Owner Scorecard


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CENX, Century Aluminum Company

Metals & Mining capital-intensive Cyclical

A metals and mining business, a price-taker on a global commodity.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CENX · Century Aluminum Company
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.5B
+13.9% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $2.4B
Operating margin 19.2% 5-yr avg 2.0%
ROIC 34% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg −2%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −3.1% through the cycle on a 1.7% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

31% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States69%$1.7B
  • Iceland31%$793M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.3B$1.6B$1.9B$1.8B$1.6B$2.2B$2.8B$2.2B$2.2B$2.5B$2.5BRevenueRevenue
−0%8%−1%−1%−2%6%2%4%8%10%Gross marginGross mgn
3%3%2%3%3%3%1%2%3%3%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($228M)$97M($59M)($72M)($81M)$66M($150M)$28M$108M$158M$489MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−17.3%6.1%−3.1%−3.9%−5.0%3.0%−5.4%1.3%4.9%6.3%19.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($252M)$49M($66M)($81M)($123M)($167M)($14M)($43M)$337M$42M$350MNet incomeNet inc.
14%1%-4%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$38M$52M($69M)$18M$43M($65M)$26M$106M($25M)$185M$181MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$85M$84M$90M$83M$83M$83M$73M$79M$87M$92M$91MDepreciationDeprec.
$204M($83M)($93M)$15M$83M$20M($33M)$63M($464M)$4M($314M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$22M$32M$83M$60M$13M$83M$86M$95M$82M$100M$154MCapexCapex
1.7%2.0%4.4%3.2%0.8%3.8%3.1%4.3%3.7%4.0%6.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$16M$20M($152M)($42M)$30M($148M)($60M)$11M($107M)$85M$91MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.2%1.2%−8.0%−2.3%1.8%−6.7%−2.2%0.5%−4.8%3.4%3.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$16M$20M($152M)($42M)$30M($148M)($60M)$11M($107M)$85M$27MFree cash flowFCF
1.2%1.2%−8.0%−2.3%1.8%−6.7%−2.2%0.5%−4.8%3.4%1.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$0$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
-20%9%-5%-6%-8%6%-9%3%9%13%34%ROICROIC
-33%6%-9%-12%-23%-40%-4%-12%49%5%30%Return on equityROE
−33%6%−9%−12%−23%−40%−4%−12%49%5%30%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$132M$167M$39M$39M$82M$29M$54M$89M$33M$134M$244MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$12M$43M$83M$70M$51M$81M$67M$54M$76M$110M$111MReceivablesReceiv.
$234M$318M$344M$321M$291M$426M$399M$477M$539M$520M$512MInventoryInvent.
$95M$90M$119M$97M$106M$187M$167M$250M$187M$187M$196MAccounts payablePayables
$151M$271M$307M$294M$236M$320M$298M$281M$428M$442M$427MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$441M$554M$507M$487M$456M$618M$678M$767M$783M$830M$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$179M$191M$224M$234M$240M$547M$411M$764M$467M$444M$545MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×2.9×2.3×2.1×1.9×1.1×1.7×1.0×1.7×1.9×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.7BTotal assetsAssets
$256M$256M$280M$301M$316M$451M$528M$479M$528M$548M$546MTotal debtDebt
$123M$89M$241M$262M$234M$422M$473M$390M$495M$414M$302MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-10.3×4.4×-2.6×-3.1×21.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$757M$830M$762M$675M$546M$421M$399M$356M$694M$806M$1.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.1%0.3%0.7%1.9%2.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
87.1M88.0M87.6M88.8M89.5M90.2M91.4M92.4M98.4M95.3M105MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.14$18.06$21.61$20.68$17.93$24.53$30.39$23.65$22.56$26.53$24.31Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.90$0.55$-0.76$-0.91$-1.38$-1.85$-0.15$-0.47$3.42$0.44$3.34EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.19$0.22$-1.74$-0.47$0.33$-1.64$-0.66$0.11$-1.09$0.89$0.87Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.19$0.22$-1.74$-0.47$0.33$-1.64$-0.66$0.11$-1.09$0.89$0.26Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.25$0.36$0.95$0.67$0.15$0.92$0.94$1.03$0.84$1.05$1.47Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.69$9.43$8.70$7.60$6.10$4.67$4.37$3.85$7.06$8.45$11.00Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.4%/yr+8.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+18.9%/yr+22.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+17.2%/yr+47.7%/yr
Book value / share−0.3%/yr+6.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
95Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
13%low FY2016
Gross margin
10%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.9×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$85Mowner earningsvs.$42Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $42M of profit into $85M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$42M
Owner earnings$85M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$42M$337M($43M)($14M)($167M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$92M+$87M+$79M+$73M+$83M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$47M+$15M+$7M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$4M−$464M+$63M−$33M+$20M
Cash from operations$185M($25M)$106M$26M($65M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$100M−$82M−$95M−$86M−$83M
Owner earnings$85M($107M)$11M($60M)($148M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%-5%0%-2%-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $47M), owner earnings is nearer $38M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“In response to the identified material weakness, during the year ended December 31, 2025, management, with the oversight of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors, took actions to remediate this material weakness in internal control over financial…”
Restated past financials
“Restatement of Previously Issued Financial Statements and Note 23.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $158M ÷ interest expense $23M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $414M · 2.6× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $134M − debt $548M
    What this means

    Netting $134M of cash and short-term investments against $548M of debt leaves $414M owed, about 2.6× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 16 + DIO 83 − DPO 30 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -20%–13%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $85M = operating cash $185M − maintenance capex $100M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -2%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a -2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $47M of SBC) leaves $38M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $185M ÷ net income $42M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $85M
    What this means

    Of $85M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.09×
    Maintaining
    Capex $100M ÷ depreciation $92M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.87×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $548M vs $386M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.13/share (latest year $0.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −5% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −5% early to 4% lately, median −3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2016 · −17.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$244M
  • Receivables$111M
  • Inventory$512M
  • Other current assets$387M
Current liabilities$545M
  • Debt due within a year$84M
  • Accounts payable$196M
  • Other current liabilities$265M
Current ratio2.30×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.45×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$710Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$84M due · $244M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$32MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$540M$25M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $308M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$657M · 213%
  • Source of funding−$348M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $348M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $256M to $546M.

  • Net change in share count20.1%

    The diluted count rose from 87M to 105M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Jesse Gary$5.4M$6.4M($148M)
2021Jesse Gary$4.2M$4.6M($148M)
2022Jesse Gary$8.2M$1.6M($60M)
2023Jesse Gary$8.0M$13.8M$11M
2024Jesse Gary$8.2M$17.1M($107M)
2025Jesse Gary$7.2M$32.1M$85M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$47M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 30% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Century Aluminum Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?20.1%

    Diluted shares grew 20.1% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$256M → $546M

    Debt rose from $256M to $546M while owner earnings went from about ($39M) to ($4M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 25% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $246M to $623M while revenue grew 93%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 25% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Metals & Mining

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AAAlcoa$12.8B4.6%5%2%
KALUKaiser Aluminum Corporation$3.4B16%6.3%8%5%
WSWorthington Steel Inc.$3.1B11%5.2%12%3%
CRSCarpenter Technology$2.9B17%6.0%5%5%
BDCBelden Inc$2.7B38%11.1%10%8%
CENXCentury Aluminum Company$2.5B3%-0.9%-1%-1%
NXQuanex Building Products Corporation$1.8B23%4.2%6%5%
SXCSunCoke Energy Inc.$1.8B7.8%8%6%
Group median16%5.6%7%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Century Aluminum Company has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $27M on 99M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $302M. The if-converted diluted count is 105M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($154M) runs well above depreciation ($91M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $81M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Century Aluminum Company (CENX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CENX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CENTA its page in the Manual CEPL →

Industry order: ← BVN the Metals & Mining chapter CMP →