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KOPN, Kopin Corporation
Kopin Corporation is headquartered in Westborough, Massachusetts, is a leader of innovative microdisplay technologies and optical systems, catering to defense, enterprise, industrial, consumer, and medical sectors.
Corporate Background and Market Presence As used herein, the terms "Company," "we," "us," or "our" refer to Kopin Corporation, a Delaware corporation.
The display is a bi-directional, human-in-the-loop and artificial intelligence enabled backplane that can be manufactured into microdisplays using either OLED or MicroLED deposition technology.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −86% through the cycle on a 35% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −70%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $23M | $28M | $24M | $30M | $40M | $46M | $47M | $40M | $50M | $39M | $39M | RevenueRevenue |
| 21% | 35% | 35% | 29% | 47% | — | — | — | — | — | 46% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 75% | 74% | 111% | 72% | 29% | 40% | 38% | 54% | 45% | 41% | 45% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 67% | 56% | 51% | 31% | 10% | 14% | 18% | 9% | 12% | 17% | 16% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($20M) | ($30M) | ($40M) | ($26M) | ($5M) | ($14M) | ($22M) | ($17M) | ($43M) | ($10M) | ($12M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −90.4% | −108.8% | −163.4% | −89.4% | −11.9% | −30.2% | −46.0% | −42.5% | −85.6% | −25.1% | −30.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($24M) | ($25M) | ($35M) | ($30M) | ($4M) | ($13M) | ($19M) | ($20M) | ($44M) | $3M | $2M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($26M) | ($26M) | ($28M) | ($21M) | ($4M) | ($11M) | ($18M) | ($15M) | ($14M) | ($16M) | ($13M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $900K | $1M | $800K | $651K | $669K | $722K | $608K | $637K | $830K | $857K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($6M) | ($4M) | $639K | $6M | ($1M) | ($2M) | ($351K) | $4K | $26M | ($22M) | ($19M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $395K | $3M | $1M | $170K | $543K | $1M | $833K | $949K | $815K | $1M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 1.7% | 10.0% | 4.8% | 0.6% | 1.4% | 2.3% | 1.8% | 2.4% | 1.6% | 3.7% | 5.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($27M) | ($27M) | ($29M) | ($21M) | ($5M) | ($11M) | ($19M) | ($16M) | ($15M) | ($16M) | ($14M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −117.3% | −96.3% | −119.7% | −71.8% | −12.4% | −25.0% | −39.1% | −39.3% | −29.5% | −41.6% | −35.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($27M) | ($29M) | ($29M) | ($21M) | ($5M) | ($12M) | ($19M) | ($16M) | ($15M) | ($17M) | ($15M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −117.3% | −103.1% | −119.7% | −71.8% | −12.4% | −25.8% | −39.1% | −40.1% | −29.9% | −43.2% | −38.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $792K | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $792K | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -28% | -46% | -94% | -92% | -33% | -84% | -108% | -57% | -373% | -33% | -40% | ROICROIC |
| -32% | -33% | -72% | -103% | -16% | -34% | -80% | -67% | -188% | 4% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| −32% | −34% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $16M | $25M | $14M | $22M | $21M | $29M | $13M | $17M | $36M | $36M | $37M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2M | $4M | $3M | $6M | $9M | $12M | $7M | $10M | $12M | $11M | $3M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $5M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $7M | $6M | $8M | $6M | $6M | $5M | InventoryInvent. |
| $4M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $6M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $6M | $5M | $6M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $611K | $4M | $4M | $6M | $8M | $13M | $8M | $12M | $12M | $11M | $3M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $83M | $80M | $49M | $34M | $39M | $52M | $31M | $40M | $63M | $92M | $82M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $13M | $12M | $10M | $11M | $17M | $18M | $14M | $16M | $44M | $34M | $32M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 6.2× | 6.6× | 4.8× | 3.0× | 2.3× | 3.0× | 2.1× | 2.5× | 1.4× | 2.7× | 2.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $844K | $2M | $331K | $0 | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $88M | $91M | $60M | $43M | $48M | $63M | $44M | $49M | $71M | $108M | $102M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($16M) | ($25M) | ($14M) | ($22M) | ($21M) | ($29M) | ($13M) | ($17M) | ($36M) | ($36M) | ($37M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $74M | $77M | $48M | $29M | $28M | $40M | $24M | $30M | $23M | $64M | $61M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 10.7% | 8.2% | 19.6% | 7.0% | 2.0% | 9.7% | 2.7% | 9.6% | 6.6% | 7.7% | 7.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $600K | $1M | $331K | — | — | — | — | — | — | $331K | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 64.0M | 69.9M | 73.2M | 80.3M | 82.3M | 88.8M | 91.4M | 109M | 133M | 175M | 187M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.35 | $0.40 | $0.33 | $0.37 | $0.49 | $0.51 | $0.52 | $0.37 | $0.38 | $0.22 | $0.21 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.37 | $-0.36 | $-0.47 | $-0.37 | $-0.05 | $-0.15 | $-0.21 | $-0.18 | $-0.33 | $0.01 | $0.01 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.41 | $-0.38 | $-0.40 | $-0.26 | $-0.06 | $-0.13 | $-0.20 | $-0.15 | $-0.11 | $-0.09 | $-0.07 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.41 | $-0.41 | $-0.40 | $-0.26 | $-0.06 | $-0.13 | $-0.20 | $-0.15 | $-0.11 | $-0.10 | $-0.08 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.01 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.16 | $1.10 | $0.65 | $0.36 | $0.35 | $0.45 | $0.26 | $0.27 | $0.18 | $0.37 | $0.33 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −4.9%/yr | −14.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.2%/yr | +4.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | −12.0%/yr | +1.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($16M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $830K it takes just to hold its position. It put $608K more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($17M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $3M | ($44M) | ($20M) | ($19M) | ($13M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$830K | +$637K | +$608K | +$722K | +$669K |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$3M | +$3M | +$4M | +$1M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$22M | +$26M | +$4K | −$351K | −$2M |
| Cash from operations | ($16M) | ($14M) | ($15M) | ($18M) | ($11M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$830K | −$637K | −$608K | −$833K | −$669K |
| Owner earnings | ($16M) | ($15M) | ($16M) | ($19M) | ($11M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$608K | −$179K | −$341K | — | −$365K |
| Free cash flow | ($17M) | ($15M) | ($16M) | ($19M) | ($12M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -42% | -30% | -39% | -39% | -25% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $830K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $608K of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer ($19M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We are in the process of developing and implementing our remediation plan for the identified material weaknesses, and we expect that this work will continue in 2026.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $36M + ST investments $21M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $58M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 100 + DIO 94 − DPO 91 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -0%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -120%–-12%; latest ($16M) = operating cash ($16M) − maintenance capex $830KIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -42% of revenue this year, a -42% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves ($19M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -5.96×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($16M) ÷ net income $3M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.73×ExpandingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $830K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $39M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.70×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.11/share (latest year $0.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −121% → −51% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −121% early to −51% lately, median −86% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2018 · −163.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“These competitors may be able to respond more rapidly than us to new or emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence technologies, or changes in customer requirements.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$37M
- Receivables$3M
- Inventory$5M
- Other current assets$37M
- Accounts payable$6M
- Other current liabilities$26M
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Murray | $1.0M | $1.7M | ($16M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Murray | $1.0M | $1.7M | ($16M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Murray | $2.4M | $2.5M | ($15M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Murray | $2.4M | $2.5M | ($15M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Murray | $2.3M | $2.9M | ($16M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Murray | $2.3M | $2.9M | ($16M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kopin Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $13M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AXTIAXT Inc | $88M | 32% | 6.0% | 4% | -16% |
| AMBQAmbiq Micro Inc. | $73M | 44% | -54.5% | -141% | — |
| AIPArteris Inc. | $71M | 90% | -56.0% | — | -3% |
| MPTIM-tron Industries Inc. | $54M | — | 10.4% | 19% | 9% |
| NVTSNavitas Semiconductor Corporation | $46M | 33% | -196.7% | -41% | -108% |
| KOPNKopin Corporation | $39M | 35% | -65.8% | -70% | -40% |
| LPTHLightPath Technologies Inc. | $37M | 35% | -4.8% | -5% | -0% |
| NVECNVE Corporation | $26M | 79% | 61.3% | 21% | 52% |
| Group median | — | 35% | -29.7% | -5% | -3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFKopin Corporation is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered0%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← KOP its page in the Manual KOS →
Industry order: ← KLIC the Semiconductors chapter LAES →