Owner Scorecard


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IP, International Paper Company

Paper & Forest Products capital-intensive Cyclical

International Paper Company is a global leader in sustainable packaging solutions.

We produce renewable fiber-based packaging products with manufacturing operations in North America, Latin America, Europe and North Africa.

STRATEGY At International Paper, we follow the IP 80/20 performance system.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
IP · International Paper Company
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$23.6B
+49.3% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $24.3B 5-yr avg $19.2B
Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 29%
Operating margin 9.7% 5-yr avg 2.8%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 7.9% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −15% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

39% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States61%$14.4B
  • EMEA36%$8.5B
  • Americas Other Than U S3%$713M
  • Asia Pacific0%$31M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$19.5B$21.7B$23.3B$18.3B$17.6B$19.4B$21.2B$16.0B$15.8B$23.6B$24.3BRevenueRevenue
28%32%33%31%30%29%28%28%28%30%30%Gross marginGross mgn
7%7%7%8%8%7%6%8%11%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.8B$1.8B$3.2B$2.4B$1.3B$2.4B$1.7B$774M$628M($3.5B)$2.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.2%8.4%13.7%13.1%7.1%12.2%7.9%4.8%4.0%−14.8%9.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$904M$2.1B$2.0B$1.2B$482M$1.8B$1.5B$288M$557M($3.5B)($3.4B)Net incomeNet inc.
18%18%28%27%10%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.5B$1.8B$3.2B$3.6B$3.1B$2.0B$2.2B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7B$2.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$851M$2.7B$2.7BDepreciationDeprec.
$450M($1.7B)($114M)$1.3B$1.5B($819M)($370M)$399M$270M$2.5B$3.2BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$1.2B$1.3B$1.6B$1.1B$663M$480M$931M$1.1B$921M$1.9B$2.0BCapexCapex
6.4%5.9%6.7%6.2%3.8%2.5%4.4%7.1%5.8%7.9%8.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.2B$477M$1.7B$2.5B$2.4B$1.6B$1.2B$692M$757M($159M)$553MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.3%2.2%7.1%13.5%13.7%8.0%5.9%4.3%4.8%−0.7%2.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.2B$477M$1.7B$2.5B$2.4B$1.6B$1.2B$692M$757M($159M)$553MFree cash flowFCF
6.3%2.2%7.1%13.5%13.7%8.0%5.9%4.3%4.8%−0.7%2.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.2B$45M$8M$103M$65M$80M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$733M$769M$789M$796M$806M$780M$673M$642M$643M$977M$978MDividends paidDiv. paid
$132M$47M$732M$535M$42M$839M$1.3B$218M$23M$65MBuybacksBuybacks
10%11%15%10%6%16%13%5%5%-12%ROICROIC
21%33%27%16%6%19%18%3%7%-24%-23%Return on equityROE
4%21%17%6%−4%11%10%−4%−1%−30%−29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.0B$1.0B$589M$511M$468M$1.3B$804M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.2B$2.3B$2.2B$2.2B$1.6B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$1.5B$2.0B$1.9BInventoryInvent.
$2.2B$2.5B$2.4B$2.4B$2.0B$2.6B$2.7B$2.4B$2.1B$3.9B$3.8BAccounts payablePayables
$34M($145M)($172M)($215M)($409M)($792M)($766M)($553M)($624M)($1.9B)($1.9B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$6.7B$8.3B$7.0B$6.6B$11.2B$7.1B$6.8B$6.6B$6.4B$10.1B$8.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$4.1B$5.1B$4.7B$8.6B$8.3B$4.1B$5.0B$4.0B$4.3B$7.9B$7.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.6×1.5×0.8×1.4×1.7×1.4×1.7×1.5×1.3×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.4B$3.4B$3.4B$3.1B$3.1B$3.1B$3.0B$3.0B$3.0B$5.3B$5.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$33.1B$33.9B$33.6B$33.5B$31.7B$25.2B$23.9B$23.3B$22.8B$38.0B$36.4BTotal assetsAssets
$11.3B$11.2B$10.7B$9.8B$8.1B$5.6B$5.6B$5.6B$5.6B$9.8B$9.8BTotal debtDebt
$10.3B$10.1B$10.1B$9.3B$7.6B$4.3B$4.8B$4.5B$4.5B$8.7B$8.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×2.4×4.3×3.4×2.1×5.5×4.1×1.9×1.5×-6.3×4.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.3B$6.5B$7.4B$7.7B$7.9B$9.1B$8.5B$8.4B$8.2B$14.8B$14.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
$60M$76M$2.5B$2.5BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
416M418M414M399M396M392M367M349M354M506M532MShares out (diluted)Shares
$46.91$52.05$56.27$45.93$44.39$49.35$57.66$45.93$44.71$46.74$45.77Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.18$5.13$4.86$3.07$1.22$4.46$4.10$0.82$1.57$-6.95$-6.30EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.98$1.14$3.99$6.20$6.07$3.95$3.39$1.98$2.14$-0.31$1.04Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.98$1.14$3.99$6.20$6.07$3.95$3.39$1.98$2.14$-0.31$1.04Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.76$1.84$1.90$2.00$2.04$1.99$1.83$1.84$1.82$1.93$1.84Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.99$3.06$3.80$2.85$1.68$1.22$2.54$3.27$2.60$3.67$3.84Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.45$15.61$17.77$19.34$19.85$23.14$23.15$23.93$23.07$29.32$27.85Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.0%/yr+1.0%/yr
Dividends / share+1.0%/yr−1.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.3%/yr+17.0%/yr
Book value / share+12.2%/yr+8.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
506Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−12%low FY2025
Gross margin
30%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.9×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($159M)owner earningsvs.($3.5B)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $3.5B loss into ($159M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($3.5B)$557M$288M$1.5B$1.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.7B+$851M+$1.1B+$1.0B+$1.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2.5B+$270M+$399M−$370M−$819M
Cash from operations$1.7B$1.7B$1.8B$2.2B$2.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1.9B−$921M−$1.1B−$931M−$480M
Owner earnings($159M)$757M$692M$1.2B$1.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%5%4%6%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“Through AICPA audits performed as part of the preparation of the acquisition proxy statement, the independent auditors identified material weaknesses in DS Smith's ICFR environment including Information Technology General Controls ("ITGCs") in fiscal years…”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $2.4B ÷ interest expense $551M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $8.7B · 3.7× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $1.1B − debt $9.8B
    What this means

    Netting $1.1B of cash and short-term investments against $9.8B of debt leaves $8.7B owed, about 3.7× a year's operating profit (4.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -12%–16%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1%–14%; latest ($159M) = operating cash $1.7B − maintenance capex $1.9B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($3.5B) · cash from operations $1.7B

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.68×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1.9B ÷ depreciation $2.7B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $23.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.28×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $9.8B vs $2.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −153%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.68/share (latest year $-6.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → −2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −2% lately, median 8% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −14.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Pricing in the paper and packaging industries can be affected by, among other things, product commoditization, changes in demand, entrance or withdrawal of new competitors or capacity, changes in product supply, and the introduction of new products, technologies and equipment, in…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
  • Inventory$1.9B
  • Other current assets$5.4B
Current liabilities$7.1B
  • Debt due within a year$918M
  • Accounts payable$3.8B
  • Other current liabilities$2.3B
Current ratio1.21×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.94×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$918M due · $1.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$5.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$10.4B$666M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$992M
'27$2.6B
'28$739M
'29$381M
'30$807M
later$4.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$992Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$3.6Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.6Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$9.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$1.2B
Together, against $992M due next year1.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $1.2B against the $992M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.2 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $23.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$11.2B · 48%
  • Dividends$7.6B · 32%
  • Buybacks$3.9B · 17%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$799M · 3%
  • Returned to owners$11.5B

    94% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $7.6B as dividends and $3.9B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $3.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count28.0%

    The diluted count rose from 416M to 532M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.93/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$9.4B25% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity36%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $11.2B of capital spent building

$2.6B written down across 3 years (2019, 2022, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$15.2M$12.6M$1.6B
2022$13.7M$14.6M$1.2B
2023$12.8M$6.5M$692M
2024$15.3M$5.3M$757M
2024$20.7M$47.7M$757M
2025$14.8M−$8.7M($159M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio164:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why International Paper Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.8% vs 5.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.2% early in the record and 2.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?28.0%

    Diluted shares grew 28.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $3.9B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Paper & Forest Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SWSmurfit WestRock plc$31.2B22%8.4%4%5%
IPInternational Paper Company$23.6B29%8.1%10%6%
KMBKimberly-Clark Corp.$16.4B36%14.3%27%11%
PKGPackaging Corporation of America$9.0B22%14.1%15%10%
AVYAvery Dennison Corporation$8.9B27%9.9%15%7%
GPKGraphic Packaging Holding$8.6B18%9.0%9%9%
SLVMSylvamo Corporation$3.4B12.0%17%10%
MAGNMagnera Corporation$3.2B14%2.6%1%3%
Group median22%9.4%13%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what International Paper Company has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, International Paper Company earns about $1.4B on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −0.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−32%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $553M on 530M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $8.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "International Paper Company (IP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← IOVA its page in the Manual IPAR →

Industry order: ← 3861 the Paper & Forest Products chapter LPX →