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LANV, Lanvin Group Holdings Limited
A consumer-brand business, where the durable asset is the brand and the pricing power it commands.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −48% through the cycle on a 56% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 26% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −48%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest North America at 43%.
- North America43%€124M
- EMEA39%€115M
- Greater China12%€34M
- Other Asia7%€20M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMJun 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| €223M | €309M | €422M | €426M | €329M | €291M | RevenueRevenue |
| 53% | 55% | 56% | 59% | 56% | 54% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (€124M) | (€63M) | (€225M) | (€122M) | (€156M) | (€174M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −55.8% | −20.3% | −53.4% | −28.7% | −47.6% | −59.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (€111M) | (€65M) | (€218M) | (€129M) | (€165M) | (€181M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| (€87M) | (€73M) | (€81M) | (€58M) | (€59M) | (€95M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| €48M | €42M | €46M | €47M | €47M | €45M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (€25M) | (€49M) | €92M | €24M | €59M | €40M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| €6M | €10M | €25M | €43M | €13M | €10M | CapexCapex |
| 2.6% | 3.2% | 5.8% | 10.0% | 4.0% | 3.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (€93M) | (€83M) | (€106M) | (€101M) | (€72M) | (€106M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −41.8% | −26.9% | −25.0% | −23.6% | −22.0% | −36.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (€93M) | (€83M) | (€106M) | (€101M) | (€72M) | (€106M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −41.8% | −26.9% | −25.0% | −23.6% | −22.0% | −36.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -48% | -20% | -75% | -46% | -77% | -89% | ROICROIC |
| -44% | -25% | -74% | -76% | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| −44% | −25% | −74% | −76% | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| €44M | €89M | €92M | €28M | €18M | €30M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | €40M | €49M | €46M | €28M | €24M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | €92M | €109M | €107M | €90M | €74M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | €132M | €158M | €153M | €118M | €98M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | €263M | €280M | €207M | €165M | €165M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | €223M | €233M | €288M | €416M | €476M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 1.2× | 0.7× | 0.4× | 0.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | €69M | €69M | €69M | €38M | €38M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | €706M | €732M | €688M | €614M | €585M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | €67M | €33M | €68M | €184M | €269M | Total debtDebt |
| — | (€22M) | (€58M) | €40M | €166M | €239M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -9.6× | -6.7× | -15.5× | -6.0× | -5.2× | -5.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| €250M | €264M | €295M | €169M | (€4M) | (€85M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 72.6M | 77.9M | 101M | 132M | 117M | 117M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| €3.07 | €3.97 | €4.16 | €3.24 | €2.80 | €2.49 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| €-1.53 | €-0.84 | €-2.15 | €-0.98 | €-1.41 | €-1.55 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| €-1.28 | €-1.07 | €-1.04 | €-0.76 | €-0.62 | €-0.90 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| €-1.28 | €-1.07 | €-1.04 | €-0.76 | €-0.62 | €-0.90 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| €0.08 | €0.13 | €0.24 | €0.32 | €0.11 | €0.09 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| €3.45 | €3.40 | €2.91 | €1.29 | €-0.04 | €-0.73 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −2.2%/yr | −2.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +9.2%/yr | +9.2%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2020–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned a €165M loss into (€72M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (€165M) | (€129M) | (€218M) | (€65M) | (€111M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +€47M | +€47M | +€46M | +€42M | +€48M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +€59M | +€24M | +€92M | −€49M | −€25M |
| Cash from operations | (€59M) | (€58M) | (€81M) | (€73M) | (€87M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −€13M | −€43M | −€25M | −€10M | −€6M |
| Owner earnings | (€72M) | (€101M) | (€106M) | (€83M) | (€93M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -22% | -24% | -25% | -27% | -42% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -5.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income (€174M) ÷ interest expense €29M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash €30M − debt €269M
What this means
Netting €30M of cash and short-term investments against €269M of debt leaves €239M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -77%–-20%; -89% latest = NOPAT (€137M) ÷ invested capital €154MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -89% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -42%–-22%; latest (€106M) = operating cash (€95M) − maintenance capex €10MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -36% of revenue this year, a -25% median across 5 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? (€95M)Loss, and burning cashNet income (€181M) · cash from operations (€95M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.23×HarvestingCapex €10M ÷ depreciation €45M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €291M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.35×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · €269M vs (€311M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €-1.36/share (latest year €-1.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €-0.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −38% → −38% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −38% early, −38% lately, median −48%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −55.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +12.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Jun 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments€30M
- Receivables€24M
- Inventory€74M
- Other current assets€38M
- Debt due within a year€259M
- Other current liabilities€217M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈€28M · 10% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Sales to our five largest customers were 9.6% and 7.1% of our revenues for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Textiles & Apparel
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LEVILevi Strauss & Co | $6.3B | 58% | 9.8% | 23% | 5% |
| UAUnder Armour Inc. | $5.0B | 46% | 2.3% | 4% | 2% |
| COLMColumbia Sportswear | $3.4B | 50% | 10.7% | 18% | 10% |
| GIIIG-III Apparel | $3.0B | 36% | 6.3% | 9% | 4% |
| CRICarter's | $2.9B | 43% | 11.0% | 24% | 9% |
| OXMOxford Industries | $1.5B | 59% | 8.0% | 14% | 7% |
| FIGSFIGS Inc. | $631M | 70% | 6.0% | 8% | 8% |
| LANVLanvin Group Holdings Limited | €291M | 56% | -47.6% | -48% | -25% |
| Group median | — | 53% | 7.2% | 11% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Lanvin Group Holdings Limited reports in EUR, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that EUR, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in EUR. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Lanvin Group Holdings Limited is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered12%/yr’20→’24
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← LAES its page in the Manual LEGN →
Industry order: ← KTB the Textiles & Apparel chapter LEVI →