3.7B
Gross margin 70% 5-yr avg 62%
Operating margin 17.3% 5-yr avg 14.0%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Field Systems (43%), AECO (42%) and T&L (15%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 66% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The largest slice of sales is Field Systems at 43%, but the profit engine is AECO: 42% of revenue and 46% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
Operating profit same segments
  • Field Systems43%$1.5B43% of profit
  • AECO42%$1.5B46% of profit
  • T&L15%$549M11% of profit
By geographyNorth America58%Europe28%Asia Pacific10%Rest of World4%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182020’202021’212022’222023’232025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$2.4B$2.4B$2.6B$3.1B$3.3B$3.7B$3.7B$3.8B$3.7B$3.6B$3.7BRevenueRevenue
54%52%52%54%55%56%57%61%65%69%70%Gross marginGross mgn
10%11%11%11%10%10%11%13%15%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
13%15%14%14%14%15%15%17%18%18%17%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$261M$180M$236M$321M$376M$561M$511M$449M$461M$592M$639MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.9%7.6%8.9%10.3%11.5%15.3%13.9%11.8%12.5%16.5%17.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$214M$132M$118M$283M$514M$493M$450M$311M$1.5B$424M$456MNet incomeNet inc.
20%25%52%-2%14%21%13%25%17%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$407M$431M$430M$487M$585M$751M$391M$597M$531M$386M$505MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$33M$37M$35M$36M$39M$41M$172M$251M$232M$200M$201MDepreciationDeprec.
$116M$209M$212M$91M($44M)$94M($351M)($110M)($1.4B)($384M)($302M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$47M$26M$44M$68M$69M$46M$43M$42M$34M$25M$25MCapexCapex
2.0%1.1%1.7%2.2%2.1%1.3%1.2%1.1%0.9%0.7%0.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$374M$405M$395M$451M$546M$704M$348M$555M$498M$361M$481MOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.6%17.1%14.9%14.5%16.7%19.3%9.5%14.6%13.5%10.1%13.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$360M$405M$386M$419M$516M$704M$348M$555M$498M$361M$481MFree cash flowFCF
15.0%17.1%14.6%13.5%15.8%19.3%9.5%14.6%13.5%10.1%13.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$308M$24M$280M$1.8B$221M$236M$374M$2.1B$22M$4M$4MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$98M$120M$285M$93M$180M$180M$395M$100M$175M$863MBuybacksBuybacks
7%5%4%7%8%11%8%5%5%7%7%ROICROIC
9%6%5%11%16%14%11%7%26%7%8%Return on equityROE
9%6%5%11%16%14%11%7%26%7%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$148M$327M$537M$173M$189M$326M$271M$230M$739M$253M$234MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$362M$366M$428M$513M$608M$625M$643M$707M$726M$856M$618MReceivablesReceiv.
$278M$213M$265M$298M$312M$363M$403M$236M$194M$186M$188MInventoryInvent.
$104M$110M$146M$148M$159M$207M$176M$165M$162M$168M$176MAccounts payablePayables
$536M$470M$546M$663M$761M$781M$870M$777M$759M$874M$630MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$902M$979M$1.3B$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$2.3B$1.6B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$588M$688M$773M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.5B$1.8B$1.8B$1.5B$1.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.4×1.7×1.0×1.0×1.2×1.0×1.0×1.3×1.1×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.1B$2.1B$2.3B$3.5B$3.7B$4.0B$4.1B$5.4B$5.0B$5.2B$5.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$3.9B$3.7B$4.3B$5.8B$6.6B$7.1B$7.3B$9.5B$9.5B$9.3B$9.0BTotal assetsAssets
$742M$625M$918M$2.0B$1.8B$1.3B$1.5B$3.1B$1.4B$1.4B$1.9BTotal debtDebt
$594M$298M$381M$1.8B$1.7B$968M$1.2B$2.8B$652M$1.1B$1.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.8×5.1×8.0×8.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.3B$2.3B$2.4B$2.7B$3.1B$3.6B$4.1B$4.5B$5.7B$5.8B$5.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.8%2.2%2.4%2.5%2.3%3.4%3.3%3.8%4.3%4.1%4.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
265M254M257M253M253M254M250M249M247M242M237MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.06$9.30$10.31$12.27$12.91$14.39$14.69$15.25$14.90$14.85$15.56Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.81$0.52$0.46$1.12$2.03$1.94$1.80$1.25$6.09$1.76$1.93EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.41$1.60$1.54$1.78$2.16$2.77$1.39$2.23$2.01$1.49$2.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.36$1.60$1.50$1.65$2.04$2.77$1.39$2.23$2.01$1.49$2.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.18$0.10$0.17$0.27$0.27$0.18$0.17$0.17$0.14$0.10$0.10Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.85$9.08$9.41$10.55$12.33$14.15$16.19$18.07$23.24$24.17$23.80Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
11-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.6%/yr+0.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+0.5%/yr−11.6%/yr
EPS+7.3%/yr−2.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−4.7%/yr−10.4%/yr
Book value / share+9.6%/yr+11.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
242Mpeak FY2015
ROIC
7%low FY2017
Gross margin
69%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.2×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$361Mowner earningsvs.$424Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2015FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported $424M of profit but $361M of owner earnings: $63M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$424M
Owner earnings$361M · 10% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$424M$1.5B$311M$450M$493M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$200M+$232M+$251M+$172M+$41M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$147M+$159M+$145M+$120M+$123M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$384M−$1.4B−$110M−$351M+$94M
Cash from operations$386M$531M$597M$391M$751M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$25M−$34M−$42M−$43M−$46M
Owner earnings$361M$498M$555M$348M$704M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%14%15%9%19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $147M), owner earnings is nearer $214M.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“Those filings disclosed additional material weaknesses as described more fully therein.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $592M ÷ interest expense $74M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.7B · 2.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $253M − debt $1.9B
    What this means

    Netting $253M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (3.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 87 + DIO 61 − DPO 55 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–11%; 7% latest = NOPAT $493M ÷ invested capital $7.5B
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 9%–19%; latest $361M = operating cash $386M − maintenance capex $25M
    Industry peers: median 20%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $147M of SBC) leaves $214M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $386M ÷ net income $424M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $863M ÷ Owner Earnings $361M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $361M of Owner Earnings, $863M (239%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $863M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $147M stock comp, the real buyback was about $717M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.13×
    Harvesting
    Capex $25M ÷ depreciation $200M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $129M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +382%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.20/share (latest year $1.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.04/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 14% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 7.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In addition, substantial increases in demand for certain commodities and components by major AI companies, who are able to pay high prices and acquire significant portions of the available supply, have made it difficult and more expensive to obtain certain commodities and components, and such challenges could continue …”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 3, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$234M
  • Receivables$618M
  • Inventory$188M
  • Other current assets$353M
Current liabilities$1.4B
  • Debt due within a year$530M
  • Accounts payable$176M
  • Other current liabilities$668M
Current ratio1.01×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$19Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$530M due · $234M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Apr 3, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($449M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$169M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$971Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2026

Over the record, the business generated $5.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$444M · 9%
  • Buybacks$2.5B · 50%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.1B · 41%
  • Returned to owners$2.5B

    54% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $86M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$59.62

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 21M shares were bought for $1.2B, about $59.62 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $30.23 (2015) to $70.77 (2026), and 2026, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($863M).

  • Net change in share count−10.4%

    The diluted count fell from 265M to 237M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained4%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $80M, so each retained $1 added about 0.04 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$6.2B66% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity90%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$5.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $444M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Robert G. Painter$14.0M$27.4M$704M
2022Robert G. Painter$16.1M−$8.5M$348M
2023Robert G. Painter$15.0M$15.0M$555M
2025Robert G. Painter$18.9M$30.9M$498M
2026Robert G. Painter$19.1M$26.5M$361M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$147M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Trimble Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?12.7% vs 15.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 15.9% early in the record and 12.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$742M → $1.9B

    Debt rose from $742M to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about $391M to $471M — about 1.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KEYSKeysight Technologies Inc.$5.4B61%16.6%19%20%
ILMNIllumina Inc.$4.3B67%18.2%12%23%
FTVFortive Corp.$4.2B57%17.0%6%25%
MTDMettler-Toledo International Inc.$4.0B79%26.1%43%21%
TRMBTrimble Inc.$3.6B55%11.7%7%15%
TERTeradyne Inc.$3.2B58%23.3%34%19%
WATWaters Corporation$3.2B59%28.8%28%18%
BIOBio-Rad$2.6B55%10.2%3%10%
Group median59%17.6%15%20%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Trimble Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Trimble Inc. earns about $530M on its 14.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’26−4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $481M on 233M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Trimble Inc. (TRMB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TRMB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TRLV its page in the Manual TRMK →

Industry order: ← TMO the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter TRNS →