Owner Scorecard


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LYB, LyondellBasell

Chemicals capital-intensive Cyclical

LyondellBasell makes the plastics that go into everyday goods, mainly polyethylene and polypropylene, sold in bulk to manufacturers, alongside the chemical building blocks behind them and an arm that licenses its chemical-process technology to other producers. Most of the profit is the spread between the cost of oil- and gas-linked feedstock and the price its commodity polymers fetch.

With respect to circularity, we are now aiming to produce and market 800 thousand metric tons of recycled and renewable-based polymers annually by 2030.

Production and marketing includes joint venture production we market plus our pro rata share of the remaining production produced and marketed by the joint venture, and production via third-party tolling arrangements.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LYB · LyondellBasell
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$30.2B
−9.7% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $29.7B 5-yr avg $38.7B
Gross margin 9% 5-yr avg 14%
Operating margin −1.0% 5-yr avg 7.5%
ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 13%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by O&P - EAI (32%) and I&D (30%), with 3 more segments behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
This is a price-taker. The pellets are a commodity set by the market, and the feedstock is tied to oil and gas, so the whole business is the spread between two prices it does not control. That spread answers to the industry's capacity cycle: when rivals bring on new plants, supply can swamp demand and crush the margin regardless of how well any one plant runs. The plants cost enormous sums and run best flat-out, so the pull to keep making product into a glut is built in. The technology-licensing arm is steadier but small against the chemical swing. So the levers are feedstock advantage and where the capacity cycle sits. Watch the spread through the trough as closely as the peak in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 6 segments, the largest O&P - EAI at 32%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • O&P - EAI32%$9.6B
  • I&D30%$9.0B
  • O&P– America25%$7.7B
  • APS11%$3.5B
  • Technology2%$463M
  • Other0%$0
By geographyUnited States37%Other27%Germany7%China6%Mexico5%Italy4%Other13%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$28.5B$33.7B$38.1B$33.9B$27.0B$46.2B$50.5B$33.3B$33.4B$30.2B$29.7BRevenueRevenue
18%17%15%14%10%19%13%15%14%9%9%Gross marginGross mgn
3%3%3%4%4%3%3%5%5%5%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$5.1B$5.5B$5.2B$4.1B$1.6B$6.8B$5.1B$2.7B$1.9B($420M)($295M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
17.8%16.2%13.7%12.1%5.8%14.7%10.1%8.2%5.7%−1.4%−1.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3.8B$4.9B$4.7B$3.4B$1.4B$5.6B$3.9B$2.1B$1.4B($738M)($790M)Net incomeNet inc.
27%11%12%16%-3%17%18%17%16%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$5.6B$5.2B$5.5B$5.0B$3.4B$7.7B$6.1B$4.9B$3.8B$2.3B$2.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4BDepreciationDeprec.
$668M($902M)($499M)$204M$537M$619M$893M$1.2B$839M$1.5B$1.9BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2.2B$1.5B$2.1B$2.7B$1.9B$2.0B$1.9B$1.5B$1.8B$1.9B$1.7BCapexCapex
7.9%4.6%5.5%7.9%7.2%4.2%3.7%4.6%5.5%6.2%5.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3.4B$3.7B$3.4B$2.3B$1.5B$5.7B$4.2B$3.4B$2.0B$384M$908MOwner earningsOwner earn.
11.8%10.9%8.8%6.7%5.4%12.4%8.4%10.2%5.9%1.3%3.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3.4B$3.7B$3.4B$2.3B$1.5B$5.7B$4.2B$3.4B$2.0B$384M$908MFree cash flowFCF
11.8%10.9%8.8%6.7%5.4%12.4%8.4%10.2%5.9%1.3%3.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$1.8B$0$0$106M$4M$102M$102MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$1.4B$1.5B$3.2B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
$2.9B$866M$1.9B$3.8B$4M$463M$420M$211M$195M$201MBuybacksBuybacks
27%30%25%18%7%26%19%11%8%-2%-1%ROICROIC
63%55%46%42%18%47%31%16%11%-7%-8%Return on equityROE
40%39%31%24%0%35%5%4%−3%−25%−23%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2.0B$2.8B$1.2B$1.1B$2.5B$1.5B$2.2B$5.8B$6.0B$5.5B$4.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.7B$3.4B$3.4B$3.0B$3.3B$4.6B$3.4B$3.6BReceivablesReceiv.
$3.8B$4.2B$4.5B$4.6B$4.3B$4.9B$4.8B$4.8B$4.7B$3.5B$3.6BInventoryInvent.
$2.0B$2.3B$2.6B$2.5B$2.4B$3.5B$3.1B$3.0BAccounts payablePayables
$4.5B$5.3B$5.3B$5.1B$5.2B$6.0B$5.1B$4.8B$4.7B$3.5B$4.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$9.6B$11.7B$10.6B$9.5B$11.6B$12.2B$11.8B$13.2B$12.3B$10.9B$11.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4.5B$4.8B$5.5B$5.2B$5.5B$7.2B$6.8B$7.2B$6.7B$6.1B$7.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×2.5×1.9×1.8×2.1×1.7×1.8×1.8×1.8×1.8×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$528M$570M$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$1.6B$1.6B$708M$705MGoodwillGoodwill
$23.4B$26.2B$28.3B$30.4B$35.4B$36.7B$36.4B$37.0B$35.7B$34.0B$34.0BTotal assetsAssets
$8.4B$8.6B$8.5B$11.6B$15.3B$11.3B$11.0B$11.1B$11.0B$12.7B$12.7BTotal debtDebt
$6.4B$5.7B$7.3B$10.6B$12.8B$9.8B$8.8B$5.3B$5.0B$7.2B$8.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
15.7×11.1×14.5×11.9×3.0×13.1×17.8×5.7×4.0×-0.9×-0.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$6.0B$8.9B$10.3B$8.0B$8.0B$11.9B$12.6B$12.9B$12.5B$10.1B$10.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.2%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.1%0.1%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$624M$69M$252M$972M$972MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
404M395M376M333M334M330M326M324M324M322M322MShares out (diluted)Shares
$70.42$85.43$101.48$101.68$80.82$140.12$154.89$102.74$103.10$93.62$92.13Revenue / shareRev/sh
$9.49$12.37$12.48$10.19$4.27$17.05$11.94$6.54$4.22$-2.29$-2.45EPS (diluted)EPS
$8.32$9.27$8.96$6.80$4.36$17.41$12.98$10.51$6.11$1.19$2.82Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$8.32$9.27$8.96$6.80$4.36$17.41$12.98$10.51$6.11$1.19$2.82Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.45$3.59$4.14$4.38$4.21$4.51$9.97$4.96$5.31$5.48$4.83Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.55$3.92$5.60$8.08$5.83$5.94$5.80$4.72$5.68$5.83$5.17Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.97$22.68$27.30$24.12$23.86$35.98$38.73$39.85$38.48$31.30$31.17Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.2%/yr+3.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−19.4%/yr−22.9%/yr
Dividends / share+5.3%/yr+5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.5%/yr+0.0%/yr
Book value / share+8.5%/yr+5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
322Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
−2%low FY2025
Gross margin
9%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
18.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$384Mowner earningsvs.($738M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $738M loss into $384M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($738M)$1.4B$2.1B$3.9B$5.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.4B+$1.5B+$1.5B+$1.3B+$1.4B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$91M+$91M+$91M+$70M+$66M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.5B+$839M+$1.2B+$893M+$619M
Cash from operations$2.3B$3.8B$4.9B$6.1B$7.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1.9B−$1.8B−$1.5B−$1.9B−$2.0B
Owner earnings$384M$2.0B$3.4B$4.2B$5.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%6%10%8%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $91M), owner earnings is nearer $293M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($420M) ÷ interest expense $487M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $3.4B + ST investments $2.0B − debt $12.7B
    What this means

    Netting $5.5B of cash and short-term investments against $12.7B of debt leaves $7.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 41 + DIO 47 − DPO 41 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -2%–30%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($332M) ÷ invested capital $19.4B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–12%; latest $384M = operating cash $2.3B − maintenance capex $1.9B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $91M of SBC) leaves $293M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($738M) · cash from operations $2.3B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $384M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $384M of Owner Earnings, $2.0B (512%) went back to shareholders, $1.8B dividends, $201M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $91M stock comp, the real buyback was about $110M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.35×
    Expanding
    Capex $1.9B ÷ depreciation $1.4B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $30.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.77×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $12.7B vs $4.7B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −79%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.84/share (latest year $-2.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 4% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −1.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Changes in these regulations may require significant adjustments to our AI strategies and operations, potentially leading to increased costs and operational disruptions.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$11.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$4.1B
  • Receivables$3.6B
  • Inventory$3.6B
Current liabilities$7.2B
  • Accounts payable$3.0B
  • Other current liabilities$4.2B
Current ratio1.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.03×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.57×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.9Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−6.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$8.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$7.5B$1.7B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $14.4B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$113Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$418M
'27$335M
'28$240M
'29$157M
'30$129M
later$797M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$418Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$2.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.7Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$12.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.7B
Total fixed claims on the business$14.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $14.4B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $49.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$19.6B · 40%
  • Dividends$17.1B · 34%
  • Buybacks$10.9B · 22%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 4%
  • Returned to owners$28.0B

    94% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $17.1B as dividends and $10.9B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$86.69

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 126M shares were bought for $10.9B, about $86.69 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $66.16 (2025) to $96.46 (2018); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $87.91 ($3.8B).

  • Net change in share count−20.3%

    The diluted count fell from 404M to 322M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.48/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.2B3% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity7%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $19.6B of capital spent building

$1.9B written down across 4 years (2021, 2022, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 96% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Bhavesh Patel$19.0M$1.5M$5.7B
2022Kenneth Lane$8.8M$9.0M$4.2B
2022Peter Vanacker$17.0M$14.9M$4.2B
2023Peter Vanacker$16.5M$21.2M$3.4B
2024Peter Vanacker$17.0M$6.5M$2.0B
2025Peter Vanacker$15.6M$1.2M$384M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • CEO pay ratio141:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$91M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why LyondellBasell is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.8% vs 10.5%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.5% early in the record and 5.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$8.4B → $12.7B

    Debt rose from $8.4B to $12.7B while owner earnings went from about $3.5B to $1.9B — about 2.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $5.9B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DOWDow Inc. Common Stock$40.0B15%4.5%4%6%
LINLinde plc$34.0B21.4%8%16%
LYBLyondellBasell$30.2B14%11.1%19%9%
PPGPPG Industries Inc.$15.9B41%14.7%16%7%
MOSMosaic Company (The)$12.1B16%8.2%6%7%
WLKWestlake$11.2B19%9.8%6%10%
IFFInternational Flavors & Fragrances Inc.$10.9B39%8.9%4%8%
NEUNewMarket Corp$2.7B29%15.5%20%11%
Group median19%10.5%7%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LyondellBasell has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, LyondellBasell earns about $2.6B on its 8.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−30%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $908M on 323M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $8.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LyondellBasell (LYB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LYB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LXU its page in the Manual LYEL →

Industry order: ← LOOP the Chemicals chapter MEOH →