Owner Scorecard


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LXU, LSB Industries Inc.

Industrial Gases capital-intensive Distress / turnaround

LSB is headquartered in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and we manufacture and sell chemical products for the agricultural and industrial markets.

Our products are sold through distributors and directly to end customers, primarily throughout the United States and parts of Canada, and to explosives manufacturers in the United States and other parts of North America.

Improve the Reliability at our Facilities while Supplying our Customers with Products of the Highest Quality.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LXU · LSB Industries Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$615M
+17.8% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $641M 5-yr avg $638M
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 16%
Operating margin 11.8% 5-yr avg 13.9%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 34% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.4%) on a 4.9% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 10% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$375M$428M$378M$365M$351M$556M$902M$594M$522M$615M$641MRevenueRevenue
−13%1%4%1%5%25%15%9%17%20%Gross marginGross mgn
11%8%11%9%9%7%4%6%8%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($90M)($34M)($23M)($39M)($16M)$101M$308M$52M($6M)$57M$76MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−24.1%−8.0%−6.1%−10.7%−4.4%18.2%34.2%8.7%−1.1%9.3%11.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$112M($29M)($72M)($63M)($62M)$44M$230M$28M($19M)$25M$46MNet incomeNet inc.
15%18%24%12%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($22M)$2M$18M$2M($3M)$88M$346M$138M$87M$96M$140MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$59M$67M$70M$68M$70M$69M$67M$69M$74M$82M$83MDepreciationDeprec.
($198M)($41M)$11M($5M)($12M)($30M)$44M$35M$25M($18M)$1MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$213M$35M$37M$36M$30M$35M$46M$68M$92M$77M$74MCapexCapex
56.7%8.3%9.8%9.9%8.7%6.3%5.1%11.4%17.7%12.6%11.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($81M)($33M)($19M)($34M)($33M)$52M$300M$70M($6M)$18M$67MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−21.7%−7.8%−5.1%−9.3%−9.4%9.4%33.3%11.8%−1.1%2.9%10.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($235M)($33M)($19M)($34M)($33M)$52M$300M$70M($6M)$18M$67MFree cash flowFCF
−62.6%−7.8%−5.1%−9.3%−9.4%9.4%33.3%11.8%−1.1%2.9%10.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-11%-3%-2%-5%-2%11%23%4%-0%5%7%ROICROIC
23%-7%-21%-26%-41%9%45%5%-4%5%8%Return on equityROE
23%−7%−21%−26%−41%9%45%5%−4%5%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$60M$34M$26M$23M$16M$82M$394M$306M$184M$148M$182MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$51M$60M$67M$40M$43M$86M$75M$40M$39M$57M$53MReceivablesReceiv.
$23M$22M$29M$23M$20M$17M$31M$28M$25M$18M$23MInventoryInvent.
$54M$56M$63M$58M$47M$49M$78M$68M$82M$65M$62MAccounts payablePayables
$20M$25M$33M$5M$16M$54M$27M$190K($19M)$11M$13MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$181M$164M$166M$131M$130M$243M$567M$437M$310M$293M$321MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$120M$109M$126M$103M$107M$105M$142M$119M$136M$106M$105MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.5×1.3×1.3×1.2×2.3×4.0×3.7×2.3×2.8×3.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BTotal assetsAssets
$420M$409M$425M$459M$484M$528M$712M$582M$485M$441M$441MTotal debtDebt
$360M$376M$399M$436M$468M$446M$318M$276M$301M$293M$260MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.9×-0.9×-0.5×-0.8×-0.3×2.0×6.6×1.3×-0.2×1.9×2.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$493M$438M$342M$247M$150M$460M$516M$518M$492M$520M$543MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.1%1.2%2.2%0.6%0.5%1.0%0.4%0.9%1.3%1.2%1.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
25.5M27.3M27.5M36.5M36.7M50.0M86.0M75.1M72.0M72.4M73.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.72$15.69$13.76$10.01$9.58$11.13$10.48$7.91$7.26$8.50$8.78Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.41$-1.07$-2.63$-1.74$-1.69$0.87$2.68$0.37$-0.27$0.34$0.63EPS (diluted)EPS
$-3.20$-1.22$-0.71$-0.93$-0.90$1.05$3.49$0.93$-0.08$0.25$0.92Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-9.22$-1.22$-0.71$-0.93$-0.90$1.05$3.49$0.93$-0.08$0.25$0.92Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$8.35$1.30$1.35$0.99$0.83$0.70$0.53$0.90$1.28$1.07$1.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.35$16.08$12.45$6.78$4.08$9.22$6.00$6.90$6.83$7.19$7.43Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.72 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−5.9%/yr−2.4%/yr
EPS−24.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−20.4%/yr+5.2%/yr
Book value / share−10.4%/yr+12.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
72Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
5%low FY2016
Gross margin
17%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
16.2×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$18Mowner earningsvs.$25Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $25M of profit but $18M of owner earnings: $7M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$25M
Owner earnings$18M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$25M($19M)$28M$230M$44M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$82M+$74M+$69M+$67M+$69M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$7M+$7M+$5M+$4M+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$18M+$25M+$35M+$44M−$30M
Cash from operations$96M$87M$138M$346M$88M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$77M−$92M−$68M−$46M−$35M
Owner earnings$18M($6M)$70M$300M$52M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%-1%12%33%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $11M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $57M ÷ interest expense $31M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $293M · 5.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $20M + ST investments $129M − debt $441M
    What this means

    Netting $148M of cash and short-term investments against $441M of debt leaves $293M owed, about 5.1× a year's operating profit (7.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 34 + DIO 13 − DPO 46 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -11%–23%; 5% latest = NOPAT $43M ÷ invested capital $942M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $18M = operating cash $96M − maintenance capex $77M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -5%)
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a -5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $11M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $96M ÷ net income $25M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $2M ÷ Owner Earnings $18M
    What this means

    Of $18M Owner Earnings, $2M (13%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($7M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.95×
    Maintaining
    Capex $77M ÷ depreciation $82M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $615M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.78×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $441M vs $188M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +209%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.15/share (latest year $0.34), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −13% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −13% early to 6% lately, median −4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2016 · −24.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$321M
  • Cash & short-term investments$182M
  • Receivables$53M
  • Inventory$23M
  • Other current assets$64M
Current liabilities$105M
  • Debt due within a year$770K
  • Accounts payable$62M
  • Other current liabilities$41M
Current ratio3.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.85×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$217Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$770K due · $182M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+18.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.4× → 3.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$541Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$485M$43M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $750M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$670M · 89%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$80M · 11%
  • Net change in share count187.0%

    The diluted count rose from 25M to 73M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained37%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($192M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $72M, so each retained $1 added about 0.37 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Behrman$3.5M$17.2M$52M
2022Mr. Behrman$3.7M$5.6M$300M
2023Mr. Behrman$4.5M$958k$70M
2024Mr. Behrman$4.3M$2.7M($6M)
2025Mr. Behrman$5.3M$5.3M$18M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio49:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$7M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why LSB Industries Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?187.0%

    Diluted shares grew 187.0% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $26M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Gases

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VHIValhi Inc.$2.1B22%10.1%3%
MTXMinerals Technologies Inc.$2.1B25%12.2%9%7%
KROKronos Worldwide Inc$1.9B21%7.7%11%3%
ECVTEcovyst Inc.$724M27%11.8%4%12%
REXREX American Resources Corporation$650M11%6.8%13%8%
LXULSB Industries Inc.$615M5%-2.7%-1%-3%
UANCVR Partners LP Common$606M19%12.0%11%
LXFRLuxfer Holdings PLC$385M24%7.8%10%5%
Group median22%9.0%9%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what LSB Industries Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−57%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $67M on 72M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $260M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "LSB Industries Inc. (LXU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LXU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LXRX its page in the Manual LYB →

Industry order: ← LXFR the Industrial Gases chapter MTX →