Owner Scorecard


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IESC, IES Holdings Inc.

Construction & Engineering capital-intensive

IES Holdings, Inc. designs and installs integrated electrical and technology systems and provides infrastructure products and services to a variety of end markets, including data centers, residential housing and commercial and industrial facilities.

Residential Regional provider of electrical installation services for single-family housing and multi-family apartment complexes, as well as heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) and plumbing installation services in certain markets.

Infrastructure Solutions Provider of electro-mechanical solutions for industrial operations, including apparatus repair and custom-engineered products, such as generator enclosures used in data centers and other industrial applications.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
IESC · IES Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.4B
+16.9% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.6B 5-yr avg $2.5B
Gross margin 26% 5-yr avg 20%
Operating margin 11.7% 5-yr avg 7.3%
ROIC 31% 5-yr avg 29%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Residential (39%) and Communications (34%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 19% and operating margin about 3.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.5% to 11% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The largest slice of sales is Residential at 39%, but the profit engine is Communications: 34% of revenue and 38% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Corporate ran a $52M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Residential39%$1.3B24% of profit
  • Communications34%$1.1B38% of profit
  • Infrastructure Solutions15%$499M27% of profit
  • Commercial and Industrial13%$428M11% of profit
  • Corporate0%$0loss of $52M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$696M$811M$877M$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$2.2B$2.4B$2.9B$3.4B$3.6BRevenueRevenue
17%17%17%19%19%15%19%24%25%26%Gross marginGross mgn
14%15%14%13%14%13%12%13%14%14%14%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$25M$20M$26M$42M$50M$86M$56M$160M$301M$384M$426MOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.6%2.5%3.0%3.9%4.2%5.6%2.6%6.7%10.4%11.4%11.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$121M$13M($14M)$33M$42M$67M$35M$108M$219M$306M$380MNet incomeNet inc.
28%17%17%20%27%26%25%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$25M$22M$12M$39M$77M$38M$16M$154M$234M$286M$355MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$6M$10M$9M$10M$13M$22M$25M$29M$37M$47M$53MDepreciationDeprec.
($101M)($2M)$18M($6M)$19M($54M)($48M)$12M($27M)($80M)($93M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M$5M$5M$6M$5M$7M$29M$18M$45M$67M$116MCapexCapex
0.5%0.6%0.5%0.6%0.4%0.5%1.4%0.7%1.6%2.0%3.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$22M$18M$8M$32M$72M$31M($13M)$136M$189M$239M$302MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.1%2.2%0.9%3.0%6.0%2.0%−0.6%5.7%6.6%7.1%8.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$22M$18M$8M$32M$72M$31M($13M)$136M$189M$219M$239MFree cash flowFCF
3.1%2.2%0.9%3.0%6.0%2.0%−0.6%5.7%6.6%6.5%6.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$60M$20M$7M$50K$29M$92M$0$0$67M$52M$173MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$590K$2M$2M$10M$8M$7M$19M$8M$44M$42MBuybacksBuybacks
11%6%6%15%18%19%10%31%44%38%31%ROICROIC
54%6%-6%13%15%19%10%24%36%35%35%Return on equityROE
54%6%−6%13%15%19%10%24%36%35%35%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$33M$28M$26M$19M$54M$23M$25M$76M$136M$232M$263MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$124M$143M$152M$186M$213M$287M$371M$364M$470M$552M$657MReceivablesReceiv.
$13M$17M$21M$22M$25M$69M$96M$96M$102M$112M$127MInventoryInvent.
$109M$121M$75M$85M$93M$137M$185M$139M$149M$209M$511MAccounts payablePayables
$29M$39M$97M$123M$145M$218M$282M$321M$422M$454M$272MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$210M$232M$263M$296M$371M$484M$624M$671M$872M$1.1B$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$133M$151M$164M$193M$242M$312M$402M$401M$523M$633M$833MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.5×1.6×1.5×1.5×1.6×1.6×1.7×1.7×1.7×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$40M$47M$51M$51M$54M$92M$92M$92M$94M$108M$129MGoodwillGoodwill
$394M$424M$422M$445M$561M$767M$935M$982M$1.2B$1.6B$2.0BTotal assetsAssets
$29M$29M$30M$299K$217K$40M$82M$0$0$0$29MTotal debtDebt
($4M)$1M$3M($19M)($53M)$17M$57M($76M)($136M)($232M)($233M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
19.5×12.0×13.3×89.0×18.9×52.9×224.9×211.4×140.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$223M$237M$220M$246M$283M$346M$361M$450M$611M$884M$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%−0.0%0.2%0.3%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
21.5M21.5M21.2M21.3M21.1M21.1M20.9M20.4M20.4M20.2M20.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$32.38$37.65$41.37$50.53$56.46$72.87$103.70$116.46$141.29$167.05$180.04Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.62$0.62$-0.67$1.56$1.97$3.16$1.66$5.30$10.73$15.16$18.85EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.00$0.82$0.36$1.52$3.41$1.45$-0.62$6.67$9.27$11.85$14.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.00$0.82$0.36$1.52$3.41$1.45$-0.62$6.67$9.27$10.84$11.87Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.21$0.22$0.30$0.22$0.35$1.40$0.87$2.21$3.33$5.73Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.39$10.99$10.40$11.55$13.43$16.41$17.29$22.04$29.93$43.80$53.16Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+20.0%/yr+24.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+31.6%/yr+28.3%/yr
EPS+11.7%/yr+50.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+40.2%/yr+71.4%/yr
Book value / share+17.3%/yr+26.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+16.9%
    “Revenues in our Commercial & Industrial segment increased $59.8 million, or 16.2%, during the year ended September 30, 2025, compared to the year ended September 30, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by increased activity in the education and healthcare end markets, continued strong demand and successful execution in the data center end market, and the expansion of one of our operations in the Midwest market.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
20Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
38%low FY2018
Gross margin
25%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$239Mowner earningsvs.$306Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $239M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $47M it takes just to hold its position. It put $20M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $219M.

Reported net income$306M
Owner earnings$239M · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$306M$219M$108M$35M$67M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$47M+$37M+$29M+$25M+$22M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$13M+$6M+$4M+$4M+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$80M−$27M+$12M−$48M−$54M
Cash from operations$286M$234M$154M$16M$38M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$47M−$45M−$18M−$29M−$7M
Owner earnings$239M$189M$136M($13M)$31M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$20M
Free cash flow$219M$189M$136M($13M)$31M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%7%6%-1%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $47M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $20M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $226M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $384M ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $127M + ST investments $105M − debt $29M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $203M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 60 + DIO 16 − DPO 30 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 6%–44%; 37% latest = NOPAT $291M ÷ invested capital $786M
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 37% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $239M = operating cash $286M − maintenance capex $47M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $226M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $286M ÷ net income $306M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $42M ÷ Owner Earnings $239M
    What this means

    Of $239M Owner Earnings, $42M (17%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $42M buybacks. Net of $13M stock comp, the real buyback was about $29M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.43×
    Expanding
    Capex $67M ÷ depreciation $47M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.71×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $29M vs $452M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +428%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $10.60/share (latest year $15.36), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $44.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 10% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +30%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 30% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 2.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$263M
  • Receivables$657M
  • Inventory$127M
  • Other current assets$249M
Current liabilities$833M
  • Accounts payable$511M
  • Other current liabilities$322M
Current ratio1.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.40×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.32×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$462Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$885Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$378MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$99M$99M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$287Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $904M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$190M · 21%
  • Buybacks$142M · 16%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$571M · 63%
  • Returned to owners$142M

    19% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $142M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $0 and cash and short-term investments rose $230M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$59.01

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $139M, about $59.01 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $20.46 (2018) to $196.43 (2025); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $133.56 ($44M).

  • Net change in share count−6.1%

    The diluted count fell from 21M to 20M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained22%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($788M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $173M, so each retained $1 added about 0.22 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$149M9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity12%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$328Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $190M of capital spent building

$7M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Jeffrey L. Gendell$2.9M$5.8M$31M
2022Jeffrey L. Gendell$2.2M$1.4M($13M)
2023Jeffrey L. Gendell$3.2M$5.5M$136M
2024Jeffrey L. Gendell$4.7M$15.8M$189M
2025Jeffrey L. Gendell$3.3M$20.6M$239M
2025Jeffrey L. Gendell$6.2M$21.3M$239M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership56.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$13M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why IES Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Construction & Engineering

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PWRQuanta Services Inc.$28.5B14%5.1%8%4%
EMEEMCOR Group$17.0B15%5.1%20%4%
FIXComfort Systems$9.1B20%6.5%20%6%
BLDTopBuild$5.4B28%13.4%12%9%
IESCIES Holdings Inc.$3.4B19%4.0%17%3%
LGNLegence Corp.$2.6B21%2.4%1%
AMRCAmeresco Inc.$1.8B19%6.1%8%-10%
AGXArgan Inc.$945M17%8.9%29%19%
Group median19%5.6%17%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what IES Holdings Inc. has delivered.

IES Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, IES Holdings Inc. earns about $103M on its 3.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+122%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+30%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $239M on 20M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net cash $233M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($116M) runs well above depreciation ($53M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $308M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "IES Holdings Inc. (IESC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IESC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IEP its page in the Manual IEX →

Industry order: ← GVA the Construction & Engineering chapter J →