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LYB, LyondellBasell
LyondellBasell makes the plastics that go into everyday goods, mainly polyethylene and polypropylene, sold in bulk to manufacturers, alongside the chemical building blocks behind them and an arm that licenses its chemical-process technology to other producers. Most of the profit is the spread between the cost of oil- and gas-linked feedstock and the price its commodity polymers fetch.
With respect to circularity, we are now aiming to produce and market 800 thousand metric tons of recycled and renewable-based polymers annually by 2030.
Production and marketing includes joint venture production we market plus our pro rata share of the remaining production produced and marketed by the joint venture, and production via third-party tolling arrangements.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by O&P - EAI (32%) and I&D (30%), with 3 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- This is a price-taker. The pellets are a commodity set by the market, and the feedstock is tied to oil and gas, so the whole business is the spread between two prices it does not control. That spread answers to the industry's capacity cycle: when rivals bring on new plants, supply can swamp demand and crush the margin regardless of how well any one plant runs. The plants cost enormous sums and run best flat-out, so the pull to keep making product into a glut is built in. The technology-licensing arm is steadier but small against the chemical swing. So the levers are feedstock advantage and where the capacity cycle sits. Watch the spread through the trough as closely as the peak in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 6 segments, the largest O&P - EAI at 32%.
- O&P - EAI32%$9.6B
- I&D30%$9.0B
- O&P– America25%$7.7B
- APS11%$3.5B
- Technology2%$463M
- Other0%$0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $28.5B | $33.7B | $38.1B | $33.9B | $27.0B | $46.2B | $50.5B | $33.3B | $33.4B | $30.2B | $29.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 18% | 17% | 15% | 14% | 10% | 19% | 13% | 15% | 14% | 9% | 9% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 3% | 3% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $5.1B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $4.1B | $1.6B | $6.8B | $5.1B | $2.7B | $1.9B | ($420M) | ($295M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 17.8% | 16.2% | 13.7% | 12.1% | 5.8% | 14.7% | 10.1% | 8.2% | 5.7% | −1.4% | −1.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $3.8B | $4.9B | $4.7B | $3.4B | $1.4B | $5.6B | $3.9B | $2.1B | $1.4B | ($738M) | ($790M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 27% | 11% | 12% | 16% | -3% | 17% | 18% | 17% | 16% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $5.6B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $5.0B | $3.4B | $7.7B | $6.1B | $4.9B | $3.8B | $2.3B | $2.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $668M | ($902M) | ($499M) | $204M | $537M | $619M | $893M | $1.2B | $839M | $1.5B | $1.9B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2.2B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.7B | CapexCapex |
| 7.9% | 4.6% | 5.5% | 7.9% | 7.2% | 4.2% | 3.7% | 4.6% | 5.5% | 6.2% | 5.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $3.4B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $2.3B | $1.5B | $5.7B | $4.2B | $3.4B | $2.0B | $384M | $908M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 11.8% | 10.9% | 8.8% | 6.7% | 5.4% | 12.4% | 8.4% | 10.2% | 5.9% | 1.3% | 3.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $3.4B | $3.7B | $3.4B | $2.3B | $1.5B | $5.7B | $4.2B | $3.4B | $2.0B | $384M | $908M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 11.8% | 10.9% | 8.8% | 6.7% | 5.4% | 12.4% | 8.4% | 10.2% | 5.9% | 1.3% | 3.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $1.8B | $0 | $0 | $106M | $4M | $102M | — | — | $102M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $3.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.6B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $2.9B | $866M | $1.9B | $3.8B | $4M | $463M | $420M | $211M | $195M | $201M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 27% | 30% | 25% | 18% | 7% | 26% | 19% | 11% | 8% | -2% | -1% | ROICROIC |
| 63% | 55% | 46% | 42% | 18% | 47% | 31% | 16% | 11% | -7% | -8% | Return on equityROE |
| 40% | 39% | 31% | 24% | 0% | 35% | 5% | 4% | −3% | −25% | −23% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $2.0B | $2.8B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $2.5B | $1.5B | $2.2B | $5.8B | $6.0B | $5.5B | $4.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2.7B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.0B | $3.3B | $4.6B | $3.4B | — | — | — | $3.6B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.6B | $4.3B | $4.9B | $4.8B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $3.5B | $3.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $3.5B | $3.1B | — | — | — | $3.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $4.5B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.1B | $5.2B | $6.0B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $3.5B | $4.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $9.6B | $11.7B | $10.6B | $9.5B | $11.6B | $12.2B | $11.8B | $13.2B | $12.3B | $10.9B | $11.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $4.5B | $4.8B | $5.5B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $7.2B | $6.8B | $7.2B | $6.7B | $6.1B | $7.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 2.5× | 1.9× | 1.8× | 2.1× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $528M | $570M | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $708M | $705M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $23.4B | $26.2B | $28.3B | $30.4B | $35.4B | $36.7B | $36.4B | $37.0B | $35.7B | $34.0B | $34.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| $8.4B | $8.6B | $8.5B | $11.6B | $15.3B | $11.3B | $11.0B | $11.1B | $11.0B | $12.7B | $12.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $6.4B | $5.7B | $7.3B | $10.6B | $12.8B | $9.8B | $8.8B | $5.3B | $5.0B | $7.2B | $8.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 15.7× | 11.1× | 14.5× | 11.9× | 3.0× | 13.1× | 17.8× | 5.7× | 4.0× | -0.9× | -0.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $6.0B | $8.9B | $10.3B | $8.0B | $8.0B | $11.9B | $12.6B | $12.9B | $12.5B | $10.1B | $10.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | $624M | $69M | $252M | — | $972M | $972M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 404M | 395M | 376M | 333M | 334M | 330M | 326M | 324M | 324M | 322M | 322M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $70.42 | $85.43 | $101.48 | $101.68 | $80.82 | $140.12 | $154.89 | $102.74 | $103.10 | $93.62 | $92.13 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $9.49 | $12.37 | $12.48 | $10.19 | $4.27 | $17.05 | $11.94 | $6.54 | $4.22 | $-2.29 | $-2.45 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $8.32 | $9.27 | $8.96 | $6.80 | $4.36 | $17.41 | $12.98 | $10.51 | $6.11 | $1.19 | $2.82 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $8.32 | $9.27 | $8.96 | $6.80 | $4.36 | $17.41 | $12.98 | $10.51 | $6.11 | $1.19 | $2.82 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $3.45 | $3.59 | $4.14 | $4.38 | $4.21 | $4.51 | $9.97 | $4.96 | $5.31 | $5.48 | $4.83 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $5.55 | $3.92 | $5.60 | $8.08 | $5.83 | $5.94 | $5.80 | $4.72 | $5.68 | $5.83 | $5.17 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $14.97 | $22.68 | $27.30 | $24.12 | $23.86 | $35.98 | $38.73 | $39.85 | $38.48 | $31.30 | $31.17 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.2%/yr | +3.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −19.4%/yr | −22.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +5.3%/yr | +5.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +0.5%/yr | +0.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.5%/yr | +5.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $738M loss into $384M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($738M) | $1.4B | $2.1B | $3.9B | $5.6B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.4B | +$1.5B | +$1.5B | +$1.3B | +$1.4B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$91M | +$91M | +$91M | +$70M | +$66M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.5B | +$839M | +$1.2B | +$893M | +$619M |
| Cash from operations | $2.3B | $3.8B | $4.9B | $6.1B | $7.7B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1.9B | −$1.8B | −$1.5B | −$1.9B | −$2.0B |
| Owner earnings | $384M | $2.0B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $5.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 6% | 10% | 8% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $91M), owner earnings is nearer $293M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($420M) ÷ interest expense $487M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $3.4B + ST investments $2.0B − debt $12.7B
What this means
Netting $5.5B of cash and short-term investments against $12.7B of debt leaves $7.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 41 + DIO 47 − DPO 41 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range -2%–30%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($332M) ÷ invested capital $19.4BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 1%–12%; latest $384M = operating cash $2.3B − maintenance capex $1.9BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $91M of SBC) leaves $293M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($738M) · cash from operations $2.3B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $384M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $384M of Owner Earnings, $2.0B (512%) went back to shareholders, $1.8B dividends, $201M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $91M stock comp, the real buyback was about $110M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.35×ExpandingCapex $1.9B ÷ depreciation $1.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $30.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.77×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $12.7B vs $4.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −79%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.84/share (latest year $-2.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 16% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 4% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −1.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −2.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Changes in these regulations may require significant adjustments to our AI strategies and operations, potentially leading to increased costs and operational disruptions.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$4.1B
- Receivables$3.6B
- Inventory$3.6B
- Accounts payable$3.0B
- Other current liabilities$4.2B
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $14.4B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $49.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$19.6B · 40%
- Dividends$17.1B · 34%
- Buybacks$10.9B · 22%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 4%
- Returned to owners$28.0B
94% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $17.1B as dividends and $10.9B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$86.69
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 126M shares were bought for $10.9B, about $86.69 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $66.16 (2025) to $96.46 (2018); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $87.91 ($3.8B).
- Net change in share count−20.3%
The diluted count fell from 404M to 322M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$5.48/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$1.9B written down across 4 years (2021, 2022, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 96% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Bhavesh Patel | $19.0M | $1.5M | $5.7B |
| 2022 | Kenneth Lane | $8.8M | $9.0M | $4.2B |
| 2022 | Peter Vanacker | $17.0M | $14.9M | $4.2B |
| 2023 | Peter Vanacker | $16.5M | $21.2M | $3.4B |
| 2024 | Peter Vanacker | $17.0M | $6.5M | $2.0B |
| 2025 | Peter Vanacker | $15.6M | $1.2M | $384M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio141:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$91M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why LyondellBasell is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.8% vs 10.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.5% early in the record and 5.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$8.4B → $12.7B
Debt rose from $8.4B to $12.7B while owner earnings went from about $3.5B to $1.9B — about 2.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $5.9B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Chemicals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOWDow Inc. Common Stock | $40.0B | 15% | 4.5% | 4% | 6% |
| LINLinde plc | $34.0B | — | 21.4% | 8% | 16% |
| LYBLyondellBasell | $30.2B | 14% | 11.1% | 19% | 9% |
| PPGPPG Industries Inc. | $15.9B | 41% | 14.7% | 16% | 7% |
| MOSMosaic Company (The) | $12.1B | 16% | 8.2% | 6% | 7% |
| WLKWestlake | $11.2B | 19% | 9.8% | 6% | 10% |
| IFFInternational Flavors & Fragrances Inc. | $10.9B | 39% | 8.9% | 4% | 8% |
| NEUNewMarket Corp | $2.7B | 29% | 15.5% | 20% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 19% | 10.5% | 7% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LyondellBasell has delivered.
Through the cycle, LyondellBasell earns about $2.6B on its 8.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $908M on 323M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $8.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LXU its page in the Manual LYEL →
Industry order: ← LOOP the Chemicals chapter MEOH →