Owner Scorecard


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KALU, Kaiser Aluminum Corporation

Metals & Mining capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is led by Packaging (44%) and Aero Hs Products (25%), with 2 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KALU · Kaiser Aluminum Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.4B
+11.5% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.7B 5-yr avg $3.1B
Gross margin 14% 5-yr avg 11%
Operating margin 6.6% 5-yr avg 3.2%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 0%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A metals and mining business, a price-taker on a global commodity.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 13% and operating margin about 5.6% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 0.1% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Packaging at 44%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Packaging44%$1.5B
  • Aero Hs Products25%$838M
  • Ge Products23%$759M
  • Automotive Extrusions8%$286M
  • Other Products0%$0
By geographyUnited States96%International4%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$1.2B$2.6B$3.4B$3.1B$3.0B$3.4B$3.7BRevenueRevenue
25%22%18%20%20%10%7%12%12%13%14%Gross marginGross mgn
1%1%1%1%1%0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$181M$155M$144M$126M$81M$64M$4M$123M$112M$189M$245MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.6%11.1%9.1%8.3%6.9%2.5%0.1%4.0%3.7%5.6%6.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$92M$45M$92M$62M$29M($19M)($30M)$68M$66M$113M$153MNet incomeNet inc.
38%24%23%26%18%25%25%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$166M$142M$150M$232M$207M$79M($63M)$212M$167M$111M$142MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$36M$40M$44M$49M$52M$92M$107M$109M$116M$123M$123MDepreciationDeprec.
$26M$43M$4M$111M$116M($7M)($155M)$19M($29M)($142M)($154M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$76M$76M$74M$60M$52M$58M$143M$143M$181M$137M$118MCapexCapex
5.7%5.4%4.7%4.0%4.4%2.2%4.2%4.6%6.0%4.1%3.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$130M$102M$106M$172M$155M$21M($170M)$103M$51M($26M)$24MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.7%7.3%6.7%11.4%13.2%0.8%−5.0%3.3%1.7%−0.8%0.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$90M$66M$76M$172M$155M$21M($206M)$69M($14M)($26M)$24MFree cash flowFCF
6.7%4.7%4.8%11.4%13.2%0.8%−6.0%2.2%−0.5%−0.8%0.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$43M$0$609M$609MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$32M$35M$38M$39M$43M$47M$50M$50M$51M$51M$52MDividends paidDiv. paid
$33M$80M$61M$44M$13MBuybacksBuybacks
10%7%11%10%8%6%5%8%10%ROICROIC
11%6%12%8%4%-3%-5%10%9%14%17%Return on equityROE
7%1%7%3%−2%−9%−13%2%2%7%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$286M$235M$162M$264M$780M$303M$57M$82M$18M$7M$75MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$138M$165M$180M$167M$113M$333M$297M$325M$320M$395M$529MReceivablesReceiv.
$202M$208M$215M$178M$152M$405M$525M$551M$602M$725M$799MInventoryInvent.
$76M$90M$121M$92M$86M$351M$305M$253M$267M$275M$494MAccounts payablePayables
$264M$283M$274M$253M$179M$386M$518M$623M$655M$846M$834MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$656M$657M$657M$780M$1.1B$1.2B$1.0B$990M$1.1B$1.3B$1.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$165M$173M$206M$170M$158M$457M$419M$370M$401M$427M$602MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.0×3.8×3.2×4.6×7.1×2.6×2.5×2.7×2.7×3.0×2.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$37M$19M$44M$19M$19M$39M$19M$19M$19M$19M$19MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.9B$2.4B$2.3B$2.3B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8BTotal assetsAssets
$369M$370M$370M$493M$838M$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.0BTotal debtDebt
$83M$135M$208M$228M$58M$733M$981M$957M$1.0B$1.1B$963MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
8.9×7.0×6.3×5.1×2.0×1.3×0.1×2.6×2.6×3.8×4.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$805M$746M$740M$734M$732M$693M$631M$708M$743M$826M$877MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%1.0%0.6%0.6%0.9%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$18M$25M$21MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
18.0M17.3M16.9M16.2M15.9M15.8M15.9M16.1M16.3M16.6M16.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$73.79$80.97$93.98$93.45$73.69$165.57$215.51$191.37$185.31$202.92$219.81Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.09$2.63$5.43$3.83$1.81$-1.17$-1.86$4.20$4.03$6.77$9.11EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.19$5.90$6.30$10.62$9.74$1.35$-10.69$6.40$3.11$-1.53$1.44Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.96$3.82$4.51$10.62$9.74$1.35$-12.93$4.26$-0.84$-1.53$1.44Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.80$2.03$2.23$2.43$2.73$2.95$3.15$3.12$3.11$3.09$3.09Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.22$4.37$4.39$3.72$3.26$3.66$8.96$8.88$11.08$8.24$7.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$44.62$43.24$43.88$45.29$46.03$43.73$39.68$43.92$45.54$49.70$52.08Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.9%/yr+22.5%/yr
EPS+3.2%/yr+30.2%/yr
Dividends / share+6.2%/yr+2.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.7%/yr+20.4%/yr
Book value / share+1.2%/yr+1.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
17Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
8%low FY2024
Gross margin
13%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
20.2×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($26M)owner earningsvs.$113Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $113M of profit but ($26M) of owner earnings: $138M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$113M$66M$68M($30M)($19M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$123M+$116M+$109M+$107M+$92M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$14M+$16M+$14M+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$142M−$29M+$19M−$155M−$7M
Cash from operations$111M$167M$212M($63M)$79M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$137M−$116M−$109M−$107M−$58M
Owner earnings($26M)$51M$103M($170M)$21M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$64M−$35M−$36M
Free cash flow($26M)($14M)$69M($206M)$21M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%2%3%-5%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($44M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $189M ÷ interest expense $50M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.0B · 5.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $7M + ST investments $37M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $44M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $1.0B owed, about 5.4× a year's operating profit (5.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $6M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $1.0B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 43 + DIO 90 − DPO 34 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 5%–11%; 8% latest = NOPAT $142M ÷ invested capital $1.9B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -5%–13%; latest ($26M) = operating cash $111M − maintenance capex $137M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($44M).

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $111M ÷ net income $113M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.12×
    Maintaining
    Capex $137M ÷ depreciation $123M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.95×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $834M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +8%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.02/share (latest year $6.88), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $50.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 11% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 11% early to 4% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −22%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 22% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 0.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$69M
  • Receivables$529M
  • Inventory$799M
  • Other current assets$91M
Current liabilities$602M
  • Accounts payable$494M
  • Other current liabilities$108M
Current ratio2.47×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.14×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$886Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+42.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$819Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($425M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$28M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$100Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$0
'28$0
'29$0
'30$22M
later$1.1B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$22Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$999M · 71%
  • Dividends$437M · 31%
  • Buybacks$230M · 16%
  • Returned to owners$667M

    104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $437M as dividends and $230M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$263M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $263M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $369M to $1.0B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $217M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$86.76

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $174M, about $86.76 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $75.03 (2016) to $98.36 (2018); its heaviest year, 2017, paid $84.69 ($80M).

  • Net change in share count−6.6%

    The diluted count fell from 18M to 17M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.09/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$60M2% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity2%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$652Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $999M of capital spent building

$64M written down across 3 years (2017, 2019, 2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Harvey$5.5M$2.5M$21M
2022Mr. Harvey$5.1M$1.6M($170M)
2023Mr. Harvey$6.2M$4.6M$103M
2024Mr. Harvey$6.6M$6.4M$51M
2025Mr. Harvey$7.9M$20.9M($26M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio84:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kaiser Aluminum Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.4% vs 7.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.9% early in the record and 1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$369M → $1.0B

    Debt rose from $369M to $1.0B while owner earnings went from about $113M to $43M — about 3.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 24 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 36% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $339M to $1.3B while revenue grew 178%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 36% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $143M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Metals & Mining

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HWMHowmet Aerospace$8.3B13.5%9%1%
MLIMueller Industries$4.2B16%13.8%25%8%
KALUKaiser Aluminum Corporation$3.4B16%6.3%8%5%
WSWorthington Steel Inc.$3.1B11%5.2%12%3%
CRSCarpenter Technology$2.9B17%6.0%5%5%
BDCBelden Inc$2.7B38%11.1%10%8%
CENXCentury Aluminum Company$2.5B3%-0.9%-1%-1%
NXQuanex Building Products Corporation$1.8B23%4.2%6%5%
Group median16%6.1%8%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kaiser Aluminum Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kaiser Aluminum Corporation earns about $169M on its 5.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $24M on 16M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net debt $963M. The if-converted diluted count is 17M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kaiser Aluminum Corporation (KALU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KALU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KAI its page in the Manual KBH →

Industry order: ← IPI the Metals & Mining chapter KNF →