Owner Scorecard


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MAGN, Magnera Corporation

Paper & Forest Products capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

The Company is a leading global supplier of a diverse portfolio of innovative specialty materials comprised of organic and synthetic raw ingredients.

We market our products predominantly into stable, consumer-oriented end markets for disposable and durable applications.

The structure is designed to align us with our customers, provide improved service, enable future growth initiatives and efficiency of decision making to facilitate synergy realization.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MAGN · Magnera Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.2B
+46.5% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $2.0B
Gross margin 11% 5-yr avg 11%
Operating margin 1.7% 5-yr avg −2.3%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 13% and operating margin about 2.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 5.9% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

56% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States and Canada44%$1.4B
  • Rest of World43%$1.4B
  • Latin America14%$435M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$761M$800M$866M$928M$916M$1.1B$1.5B$2.3B$2.2B$3.2B$3.3BRevenueRevenue
17%18%15%16%16%13%10%12%11%11%11%Gross marginGross mgn
20%14%13%10%11%11%8%5%5%6%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($22M)$33M$22M$55M$49M$29M($164M)$69M($141M)$5M$54MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−2.8%4.2%2.5%5.9%5.4%2.6%−11.0%3.0%−6.4%0.2%1.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$22M$8M($178M)($22M)$21M$7M($194M)$38M($154M)($159M)($110M)Net incomeNet inc.
35%50%47%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$31M$53M($6M)$103M$109M$71M($41M)$257M$192M$103M$185MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$39M$42M$48M$51M$57M$61M$67M$169M$175M$206M$195MDepreciationDeprec.
($35M)($2M)$118M$70M$25M($2M)$86M$43M$164M$37M$82MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$61M$81M$42M$28M$28M$30M$38M$88M$72M$67M$57MCapexCapex
8.0%10.1%4.9%3.0%3.1%2.8%2.5%3.9%3.3%2.1%1.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($8M)$11M($48M)$75M$81M$41M($79M)$169M$120M$36M$128MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−1.1%1.4%−5.6%8.1%8.8%3.8%−5.3%7.4%5.5%1.1%3.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($30M)($28M)($48M)$75M$81M$41M($79M)$169M$120M$36M$128MFree cash flowFCF
−4.0%−3.4%−5.6%8.1%8.8%3.8%−5.3%7.4%5.5%1.1%3.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$179M$1M$0$465M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$22M$22M$23M$23M$23M$24M$19M$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
-2%2%4%1%-12%3%-6%ROICROIC
3%1%-33%-4%4%1%-61%15%-7%-15%-11%Return on equityROE
−0%−2%−37%−8%−0%−3%−67%15%−11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$55M$116M$143M$126M$100M$138M$111M$50M$230M$305M$303MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$153M$111M$120M$124M$123M$170M$196M$171M$359M$522M$536MReceivablesReceiv.
$250M$136M$173M$190M$196M$280M$309M$298M$259M$474M$297MInventoryInvent.
$164M$113M$121M$130M$128M$214M$218M$158M$295M$356M$369MAccounts payablePayables
$238M$134M$172M$185M$192M$236M$287M$311M$323M$640M$464MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$494M$585M$469M$477M$453M$637M$679M$606M$886M$1.4B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$323M$347M$233M$231M$233M$371M$360M$280M$457M$601M$605MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.7×2.0×2.1×1.9×1.7×1.9×2.2×1.9×2.4×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$73M$83M$153M$151M$164M$236M$105M$794M$624M$663M$663MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.7B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.9B$1.6B$1.6B$2.8B$4.0B$3.9BTotal assetsAssets
$373M$481M$412M$360M$314M$765M$834M$854M$0$2.0B$1.9BTotal debtDebt
$317M$365M$269M$234M$214M$626M$723M$804M($230M)$1.6B$1.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.6×2.5×1.4×5.2×7.0×2.3×-4.9×1.1×-47.0×0.0×0.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$654M$709M$539M$556M$578M$543M$318M$257M$2.1B$1.1B$1.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.7%0.7%0.4%0.6%0.5%0.1%0.3%0.3%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
44.1M44.4M43.8M44.1M44.6M44.9M44.8M31.8M31.8M35.5M35.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$17.25$18.01$19.79$21.02$20.54$24.15$33.27$71.54$68.77$90.25$91.23Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.49$0.18$-4.06$-0.49$0.48$0.15$-4.33$1.19$-4.84$-4.48$-3.07EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.19$0.25$-1.10$1.70$1.81$0.91$-1.75$5.31$3.77$1.01$3.58Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.68$-0.62$-1.10$1.70$1.81$0.91$-1.75$5.31$3.77$1.01$3.58Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.49$0.51$0.52$0.52$0.53$0.54$0.42$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.39$1.82$0.96$0.63$0.63$0.67$0.84$2.77$2.26$1.89$1.59Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$14.82$15.95$12.31$12.60$12.95$12.08$7.09$8.08$67.26$29.97$29.02Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.41 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+20.2%/yr+34.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−11.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.5%/yr+24.5%/yr
Book value / share+8.1%/yr+18.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
36Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
−6%low FY2022
Gross margin
11%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
45.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$36Mowner earningsvs.($159M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $159M loss into $36M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($159M)($154M)$38M($194M)$7M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$206M+$175M+$169M+$67M+$61M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$7M+$7M+$831K+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$37M+$164M+$43M+$86M−$2M
Cash from operations$103M$192M$257M($41M)$71M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$67M−$72M−$88M−$38M−$30M
Owner earnings$36M$120M$169M($79M)$41M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%5%7%-5%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer $17M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting related to the Transaction, including information technology general controls related to certain legacy Berry U.S.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $5M ÷ interest expense $141M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.6B · 329.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $305M − debt $2.0B
    What this means

    Netting $305M of cash and short-term investments against $2.0B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, about 329.6× a year's operating profit (390.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 59 + DIO 60 − DPO 45 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    7-yr median, range -12%–4%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $36M = operating cash $103M − maintenance capex $67M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves $17M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($159M) · cash from operations $103M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $12M ÷ Owner Earnings $36M
    What this means

    Of $36M Owner Earnings, $12M (34%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $12M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($19M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.33×
    Harvesting
    Capex $67M ÷ depreciation $206M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.37×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.0B vs $822M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.56/share (latest year $-4.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $29.72/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −1% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +55%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 55% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −11.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 7 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$303M
  • Receivables$536M
  • Inventory$297M
  • Other current assets$271M
Current liabilities$605M
  • Debt due within a year$8M
  • Accounts payable$369M
  • Other current liabilities$228M
Current ratio2.33×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.83×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.50×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$802Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$8M due · $303M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 28, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−3.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$149Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$60M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $872M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$535M · 61%
  • Dividends$156M · 18%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$181M · 21%
  • Returned to owners$156M

    39% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $156M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $248M.

  • Net change in share count−18.9%

    The diluted count fell from 44M to 36M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 7 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$890M22% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity62%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$647Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $535M of capital spent building

$290M written down across 2 years (2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 45% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio232:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 380% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Magnera Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$373M → $1.9B

    Debt rose from $373M to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about ($15M) to $108M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Paper & Forest Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
IPInternational Paper Company$23.6B29%8.1%10%6%
SONSonoco$7.5B20%8.7%9%5%
REYNReynolds Consumer Products Inc.$3.7B25%14.4%10%9%
SLVMSylvamo Corporation$3.4B12.0%17%10%
MAGNMagnera Corporation$3.2B14%2.6%1%3%
MATVMativ Holdings$2.0B23%6.2%6%10%
MERCMercer International Inc.$1.9B52%8.8%6%4%
RYAMRayonier Advanced Materials Inc.$1.5B8%0.9%0%6%
Group median23%8.4%8%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Magnera Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Magnera Corporation earns about $83M on its 2.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−54%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $128M on 36M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net debt $1.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Magnera Corporation (MAGN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MAGN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MAC its page in the Manual MAMA →

Industry order: ← LPX the Paper & Forest Products chapter MATV →