Owner Scorecard


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KOP, Koppers Holdings Inc.

Chemicals capital-intensive

Koppers Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koppers Holdings Inc.

We are a leading integrated global provider of treated wood products, wood preservation chemicals and carbon compounds.

Our products and services are used in a variety of niche applications in a diverse range of end-markets, including the railroad, specialty chemical, utility, residential lumber, agriculture, aluminum, steel, rubber and construction industries.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KOP · Koppers Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
−10.2% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.9B 5-yr avg $2.0B
Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 20%
Operating margin 8.7% 5-yr avg 8.3%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 7.6% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. That margin has held in a narrow 5.4%–9.4% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

32% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States68%$1.3B
  • Australia13%$249M
  • Other countries9%$178M
  • Europe9%$172M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2B$2.1B$1.9B$1.9BRevenueRevenue
20%22%19%20%22%20%17%20%20%24%23%Gross marginGross mgn
9%9%10%9%9%9%8%8%9%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%1%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$93M$124M$84M$125M$157M$157M$138M$195M$148M$168M$163MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.6%8.4%5.4%7.6%9.4%9.3%7.0%9.1%7.1%8.9%8.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$29M$29M$23M$67M$122M$85M$63M$89M$52M$56M$77MNet incomeNet inc.
28%50%52%0%15%29%33%28%28%31%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$120M$102M$78M$115M$127M$103M$102M$146M$119M$123M$192MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$53M$50M$47M$51M$54M$58M$56M$57M$68M$74M$75MDepreciationDeprec.
$28M$12M($5M)($15M)($60M)($53M)($30M)($17M)($21M)($21M)$28MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$50M$68M$110M$37M$70M$125M$105M$121M$77M$55M$52MCapexCapex
3.5%4.6%7.0%2.3%4.2%7.4%5.3%5.6%3.7%2.9%2.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$70M$52M$31M$78M$73M$45M$46M$89M$42M$68M$139MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.9%3.5%2.0%4.8%4.4%2.7%2.3%4.1%2.0%3.6%7.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$70M$34M($31M)$78M$57M($22M)($3M)$26M$42M$68M$139MFree cash flowFCF
4.9%2.3%−2.0%4.8%3.4%−1.3%−0.2%1.2%2.0%3.6%7.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$264M$0$0$0$15M$0$99M$21M$21MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$0$0$0$4M$5M$6M$6M$7MDividends paidDiv. paid
$300K$5M$32M$900K$2M$12M$24M$20M$51M$38MBuybacksBuybacks
10%9%4%12%12%10%8%11%8%8%8%ROICROIC
96%29%42%45%36%21%16%18%11%10%14%Return on equityROE
96%29%42%36%21%15%17%10%9%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$21M$51M$37M$32M$39M$46M$33M$67M$44M$38M$43MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$137M$159M$190M$162M$175M$183M$216M$202M$192M$159M$181MReceivablesReceiv.
$229M$237M$285M$289M$296M$314M$356M$396M$405M$411M$396MInventoryInvent.
$144M$142M$177M$163M$154M$172M$207M$203M$179M$122M$143MAccounts payablePayables
$221M$254M$297M$287M$317M$325M$364M$395M$417M$448M$434MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$438M$507M$540M$520M$565M$628M$637M$699M$681M$669M$669MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$293M$281M$299M$296M$292M$286M$324M$326M$326M$227M$247MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.8×1.8×1.8×1.9×2.2×2.0×2.1×2.1×2.9×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$186M$188M$297M$296M$298M$296M$294M$294M$317M$329M$329MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9BTotal assetsAssets
$662M$677M$990M$901M$776M$784M$818M$840M$931M$919M$920MTotal debtDebt
$642M$626M$953M$869M$737M$738M$784M$774M$887M$881M$877MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.8×2.9×1.6×2.0×3.2×3.9×3.1×2.7×1.9×2.5×2.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$30M$100M$56M$147M$342M$407M$399M$499M$489M$574M$550MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.7%0.8%0.7%0.7%0.8%0.7%0.8%1.0%0.7%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
21.1M22.0M21.3M21.1M21.4M21.9M21.3M21.5M21.3M20.4M20.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$67.26$67.07$73.28$77.70$78.09$76.56$92.92$100.01$98.26$92.10$93.34Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.39$1.32$1.10$3.16$5.71$3.89$2.97$4.14$2.46$2.74$3.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.31$2.36$1.47$3.71$3.42$2.07$2.17$4.14$1.97$3.31$6.93Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.31$1.56$-1.47$3.71$2.68$-1.00$-0.14$1.19$1.97$3.31$6.93Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.20$0.23$0.28$0.31$0.35Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.37$3.07$5.14$1.77$3.27$5.70$4.94$5.59$3.64$2.70$2.59Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.44$4.54$2.64$6.99$15.99$18.55$18.74$23.16$22.95$28.13$27.31Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.6%/yr+3.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+0.0%/yr−0.6%/yr
EPS+7.8%/yr−13.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.4%/yr−3.8%/yr
Book value / share+39.1%/yr+12.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
20Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
8%low FY2018
Gross margin
24%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
13.1×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$68Mowner earningsvs.$56Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $56M of profit into $68M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$56M
Owner earnings$68M · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$56M$52M$89M$63M$85M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$74M+$68M+$57M+$56M+$58M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$14M+$21M+$17M+$13M+$13M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$21M−$21M−$17M−$30M−$53M
Cash from operations$123M$119M$146M$102M$103M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$55M−$77M−$57M−$56M−$58M
Owner earnings$68M$42M$89M$46M$45M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$64M−$49M−$67M
Free cash flow$68M$42M$26M($3M)($22M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%2%4%2%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $14M), owner earnings is nearer $54M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $168M ÷ interest expense $66M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $881M · 5.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $38M − debt $919M
    What this means

    Netting $38M of cash and short-term investments against $919M of debt leaves $881M owed, about 5.3× a year's operating profit (5.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 31 + DIO 105 − DPO 31 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–12%; 8% latest = NOPAT $116M ÷ invested capital $1.5B
    Industry peers: median 20%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–5%; latest $68M = operating cash $123M − maintenance capex $55M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $14M of SBC) leaves $54M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $123M ÷ net income $56M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $45M ÷ Owner Earnings $68M
    What this means

    Of $68M Owner Earnings, $45M (66%) went back to shareholders, $6M dividends, $38M buybacks. Net of $14M stock comp, the real buyback was about $24M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.75×
    Harvesting
    Capex $55M ÷ depreciation $74M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.94×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $919M vs $442M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +142%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.42/share (latest year $2.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $29.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 8% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 11%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · 5.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“The main driver for growth is the construction of datacenters that support artificial intelligence development.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$669M
  • Cash & short-term investments$43M
  • Receivables$181M
  • Inventory$396M
  • Other current assets$49M
Current liabilities$247M
  • Debt due within a year$5M
  • Accounts payable$143M
  • Other current liabilities$98M
Current ratio2.71×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.11×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$422Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $43M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$117Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($662M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.0B$103M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$5M
'27$5M
'28$5M
'29$5M
'30$917M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$5Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$10Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$917Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$936Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $919M of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$43M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$68M
Together, against $5M due next year22.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $110M against the $5M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 23 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$817M · 72%
  • Dividends$22M · 2%
  • Buybacks$184M · 16%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$113M · 10%
  • Returned to owners$206M

    35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $22M as dividends and $184M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $258M and cash and short-term investments rose $22M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$34.73

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $184M, about $34.73 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $17.65 (2016) to $43.16 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($51M).

  • Net change in share count−4.4%

    The diluted count fell from 21M to 20M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.31/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained4%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($411M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $15M, so each retained $1 added about 0.04 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$436M23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity57%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$399Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $817M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Leroy M. Ball$5.2M$3.8M$45M
2022Leroy M. Ball$5.8M$2.9M$46M
2023Leroy M. Ball$6.0M$17.6M$89M
2024Leroy M. Ball$5.9M−$3.0M$42M
2025Leroy M. Ball$6.4M$1.1M$68M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$14M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Koppers Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UFPIUFP Industries$6.3B16%6.2%16%6%
FBINFortune Brands$4.5B41%13.1%12%9%
LPXLouisiana-Pacific Corporation$2.7B27%18.3%29%11%
SKYChampion Homes Inc.$2.7B22%8.2%22%8%
CVCOCavco Industries, Inc.$2.2B22%9.1%20%9%
KOPKoppers Holdings Inc.$1.9B20%8.0%9%4%
TREXTrex Company, Inc.$1.2B41%25.1%37%18%
LEGHLegacy Housing Corporation$117M35.3%12%-2%
Group median22%11.1%18%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Koppers Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Koppers Holdings Inc. earns about $67M on its 3.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $139M on 19M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $877M. The if-converted diluted count is 20M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Koppers Holdings Inc. (KOP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KOP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KODK its page in the Manual KOPN →

Industry order: ← IOSP the Chemicals chapter KWR →