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LPX, Louisiana-Pacific Corporation

Paper & Forest Products capital-intensive Cyclical

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The principal customers for our building solutions are retailers, wholesalers, and home building and industrial businesses in North America and South America.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LPX · Louisiana-Pacific Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.7B

−7.9% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.6B 5-yr avg $3.2B

Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 32%

Operating margin 4.8% 5-yr avg 22.7%

ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 45%

Owner-earnings margin −0% 5-yr avg 14%

Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 18% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −0.9% and 44% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 29%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$2.2B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$3.9B	$3.9B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$2.7B	$2.6B	RevenueRevenue
18%	27%	26%	13%	35%	50%	39%	23%	28%	22%	20%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	7%	7%	10%	8%	6%	7%	10%	10%	12%	13%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$210M	$533M	$526M	($20M)	$615M	$1.7B	$1.3B	$287M	$530M	$209M	$123M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.4%	19.5%	18.6%	−0.9%	25.6%	44.3%	32.4%	11.1%	18.0%	7.7%	4.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$150M	$390M	$395M	($5M)	$499M	$1.4B	$1.1B	$178M	$420M	$146M	$82M	Net incomeNet inc.
12%	23%	24%	—	20%	23%	20%	29%	25%	26%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$342M	$474M	$511M	$159M	$659M	$1.5B	$1.1B	$316M	$605M	$382M	$280M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3M	$123M	$116M	$118M	$102M	$114M	$129M	$119M	$126M	$145M	$148M	DepreciationDeprec.
$176M	($49M)	($9M)	$46M	$58M	($7M)	($71M)	$6M	$39M	$61M	$20M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$125M	$149M	$214M	$163M	$71M	$254M	$414M	$300M	$183M	$291M	$288M	CapexCapex
5.6%	5.5%	7.6%	7.1%	3.0%	6.5%	10.7%	11.6%	6.2%	10.7%	11.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$218M	$325M	$297M	($4M)	$588M	$1.2B	$730M	$16M	$422M	$91M	($8M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
9.7%	11.9%	10.5%	−0.2%	24.5%	31.4%	18.9%	0.6%	14.3%	3.4%	−0.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$218M	$325M	$297M	($4M)	$588M	$1.2B	$730M	$16M	$422M	$91M	($8M)	Free cash flowFCF
9.7%	11.9%	10.5%	−0.2%	24.5%	31.4%	18.9%	0.6%	14.3%	3.4%	−0.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$21M	$0	$0	$0	$0	$0	$80M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$0	$74M	$65M	$65M	$66M	$69M	$69M	$74M	$78M	$79M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$0	$212M	$638M	$200M	$1.3B	$900M	$0	$212M	$61M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
20%	39%	34%	-1%	47%	109%	71%	12%	24%	9%	5%	ROICROIC
13%	24%	23%	-1%	40%	111%	76%	11%	25%	8%	5%	Return on equityROE
13%	24%	19%	−7%	35%	106%	71%	7%	21%	4%	0%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$659M	$928M	$878M	$181M	$535M	$358M	$369M	$222M	$340M	$292M	$164M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$108M	$143M	$128M	$164M	$184M	$169M	$127M	$155M	$131M	$127M	$155M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$235M	$259M	$273M	$265M	$259M	$278M	$337M	$378M	$357M	$363M	$416M	InventoryInvent.
$90M	$112M	$116M	$242M	$268M	$304M	$317M	$254M	$139M	$129M	$122M	Accounts payablePayables
$253M	$289M	$285M	$187M	$175M	$143M	$147M	$279M	$349M	$361M	$449M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.0B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$619M	$993M	$890M	$854M	$778M	$855M	$809M	$760M	Current assetsCur. assets
$229M	$270M	$262M	$244M	$286M	$351M	$336M	$259M	$299M	$291M	$233M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.4×	5.0×	4.9×	2.5×	3.5×	2.5×	2.5×	3.0×	2.9×	2.8×	3.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$10M	$16M	$16M	$30M	$25M	$19M	$19M	$19M	$19M	$19M	$19M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.0B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	Total assetsAssets
$377M	$376M	$352M	$348M	$351M	$350M	$346M	$347M	$348M	$348M	$348M	Total debtDebt
($282M)	($552M)	($526M)	$167M	($184M)	($8M)	($23M)	$125M	$8M	$56M	$184M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
6.5×	26.6×	27.7×	-1.1×	36.2×	115.6×	89.3×	16.9×	37.9×	12.3×	6.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$991M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.4%	0.3%	—	—	—	—	0.5%	0.7%	1.1%	1.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
145M	146M	144M	123M	112M	98.0M	78.0M	72.0M	71.0M	70.0M	70.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$15.37	$18.73	$19.64	$18.78	$21.42	$39.95	$49.41	$35.85	$41.42	$38.69	$36.54	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.03	$2.67	$2.74	$-0.04	$4.46	$14.05	$13.92	$2.47	$5.92	$2.09	$1.17	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.50	$2.23	$2.06	$-0.03	$5.25	$12.55	$9.36	$0.22	$5.94	$1.30	$-0.11	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.50	$2.23	$2.06	$-0.03	$5.25	$12.55	$9.36	$0.22	$5.94	$1.30	$-0.11	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.51	$0.53	$0.58	$0.67	$0.88	$0.96	$1.04	$1.11	$1.13	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.86	$1.02	$1.49	$1.33	$0.63	$2.59	$5.31	$4.17	$2.58	$4.16	$4.11	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.23	$10.99	$11.81	$8.06	$11.02	$12.60	$18.37	$21.63	$23.54	$24.73	$24.71	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+10.8%/yr	+12.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−1.6%/yr	−24.4%/yr
EPS	+8.1%/yr	−14.1%/yr
Dividends / share	—	+13.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+19.1%/yr	+45.7%/yr
Book value / share	+13.0%/yr	+17.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

70Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

9%low FY2019

Gross margin

22%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

0.6×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$91Mowner earningsvs.$146Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $146M of profit but $91M of owner earnings: $55M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$146M

Owner earnings$91M · 3% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$146M	$420M	$178M	$1.1B	$1.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$145M	+$126M	+$119M	+$129M	+$114M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$30M	+$20M	+$13M	—	—
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$61M	+$39M	+$6M	−$71M	−$7M
Cash from operations	$382M	$605M	$316M	$1.1B	$1.5B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$291M	−$183M	−$300M	−$414M	−$254M
Owner earnings	$91M	$422M	$16M	$730M	$1.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	14%	1%	19%	31%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer $61M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 12.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $209M ÷ interest expense $17M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $58M · 0.3× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $292M − debt $350M

What this means
Netting $292M of cash and short-term investments against $350M of debt leaves $58M owed, about 0.3× a year's operating profit (1.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 57d

Tight

DSO 17 + DIO 63 − DPO 22 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 24%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range -1%–109%; 9% latest = NOPAT $156M ÷ invested capital $1.8B

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -0%–31%; latest $91M = operating cash $382M − maintenance capex $291M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves $61M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.62×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $382M ÷ net income $146M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 153%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $139M ÷ Owner Earnings $91M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $91M of Owner Earnings, $139M (153%) went back to shareholders, $78M dividends, $61M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $30M stock comp, the real buyback was about $31M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 2.01×

Expanding

Capex $291M ÷ depreciation $145M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.78×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $350M vs $518M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −20%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.55/share (latest year $2.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $24.78/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 16% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 12% lately, median 18% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −12%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth −1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · −0.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$760M

Cash & short-term investments$164M
Receivables$155M
Inventory$416M
Other current assets$25M

Current liabilities$233M

Accounts payable$122M
Other current liabilities$111M

Current ratio3.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.48×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$527Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−20.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.4× → 3.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($90M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$378M$30M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0

'27$0

'28$0

'29$350M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$350Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$350Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $350M of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$2.2B · 36%
Dividends$560M · 9%
Buybacks$3.5B · 58%

Returned to owners$4.1B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $560M as dividends and $3.5B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−51.8%
The diluted count fell from 145M to 70M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.11/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained−19%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($553M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $103M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	W. Bradley Southern	$9.2M	$34.3M	$1.2B
2022	W. Bradley Southern	$8.7M	−$7.7M	$730M
2023	W. Bradley Southern	$10.7M	$10.5M	$16M
2024	W. Bradley Southern	$9.6M	$14.0M	$422M
2025	W. Bradley Southern	$13.5M	$9.3M	$91M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Louisiana-Pacific Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.1% vs 10.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.7% early in the record and 6.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 22% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $343M to $571M while revenue grew 15%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 22% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $225M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$1.2B · 47% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In 2025, our top ten customers accounted for approximately 47 % of our net sales.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Paper & Forest Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
UFPIUFP Industries	$6.3B	16%	6.2%	16%	6%
FBINFortune Brands	$4.5B	41%	13.1%	12%	9%
LPXLouisiana-Pacific Corporation	$2.7B	27%	18.3%	29%	11%
SKYChampion Homes Inc.	$2.7B	22%	8.2%	22%	8%
CVCOCavco Industries, Inc.	$2.2B	22%	9.1%	20%	9%
KOPKoppers Holdings Inc.	$1.9B	20%	8.0%	9%	4%
TREXTrex Company, Inc.	$1.2B	41%	25.1%	37%	18%
LEGHLegacy Housing Corporation	$117M	—	35.3%	12%	-2%
Group median	—	22%	11.1%	18%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Louisiana-Pacific Corporation has delivered.

Louisiana-Pacific Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Louisiana-Pacific Corporation earns about $303M on its 11.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($303M) Net of stock comp (−$30M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−28%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($8M) on 70M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $184M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LPX against another business →

The owners of LPX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Louisiana-Pacific Corporation (LPX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LPX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LPTH its page in the Manual LQDA →

Industry order: ← IP the Paper & Forest Products chapter MAGN →