Owner Scorecard


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LIN, Linde plc

Industrial Gases capital-intensive

Linde makes industrial gases — atmospheric gases pulled from the air like oxygen, nitrogen, and argon, and process gases like hydrogen, helium, and carbon dioxide — and sells them to manufacturers across chemicals, energy, metals, electronics, and healthcare. It also designs and builds the plants and equipment that produce these gases and runs gas-processing services, including olefin plants, for customers. The gas reaches the buyer one of a few ways: piped over the fence from an on-site plant Linde owns and operates, trucked as liquid in bulk, or shipped in cylinders.

Its primary products in its industrial gases business are atmospheric gases (oxygen, nitrogen, argon, and rare gases) and process gases (hydrogen, helium, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, electronic gases, specialty gases, and acetylene).

Industrial Gases Products and Manufacturing Processes Atmospheric gases are the highest volume products produced by Linde.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LIN · Linde plc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$34.0B
+3.0% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $34.7B 5-yr avg $32.8B
Operating margin 26.5% 5-yr avg 21.8%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Americas (45%) and EMEA (25%), with 3 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
The test is whether this is a franchise or a commodity. Air is free and the molecules are interchangeable, so the economics turn on local supply density and the long-term, often on-site contracts that tie a customer to the plant beside it — watch the margins and returns in the record below for whether that hands Linde durable pricing power or whether it competes on price against a short list of global rivals. Because the gas is cheap to make but costly to move, the cost edge would belong to whoever already owns the dense network nearby, and the open question is how much fresh capital can be reinvested at a worthwhile return. The bad case is plain: customers in chemicals, energy, metals, and mining are cyclical, the plants are heavy and slow to build, and the balance sheet carries net debt.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Americas at 45%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Americas45%$15.2B
  • EMEA25%$8.5B
  • APAC20%$6.7B
  • Engineering7%$2.3B
  • Other4%$1.3B
By geographyUnited States36%Other – non-U.S.33%China8%Germany7%United Kingdom4%Mexico4%Other8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$10.5B$11.4B$14.8B$28.2B$27.2B$30.8B$33.4B$32.9B$33.0B$34.0B$34.7BRevenueRevenue
11%11%11%12%12%10%9%10%10%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$2.2B$2.4B$5.2B$2.9B$3.3B$5.0B$5.4B$8.0B$8.6B$8.9B$9.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
21.3%21.5%35.4%10.4%12.2%16.2%16.1%24.4%26.2%26.3%26.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.5B$1.2B$4.4B$2.3B$2.5B$3.8B$4.1B$6.2B$6.6B$6.9B$7.1BNet incomeNet inc.
27%45%16%25%25%25%26%23%23%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.8B$3.0B$3.7B$6.1B$7.4B$9.7B$8.9B$9.3B$9.4B$10.3B$10.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.1B$1.2B$1.8B$4.7B$4.6B$4.6B$4.2B$3.8B$3.8B$3.8B$3.8BDepreciationDeprec.
$128M$551M($2.6B)($936M)$169M$1.1B$406M($710M)($922M)($311M)($588M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.5B$1.3B$1.9B$3.7B$3.4B$3.1B$3.2B$3.8B$4.5B$5.3B$5.3BCapexCapex
13.9%11.5%12.7%13.0%12.5%10.0%9.5%11.5%13.6%15.5%15.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$2.4B$4.0B$6.6B$5.7B$5.5B$4.9B$6.6B$6.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.8%15.2%11.9%8.6%14.8%21.6%17.1%16.8%14.9%19.4%19.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.3B$1.7B$1.8B$2.4B$4.0B$6.6B$5.7B$5.5B$4.9B$5.1B$5.1BFree cash flowFCF
12.6%15.2%11.9%8.6%14.8%21.6%17.1%16.8%14.9%15.0%14.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$363M$33M$25M$225M$68M$88M$110M$953M$317M$412M$453MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$856M$901M$1.2B$1.9B$2.0B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8BDividends paidDiv. paid
$228M$12M$599M$2.7B$2.5B$4.6B$5.2B$4.0B$4.5B$4.6BBuybacksBuybacks
9%7%4%4%7%8%11%12%12%12%ROICROIC
28%21%8%5%5%9%10%16%17%18%18%Return on equityROE
12%6%6%1%1%4%5%9%10%11%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$524M$617M$4.5B$2.7B$3.8B$2.8B$5.4B$4.7B$4.8B$5.1B$4.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.7B$4.3B$4.3B$4.2B$4.5B$4.6B$4.7B$4.6B$5.0B$5.3BReceivablesReceiv.
$614M$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.1B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1BInventoryInvent.
$922M$3.2B$3.3B$3.1B$3.5B$3.0B$3.0B$2.5B$2.8B$2.7BAccounts payablePayables
$1.4B$2.7B$2.8B$2.8B$2.7B$3.5B$3.8B$4.1B$4.2B$4.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.3B$17.3B$10.4B$10.9B$10.2B$13.0B$12.6B$12.9B$13.3B$12.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$3.3B$13.0B$12.2B$13.7B$13.6B$16.5B$15.7B$14.5B$15.2B$15.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.3×0.9×0.8×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.9×0.9×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.1B$3.2B$26.9B$27.0B$28.2B$27.0B$25.8B$26.8B$25.9B$27.9B$27.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$20.4B$93.4B$86.6B$88.2B$81.6B$79.7B$80.8B$80.1B$86.8B$86.3BTotal assetsAssets
$9.0B$15.3B$14.0B$16.2B$14.2B$17.9B$19.4B$21.6B$27.0B$26.3BTotal debtDebt
$8.4B$10.8B$11.3B$12.4B$11.4B$12.5B$14.7B$16.8B$21.9B$22.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
11.8×15.2×26.0×77.2×28.9×64.7×85.2×40.1×33.7×35.0×35.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.4B$6.0B$51.6B$49.1B$47.3B$44.0B$40.0B$39.7B$38.1B$38.2B$38.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.5%0.4%0.3%0.5%0.4%0.3%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
288M289M334M545M531M522M504M492M482M472M466MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.61$39.29$44.40$51.78$51.29$59.00$66.19$66.74$68.46$71.97$74.32Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.21$4.31$13.11$4.19$4.71$7.33$8.23$12.59$13.62$14.61$15.19EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.79$5.98$5.30$4.47$7.59$12.72$11.29$11.21$10.22$13.95$14.21Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.60$5.98$5.30$4.47$7.59$12.72$11.29$11.21$10.22$10.78$10.93Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.97$3.12$3.49$3.47$3.82$4.19$4.65$5.04$5.51$5.95$6.10Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.09$4.53$5.64$6.75$6.40$5.91$6.30$7.69$9.33$11.14$11.44Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.91$20.82$154.42$90.02$89.08$84.38$79.41$80.68$79.01$80.99$82.70Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.63 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.8%/yr+7.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+10.3%/yr+13.0%/yr
EPS+12.1%/yr+25.4%/yr
Dividends / share+8.0%/yr+9.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.1%/yr+11.7%/yr
Book value / share+17.5%/yr−1.9%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+3.0%
    “Sales increased 2% from higher price attainment primarily in the Americas and EMEA segments.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Operating income+3.3%
    “Operating Profit Operating profit in the Americas segment increased $197 million, or 4%, in 2025 versus 2024 driven primarily by higher pricing and continued productivity initiatives, which more than offset cost inflation. 2024 included a settlement gain with a supplier.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
472Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
12%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.3×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$6.6Bowner earningsvs.$6.9Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $6.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $3.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $5.1B.

Reported net income$6.9B
Owner earnings$6.6B · 19% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$6.9B$6.6B$6.2B$4.1B$3.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$3.8B+$3.8B+$3.8B+$4.2B+$4.6B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$107M+$128M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$311M−$922M−$710M+$406M+$1.1B
Cash from operations$10.3B$9.4B$9.3B$8.9B$9.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$3.8B−$4.5B−$3.8B−$3.2B−$3.1B
Owner earnings$6.6B$4.9B$5.5B$5.7B$6.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$1.5B
Free cash flow$5.1B$4.9B$5.5B$5.7B$6.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue19%15%17%17%22%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $3.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $8.9B ÷ interest expense $255M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $21.9B · 2.5× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $5.1B − debt $27.0B
    What this means

    Netting $5.1B of cash and short-term investments against $27.0B of debt leaves $21.9B owed, about 2.5× a year's operating profit (3.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 4%–12%; 12% latest = NOPAT $6.9B ÷ invested capital $60.2B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 9%–22%; latest $6.6B = operating cash $10.3B − maintenance capex $3.8B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $5.1B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $107M of SBC) leaves $6.5B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $10.3B ÷ net income $6.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $7.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $6.6B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $6.6B of Owner Earnings, $7.4B (113%) went back to shareholders, $2.8B dividends, $4.6B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $107M stock comp, the real buyback was about $4.5B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.40×
    Expanding
    Capex $5.3B ÷ depreciation $3.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $34.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.88×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $27.0B vs ($1.9B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +176%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $14.17/share (latest year $14.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $82.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 26% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 26% early, 26% lately, median 21%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 10.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +5.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Previously, she served as Senior Vice President of Communications, AI, and Corporate Procurement beginning in 2024 and as Vice President of Financial Planning and Analysis and Corporate Procurement from 2019 to 2024.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$12.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$4.0B
  • Receivables$5.3B
  • Inventory$2.1B
  • Other current assets$1.4B
Current liabilities$15.4B
  • Debt due within a year$1.6B
  • Accounts payable$2.7B
  • Other current liabilities$11.1B
Current ratio0.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.26×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2.6B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.6B due · $4.0B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($989M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($33.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$22.4B$866M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2.5Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.8B
'27$2.3B
'28$1.7B
'29$2.2B
'30$1.7B
later$12.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.8Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$4.1Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.3Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$22.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$4.0B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$6.6B
Together, against $1.8B due next year5.9×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $10.5B against the $1.8B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 5.9 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $70.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$31.5B · 45%
  • Dividends$19.3B · 27%
  • Buybacks$28.8B · 41%
  • Returned to owners$48.1B

    117% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $19.3B as dividends and $28.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$8.9B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $8.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$221.20

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 12M shares were bought for $2.7B, about $221.20 each.

  • Net change in share count62.1%

    The diluted count rose from 288M to 466M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$5.95/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$39.8B46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity73%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $31.5B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Stephen F. Angel$31.4M$60.0M$6.6B
2022Sanjiv Lamba$14.6M$24.6M$5.7B
2022Stephen F. Angel$363k$11.8M$5.7B
2023Sanjiv Lamba$19.2M$37.8M$5.5B
2024Sanjiv Lamba$20.7M$29.1M$4.9B
2025$21.8M$15.9M$6.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • CEO pay ratio428:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$107M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Linde plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?62.1%

    Diluted shares grew 62.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $28.8B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Gases

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DOWDow Inc. Common Stock$40.0B15%4.5%4%6%
LINLinde plc$34.0B21.4%8%16%
LYBLyondellBasell$30.2B14%11.1%19%9%
PPGPPG Industries Inc.$15.9B41%14.7%16%7%
MOSMosaic Company (The)$12.1B16%8.2%6%7%
APDAir Products and Chemicals Inc.$12.0B31%21.2%12%18%
WLKWestlake$11.2B19%9.8%6%10%
TROXTronox Holdings$2.9B23%7.7%3%4%
Group median10.5%7%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Linde plc has delivered.

Linde plc’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Linde plc earns about $5.3B on its 15.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+14%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $5.1B on 463M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $22.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5.3B) runs well above depreciation ($3.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $6.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Linde plc (LIN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LIN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LILAP its page in the Manual LINC →

Industry order: ← KRO the Industrial Gases chapter LXFR →