Owner Scorecard


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CCOI, Cogent Communications Holdings Inc.

Telecom Operators capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

We are a facilities-based provider of low-cost, high-speed Internet access, private network services, optical wavelength and optical transport services and data center colocation space and power.

We deliver our services to a diverse global base of businesses, communications service providers and other bandwidth-intensive organizations in 57 countries across North America, Europe, South America, Asia, Oceania and Africa.

We provide our on-net Internet access and private network services to corporate, net-centric and enterprise customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CCOI · Cogent Communications Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$976M
−5.8% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $968M 5-yr avg $828M
Gross margin 46% 5-yr avg 50%
Operating margin −7.7% 5-yr avg −0.8%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin −21% 5-yr avg −4%
Free cash flow margin −21% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is On-net (54%), Off-net (41%) and Wavelength (4%).
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 19% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 57% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −19% and 20% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 10% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 6 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest On-net at 54%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • On-net54%$532M
  • Off-net41%$397M
  • Wavelength4%$38M
  • Non-core1%$8M
By geographyNorth America84%Europe13%Oceania3%South America1%Africa0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$447M$485M$520M$546M$568M$590M$600M$941M$1.0B$976M$968MRevenueRevenue
57%57%58%60%61%62%62%42%38%45%46%Gross marginGross mgn
27%26%26%27%28%28%27%29%27%28%28%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$64M$76M$87M$100M$107M$119M$114M($129M)($198M)($101M)($74M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.3%15.6%16.6%18.4%18.8%20.2%19.0%−13.7%−19.1%−10.4%−7.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$15M$6M$29M$38M$6M$48M$5M$1.3B($204M)($182M)($170M)Net incomeNet inc.
38%31%29%40%33%-4%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$108M$112M$134M$149M$140M$170M$174M$17M($9M)($11M)($32M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$75M$76M$81M$80M$83M$89M$92M$232M$298M$270M$248MDepreciationDeprec.
$7M$17M$24M$31M$51M$33M$76M($1.5B)($103M)($99M)($128M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$45M$46M$50M$47M$56M$70M$79M$130M$195M$188M$176MCapexCapex
10.1%9.4%9.6%8.6%9.8%11.9%13.2%13.8%18.8%19.2%18.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$63M$66M$84M$102M$84M$100M$95M($112M)($204M)($198M)($208M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
14.0%13.6%16.1%18.6%14.9%17.0%15.8%−11.9%−19.7%−20.3%−21.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$63M$66M$84M$102M$84M$100M$95M($112M)($204M)($198M)($208M)Free cash flowFCF
14.0%13.6%16.1%18.6%14.9%17.0%15.8%−11.9%−19.7%−20.3%−21.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$68M$82M$98M$113M$129M$150M$170M$182M$189M$150M$102MDividends paidDiv. paid
$4M$2M$7M$4M$8M$17MBuybacksBuybacks
16%17%27%37%39%27%-9%-11%-5%-4%ROICROIC
Balance sheet
$274M$247M$276M$399M$371M$320M$224M$75M$198M$149M$140MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$34M$39M$42M$40M$44M$42M$44M$135M$97M$88M$91MReceivablesReceiv.
$12M$12M$9M$11M$10M$12M$27M$48M$40M$31M$36MAccounts payablePayables
$22M$28M$33M$29M$34M$30M$17M$87M$57M$57M$55MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$328M$306M$350M$476M$456M$410M$366M$514M$482M$451M$430MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$68M$75M$75M$90M$94M$81M$120M$373M$253M$221M$226MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.8×4.1×4.7×5.3×4.8×5.1×3.0×1.4×1.9×2.0×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$738M$711M$740M$932M$1.0B$985M$1.0B$3.2B$3.2B$3.1B$3.1BTotal assetsAssets
$570M$575M$645M$798M$882M$898M$950M$950M$1.5B$1.7B$1.7BTotal debtDebt
$295M$328M$369M$399M$511M$578M$726M$875M$1.3B$1.6B$1.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.6×1.6×1.7×1.7×1.7×2.1×1.0×-1.4×-1.6×-0.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($53M)($103M)($149M)($204M)($293M)($373M)($519M)$610M$223M($64M)($104M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.4%2.7%1.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
44.9M45.2M45.8M46.1M46.7M47.0M47.2M47.8M47.6M47.9M47.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.96$10.74$11.36$11.85$12.17$12.56$12.70$19.67$21.75$20.36$20.26Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.33$0.13$0.63$0.81$0.13$1.03$0.11$26.62$-4.28$-3.80$-3.55EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.40$1.46$1.83$2.21$1.81$2.14$2.01$-2.35$-4.28$-4.13$-4.35Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.40$1.46$1.83$2.21$1.81$2.14$2.01$-2.35$-4.28$-4.13$-4.35Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.52$1.81$2.14$2.44$2.77$3.20$3.60$3.80$3.98$3.13$2.14Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.01$1.01$1.09$1.02$1.20$1.49$1.67$2.71$4.09$3.91$3.68Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.19$-2.27$-3.25$-4.42$-6.28$-7.94$-10.99$12.74$4.68$-1.33$-2.18Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.3%/yr+10.8%/yr
Dividends / share+8.4%/yr+2.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+16.3%/yr+26.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
48Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−5%low FY2024
Gross margin
45%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.7×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($198M)owner earningsvs.($182M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2023

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $182M loss but ($198M) of owner earnings: $16M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($182M)($204M)$1.3B$5M$48M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$270M+$298M+$232M+$92M+$89M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$99M−$103M−$1.5B+$76M+$33M
Cash from operations($11M)($9M)$17M$174M$170M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$188M−$195M−$130M−$79M−$70M
Owner earnings($198M)($204M)($112M)$95M$100M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-20%-20%-12%16%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($101M) ÷ interest expense $123M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $149M − debt $1.7B
    What this means

    Netting $149M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 33 + DIO 0 − DPO 21 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -11%–39%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($80M) ÷ invested capital $1.5B
    Industry peers: median -2%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -20%–19%; latest ($198M) = operating cash ($11M) − maintenance capex $188M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -20% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves ($211M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($182M) · cash from operations ($11M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.69×
    Harvesting
    Capex $188M ÷ depreciation $270M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $976M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.04×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $230M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +1693%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.91/share (latest year $-3.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.27/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → −14% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to −14% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2024 · −19.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.7%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$430M
  • Cash & short-term investments$140M
  • Receivables$91M
  • Other current assets$199M
Current liabilities$226M
  • Accounts payable$36M
  • Other current liabilities$190M
Current ratio1.90×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.90×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.62×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$204Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.7 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.2× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($577M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$317M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $985M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$905M · 92%
  • Dividends$1.3B · 135%
  • Buybacks$42M · 4%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    1720% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $42M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$1.3B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $570M to $1.7B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$48.37

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $42M, about $48.37 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $39.12 (2017) to $56.86 (2020); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $48.82 ($17M).

  • Net change in share count6.5%

    The diluted count rose from 45M to 48M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$3.13/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Dave Schaeffer$12k$19k$100M
2022Dave Schaeffer$11k−$2,529$95M
2023Dave Schaeffer$8,839$20k($112M)
2024Dave Schaeffer$13k$13k($204M)
2025Dave Schaeffer$25k$8,796($198M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio259:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$13M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Cogent Communications Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−17.3% vs 14.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.6% early in the record and −17.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?6.5%

    Diluted shares grew 6.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $42M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$570M → $1.7B

    Debt rose from $570M to $1.7B while owner earnings went from about $71M to ($171M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 9% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $34M to $91M while revenue grew 117%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 9% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VSATViaSat Inc.$4.6B88%-2.7%-2%7%
GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc.$1.0B-33.2%-12%12%
LBRDALiberty Broadband$1.0B100%-54.0%-0%-40%
CALXCalix$1.0B50%-0.8%-2%3%
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.$976M57%16.1%17%14%
GOGOGogo Inc.$910M93%28.4%5%7%
IRDMIridium Communications Inc$872M95%10.5%2%35%
GSATGlobalstar Inc.$273M96%-47.3%-6%10%
Group median93%-1.7%-1%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Cogent Communications Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Cogent Communications Holdings Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Cogent Communications Holdings Inc. earns about $141M on its 14.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −20.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($208M) on 50M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Cogent Communications Holdings Inc. (CCOI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CCOI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CCO its page in the Manual CCRN →

Industry order: ← CALX the Telecom Operators chapter CHT →