Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← AMKR Manual AMP → ← 6098 Staffing & Employment Services ASGN →

AMN, AMN Healthcare Services

Staffing & Employment Services diversified CyclicalSerial acquirer

AMN Healthcare Services provide healthcare professionals opportunities to do their best work toward high-quality patient care.

As the leader and innovator in total talent solutions for the healthcare sector in the United States, we tailor our solutions to our clients' workforce challenges and goals, and provide staffing, talent optimization strategies, and technology solutions to support caregivers and patient care.

AMN Healthcare Services create an innovative and values-based culture in which our team members can achieve their goals.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AMN · AMN Healthcare Services
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.7B
−8.5% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.4B 5-yr avg $3.7B
Gross margin 28% 5-yr avg 32%
Operating margin 1.4% 5-yr avg 5.6%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin 21% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 21% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Nurse and Allied Solutions (60%), Physician and Leadership Solutions (26%) and Technology and Workforce Solutions (14%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 50% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 33% and operating margin about 8.9% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.4% to 12% — on a steadier 33% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 13%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Nurse and Allied Solutions is 60% of revenue, with Physician and Leadership Solutions the other meaningful segment at 26%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Nurse and Allied Solutions60%$1.6B
  • Physician and Leadership Solutions26%$696M
  • Technology and Workforce Solutions14%$387M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$4.0B$5.2B$3.8B$3.0B$2.7B$3.4BRevenueRevenue
33%32%33%33%33%33%33%33%31%28%28%Gross marginGross mgn
21%20%21%23%23%18%18%20%21%22%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$192M$212M$203M$177M$149M$478M$647M$338M($103M)($55M)$49MOperating incomeOp. inc.
10.1%10.7%9.5%8.0%6.2%12.0%12.3%8.9%−3.4%−2.0%1.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$106M$133M$142M$114M$71M$327M$444M$211M($147M)($96M)($32M)Net incomeNet inc.
40%31%24%23%23%26%27%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$134M$161M$227M$225M$257M$305M$654M$372M$320M$269M$739MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$30M$32M$41M$59M$94M$104M$137M$161M$174M$157M$152MDepreciationDeprec.
($13M)($15M)$33M$36M$72M($151M)$43M($17M)$270M$178M$588MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$22M$27M$35M$35M$38M$54M$76M$104M$81M$36M$33MCapexCapex
1.2%1.3%1.6%1.6%1.6%1.3%1.4%2.7%2.7%1.3%1.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$112M$134M$192M$190M$219M$252M$578M$268M$240M$234M$706MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.9%6.7%9.0%8.5%9.2%6.3%11.0%7.1%8.0%8.6%20.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$112M$134M$192M$190M$219M$252M$578M$268M$240M$234M$706MFree cash flowFCF
5.9%6.7%9.0%8.5%9.2%6.3%11.0%7.1%8.0%8.6%20.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$216M$0$217M$248M$476M$41M$70M$292M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$13M$20M$67M$19M$0$3M$577M$425M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
14%17%14%11%7%19%26%12%-5%-3%3%ROICROIC
24%24%22%15%9%28%43%25%-21%-15%-5%Return on equityROE
24%24%22%15%9%28%43%25%−21%−15%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$11M$15M$14M$83M$29M$181M$65M$33M$11M$34M$561MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$342M$350M$366M$353M$376M$789M$676M$623M$438M$383M$395MReceivablesReceiv.
$138M$130M$150M$156M$168M$425M$476M$344M$184M$162M$197MAccounts payablePayables
$204M$220M$216M$197M$208M$364M$199M$280M$254M$221M$197MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$451M$474M$482M$560M$534M$1.3B$1.1B$842M$595M$545M$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$275M$265M$307M$378M$423M$969M$858M$656M$546M$578M$1.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.8×1.6×1.5×1.3×1.4×1.3×1.3×1.1×0.9×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$342M$341M$439M$596M$864M$892M$935M$1.1B$897M$756M$756MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.9B$2.4B$3.1B$2.9B$2.9B$2.4B$2.1B$2.6BTotal assetsAssets
$363M$320M$441M$617M$863M$842M$844M$1.3B$1.1B$767M$767MTotal debtDebt
$352M$305M$427M$534M$833M$661M$779M$1.3B$1.0B$733M$206MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
12.4×10.8×12.6×6.2×2.6×14.0×16.0×6.3×-1.5×-1.2×1.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$449M$563M$639M$737M$820M$1.2B$1.0B$831M$707M$642M$713MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.5%0.5%0.7%0.9%0.6%0.6%0.5%0.8%1.1%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$222M$110M$110MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
49.3M49.4M48.7M47.6M47.7M48.0M44.9M39.3M38.2M38.5M39.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$38.61$40.23$43.89$46.69$50.19$82.93$116.85$96.32$78.13$70.88$87.41Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.15$2.68$2.91$2.40$1.48$6.81$9.90$5.36$-3.85$-2.48$-0.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.27$2.71$3.94$3.98$4.59$5.24$12.88$6.82$6.27$6.07$18.06Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.27$2.71$3.94$3.98$4.59$5.24$12.88$6.82$6.27$6.07$18.06Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.45$0.54$0.72$0.74$0.79$1.12$1.69$2.64$2.12$0.92$0.84Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.12$11.38$13.13$15.48$17.19$24.19$23.26$21.13$18.50$16.67$18.22Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.0%/yr+7.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+11.5%/yr+5.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.5%/yr+3.2%/yr
Book value / share+6.9%/yr−0.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue-8.5%
    “Revenue decreased 8% to $2,730.4 million for 2025 from $2,983.8 million for 2024, attributable to a decline in organic revenue across our segments with the greatest decline in our nurse and allied solutions segment.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
39Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
−3%low FY2024
Gross margin
28%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.1×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$234Mowner earningsvs.($96M)net incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $96M loss into $234M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($96M)($147M)$211M$444M$327M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$157M+$174M+$161M+$137M+$104M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$31M+$23M+$18M+$30M+$25M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$178M+$270M−$17M+$43M−$151M
Cash from operations$269M$320M$372M$654M$305M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$36M−$81M−$104M−$76M−$54M
Owner earnings$234M$240M$268M$578M$252M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%8%7%11%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $31M), owner earnings is nearer $203M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($55M) ÷ interest expense $46M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $34M − debt $767M
    What this means

    Netting $34M of cash and short-term investments against $767M of debt leaves $733M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 51 + DIO 0 − DPO 30 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -5%–26%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($44M) ÷ invested capital $1.4B
    Industry peers: median 22%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 6%–11%; latest $234M = operating cash $269M − maintenance capex $36M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $31M of SBC) leaves $203M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($96M) · cash from operations $269M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $234M
    What this means

    Of $234M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.23×
    Harvesting
    Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $157M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.94×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $767M vs ($32M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −108%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.28/share (latest year $-2.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to 1% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −12%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −3.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, as technology continues to evolve, more tasks currently performed by people may continue to be replaced by automation, robotics, machine learning, AI and other technological advances that may be outside of our control.”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$561M
  • Receivables$395M
  • Other current assets$181M
Current liabilities$1.0B
  • Accounts payable$197M
  • Other current liabilities$847M
Current ratio1.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.54×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$92Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+99.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($309M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($755M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$801M$34M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$5Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$506M · 17%
  • Buybacks$1.1B · 38%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 44%
  • Returned to owners$1.1B

    46% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$89.06

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 13M shares were bought for $1.1B, about $89.06 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $29.93 (2016) to $107.52 (2021); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $102.19 ($577M).

  • Net change in share count−20.6%

    The diluted count fell from 49M to 39M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained56%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($181M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $101M, so each retained $1 added about 0.56 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.0B50% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$1.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $506M of capital spent building

$332M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 21% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Cary Grace$9.5M$22.5M$252M
2022Cary Grace$8.5M$8.0M$578M
2022Cary Grace$3.3M$2.8M$578M
2023Cary Grace$6.7M$3.6M$268M
2024Cary Grace$9.6M$277k$240M
2025Cary Grace$10.7M$5.4M$234M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio123:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$31M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AMN Healthcare Services is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Insurance reserves, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Staffing & Employment Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NSPInsperity Inc.$6.8B3.8%4%
RHIRobert Half Inc.$5.4B41%10.0%45%8%
KELYAKelly Services Inc.$4.3B19%0.7%2%1%
ASGNEverforth, Inc.$4.0B29%8.1%9%7%
KFYKorn Ferry$2.9B10.0%14%10%
AMNAMN Healthcare Services$2.7B33%9.2%13%8%
KFRCKforce Inc.$1.3B29%5.6%29%5%
BBSIBarrett Business Services Inc.$1.2B21%4.8%34%5%
Group median29%6.8%14%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AMN Healthcare Services has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, AMN Healthcare Services earns about $226M on its 8.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $706M on 39M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $206M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AMN Healthcare Services (AMN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AMN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AMKR its page in the Manual AMP →

Industry order: ← 6098 the Staffing & Employment Services chapter ASGN →