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KELYA, Kelly Services Inc.

Staffing & Employment Services diversified Revenue in runoff

In 2025, Kelly integrated its P&I and OCG specialty areas, responding to a shift in large enterprise demand toward integrated workforce solutions and enabling a more streamlined and efficient go-to-market approach.

Over the next 79 years, as work evolved, Kelly continued to equip people with the skills to master new technologies as they emerged and the opportunity to put them to work in ways that enriched their lives.

In 1996, Kelly established the industry's first Managed Service Provider ("MSP") program.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

KELYA · Kelly Services Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.3B

−1.9% YoY · −5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $4.1B 5-yr avg $4.6B

Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 19%

Operating margin −2.1% 5-yr avg −0.5%

ROIC −6% 5-yr avg −2%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Revenue in runoff. Revenue has shrunk about 3% a year across the record while operations still generate cash.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 0.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −2.1% to 1.6% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$5.4B	$5.5B	$5.4B	$4.5B	$4.9B	$4.8B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$4.1B	RevenueRevenue
18%	18%	18%	18%	19%	20%	20%	20%	20%	Gross marginGross mgn
16%	16%	16%	18%	18%	19%	19%	19%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$83M	$87M	$82M	($94M)	$49M	$24M	($15M)	($70M)	($86M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.5%	1.6%	1.5%	−2.1%	1.0%	0.5%	−0.3%	−1.6%	−2.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$72M	$23M	$112M	($72M)	$156M	$36M	($600K)	($254M)	($266M)	Net incomeNet inc.
15%	—	0%	—	18%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$71M	$61M	$102M	$186M	$85M	$77M	$27M	$123M	$73M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$23M	$26M	$32M	$24M	$30M	$34M	$40M	$42M	$41M	DepreciationDeprec.
($33M)	$4M	($47M)	$230M	($106M)	($3M)	($25M)	$322M	$286M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$25M	$26M	$20M	$16M	$11M	$15M	$11M	$9M	$7M	CapexCapex
0.5%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$46M	$36M	$82M	$171M	$74M	$61M	$16M	$114M	$66M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.9%	0.6%	1.5%	3.8%	1.5%	1.3%	0.4%	2.7%	1.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$46M	$36M	$82M	$171M	$74M	$61M	$16M	$114M	$66M	Free cash flowFCF
0.9%	0.6%	1.5%	3.8%	1.5%	1.3%	0.4%	2.7%	1.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$37M	$0	$86M	$39M	$213M	$0	$432M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$12M	$12M	$12M	$3M	$4M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
6%	—	7%	-8%	3%	2%	-1%	-5%	-6%	ROICROIC
6%	2%	9%	-6%	12%	3%	-0%	-26%	-27%	Return on equityROE
5%	1%	8%	−6%	11%	2%	−1%	−27%	−29%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$33M	$35M	$26M	$223M	$113M	$126M	$39M	$33M	$26M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$538M	$541M	$504M	$537M	$687M	$646M	$614M	$631M	$622M	Accounts payablePayables
$749M	$753M	$779M	$728M	$736M	$515M	$642M	$557M	$594M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
$926M	$898M	$884M	$926M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$827M	$822M	$819M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.6×	1.6×	1.7×	1.5×	1.6×	1.7×	1.5×	1.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$107M	$107M	$128M	$4M	$115M	$151M	$304M	$202M	$202M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.3B	$2.3B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$239M	$102M	$227M	Total debtDebt
—	—	—	—	—	($126M)	$200M	$69M	$201M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
30.9×	28.2×	19.5×	-31.2×	19.4×	7.6×	-1.4×	-5.6×	-8.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$977M	$969M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	$148M	—	—	$73M	$102M	$102M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
									Per share
39.0M	39.1M	39.2M	39.3M	39.5M	36.3M	35.5M	35.1M	34.4M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$137.81	$141.02	$136.62	$114.91	$124.30	$133.21	$122.02	$121.11	$119.96	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.84	$0.59	$2.87	$-1.83	$3.95	$1.00	$-0.02	$-7.24	$-7.73	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.18	$0.92	$2.10	$4.34	$1.87	$1.69	$0.45	$3.25	$1.92	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.18	$0.92	$2.10	$4.34	$1.87	$1.69	$0.45	$3.25	$1.92	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.30	$0.30	$0.30	$0.08	$0.10	$0.30	$0.31	$0.31	$0.32	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.63	$0.65	$0.51	$0.39	$0.28	$0.42	$0.31	$0.24	$0.21	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$29.53	$29.65	$32.26	$30.61	$33.83	$34.55	$34.78	$27.82	$28.15	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−1.6%/yr	+1.3%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+13.4%/yr	−7.0%/yr (4-yr)
Dividends / share	+0.7%/yr	+42.3%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	−11.3%/yr	−11.5%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share	−0.7%/yr	−2.4%/yr (4-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-1.9%
“Revenue from talent solutions increased 1.1% and permanent placement revenue decreased 20.9% from the prior year, excluding the impact from the acquisition. 27 Gross profit decreased 3.4% on lower revenue volume, partially offset by the acquisition of MRP.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

35Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

−5%low FY2021

Gross margin

20%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.6×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$114Mowner earningsvs.($254M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $254M loss into $114M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($254M)	($600K)	$36M	$156M	($72M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$42M	+$40M	+$34M	+$30M	+$24M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$12M	+$12M	+$10M	+$5M	+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$322M	−$25M	−$3M	−$106M	+$230M
Cash from operations	$123M	$27M	$77M	$85M	$186M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$9M	−$11M	−$15M	−$11M	−$16M
Owner earnings	$114M	$16M	$61M	$74M	$171M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	0%	1%	2%	4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $102M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -5.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($70M) ÷ interest expense $12M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $165M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $33M − debt $198M

What this means
Netting $33M of cash and short-term investments against $198M of debt leaves $165M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 34d

Tight

DSO 102 + DIO 0 − DPO 68 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 2%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range -8%–7%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($55M) ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 22%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 0%–4%; latest $114M = operating cash $123M − maintenance capex $9M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $102M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $123M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($254M) · cash from operations $123M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 10%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $11M ÷ Owner Earnings $114M

What this means
Of $114M Owner Earnings, $11M (10%) went back to shareholders, $11M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.20×

Harvesting

Capex $9M ÷ depreciation $42M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.54×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $198M vs $447M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (8)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −206%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.12/share (latest year $-7.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 2% early to −0% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +6%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −2.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Additionally, the rapid evolution of AI technology may require substantial and ongoing investment to remain competitive, and our competitors or new market entrants may deploy superior AI capabilities that erode our market position.”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B

Cash & short-term investments$26M
Receivables$1.2B
Other current assets$57M

Current liabilities$819M

Debt due within a year$96M
Accounts payable$622M
Other current liabilities$101M

Current ratio1.59×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.59×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.03×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$480Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$96M due · $26M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−10.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$548Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$280M$53M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $732M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$132M · 18%
Dividends$75M · 10%
Retained (debt / cash)$525M · 72%

Returned to owners$75M
13% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $75M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Net change in share count−11.8%
The diluted count fell from 39M to 34M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.31/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$428M19% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity21%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$808Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $132M of capital spent building

$323M written down across 3 years (2021, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 40% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$3.9M	$2.9M	$171M
2022	$3.5M	$2.8M	$74M
2023	$4.2M	$4.3M	$61M
2024	$4.1M	$1.1M	$16M
2025	$5.2M	$3.7M	$114M
2025	$3.3M	$948k	$114M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kelly Services Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 8 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 8 years, $327M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$2.3B · 55% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In 2025, an estimated 55% of total company revenue was attributed to our largest 100 customers and 24% was attributed to our largest 10 customers.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Staffing & Employment Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NSPInsperity Inc.	$6.8B	—	3.8%	—	4%
RHIRobert Half Inc.	$5.4B	41%	10.0%	45%	8%
KELYAKelly Services Inc.	$4.3B	19%	0.7%	2%	1%
ASGNEverforth, Inc.	$4.0B	29%	8.1%	9%	7%
KFYKorn Ferry	$2.9B	—	10.0%	14%	10%
AMNAMN Healthcare Services	$2.7B	33%	9.2%	13%	8%
KFRCKforce Inc.	$1.3B	29%	5.6%	29%	5%
BBSIBarrett Business Services Inc.	$1.2B	21%	4.8%	34%	5%
Group median	—	29%	6.8%	14%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kelly Services Inc. has delivered.

Kelly Services Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Kelly Services Inc. earns about $59M on its 1.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($59M) Net of stock comp (−$12M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−15%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $66M on 34M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $201M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh KELYA against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kelly Services Inc. (KELYA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KELYA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KEEL its page in the Manual KELYB →

Industry order: ← EFOR the Staffing & Employment Services chapter KELYB →