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MDB, MongoDB Inc.

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundNet current asset value

MongoDB is the developer data platform company whose mission is to empower developers to create, transform, and disrupt industries by unleashing the power of software and data.

Our developer data platform is a globally distributed operational database integrated with a set of data services that allow development teams to address the growing variety of application requirements, all in a unified and consistent user experience.

The foundation of our platform is the world's leading, modern general purpose database.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

MDB · MongoDB Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$2.5B

+22.8% YoY · 33% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.6B 5-yr avg $1.7B

Gross margin 72% 5-yr avg 73%

Operating margin −4.2% 5-yr avg −18.1%

ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −13%

Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 23% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Atlas-related (73%), Other subscription (23%) and Services (3%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −35% through the cycle on a 72% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 22% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −19%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Atlas-related is 73% of revenue, with Other subscription the other meaningful line at 23%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026

Atlas-related73%$1.8B
Other subscription23%$578M
Services3%$78M

By geographyAmericas61%EMEA28%Asia Pacific12%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$115M	$166M	$267M	$422M	$590M	$874M	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.5B	$2.6B	RevenueRevenue
74%	74%	72%	70%	70%	70%	73%	75%	73%	72%	72%	Gross marginGross mgn
24%	22%	20%	17%	16%	14%	12%	12%	11%	10%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
45%	37%	34%	35%	35%	35%	33%	31%	30%	29%	29%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($69M)	($85M)	($98M)	($148M)	($209M)	($289M)	($347M)	($234M)	($216M)	($137M)	($108M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−60.4%	−51.1%	−36.6%	−35.1%	−35.5%	−33.1%	−27.0%	−13.9%	−10.8%	−5.6%	−4.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($70M)	($84M)	($99M)	($176M)	($267M)	($307M)	($345M)	($177M)	($129M)	($71M)	($29M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($38M)	($45M)	($42M)	($30M)	($43M)	$7M	($13M)	$121M	$150M	$505M	$597M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$4M	$4M	$6M	$13M	$14M	$14M	$16M	$19M	$12M	$22M	$23M	DepreciationDeprec.
$7M	$14M	$14M	$57M	$61M	$49M	($65M)	($178M)	($226M)	$3M	$47M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$2M	$7M	$4M	$12M	$8M	$7M	$6M	$30M	$5M	$6M	CapexCapex
1.5%	1.3%	2.6%	0.8%	2.0%	0.9%	0.6%	0.4%	1.5%	0.2%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($40M)	($47M)	($49M)	($33M)	($54M)	($1M)	($20M)	$115M	$138M	$500M	$591M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−34.6%	−28.3%	−18.3%	−7.8%	−9.2%	−0.1%	−1.6%	6.9%	6.9%	20.3%	22.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($40M)	($47M)	($49M)	($33M)	($54M)	($1M)	($20M)	$115M	$121M	$500M	$591M	Free cash flowFCF
−34.6%	−28.3%	−18.3%	−7.8%	−9.2%	−0.1%	−1.6%	6.9%	6.0%	20.3%	22.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$56M	$39M	$0	$4M	$0	$15M	$0	$2M	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$48K	$242K	$327K	$43K	$11K	$0	$0	$0	$0	$400M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-36%	-23%	-41%	-33%	-17%	-19%	-13%	-7%	-6%	-4%	ROICROIC
—	-34%	-37%	-212%	—	-46%	-47%	-17%	-5%	-2%	-1%	Return on equityROE
—	−34%	−37%	−212%	—	−46%	−47%	−17%	−5%	−2%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$69M	$62M	$148M	$706M	$430M	$474M	$456M	$803M	$490M	$1.1B	$1.0B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$31M	$51M	$73M	$86M	$135M	$195M	$285M	$326M	$393M	$499M	$387M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$3M	$2M	$2M	$3M	$4M	$5M	$8M	$10M	$10M	$20M	$42M	Accounts payablePayables
$28M	$48M	$71M	$83M	$131M	$190M	$277M	$316M	$383M	$479M	$346M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$158M	$347M	$566M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$98M	$113M	$165M	$242M	$355M	$527M	$589M	$564M	$562M	$669M	$618M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×	3.1×	3.4×	4.6×	3.2×	4.0×	3.8×	4.4×	5.2×	4.7×	4.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M	$2M	$42M	$56M	$56M	$58M	$70M	$70M	$70M	$191M	$191M	GoodwillGoodwill
$174M	$433M	$733M	$1.3B	$1.4B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$3.4B	$3.8B	$3.7B	Total assetsAssets
—	$0	$217M	$911M	$938M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$0	—	$217M	Total debtDebt
—	($62M)	$69M	$205M	$508M	$663M	$684M	$340M	($490M)	—	($819M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-7703.2×	-10610.1×	-9.5×	-7.0×	-3.7×	-25.6×	-35.4×	-24.9×	-26.7×	-43.8×	-37.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($245M)	$248M	$265M	$83M	($5M)	$667M	$740M	$1.1B	$2.8B	$3.0B	$2.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
18.3%	12.8%	14.0%	18.0%	25.3%	28.7%	29.7%	27.1%	24.6%	22.3%	21.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
12.2M	23.7M	52.0M	55.9M	59.0M	64.6M	68.6M	71.2M	74.6M	81.2M	81.6M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$9.40	$7.00	$5.13	$7.54	$10.01	$13.53	$18.71	$23.62	$26.91	$30.32	$31.90	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-5.74	$-3.54	$-1.90	$-3.14	$-4.53	$-4.75	$-5.03	$-2.48	$-1.73	$-0.88	$-0.36	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-3.26	$-1.98	$-0.94	$-0.59	$-0.92	$-0.02	$-0.29	$1.62	$1.86	$6.16	$7.25	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.26	$-1.98	$-0.94	$-0.59	$-0.92	$-0.02	$-0.29	$1.62	$1.62	$6.16	$7.25	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.14	$0.09	$0.13	$0.06	$0.20	$0.13	$0.11	$0.09	$0.40	$0.06	$0.07	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-20.04	$10.44	$5.08	$1.48	$-0.09	$10.33	$10.78	$15.00	$37.32	$36.34	$35.98	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.94 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.19 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.9%/yr	+24.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	−8.7%/yr	−21.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

81Mpeak FY2026

ROIC

−6%low FY2020

Gross margin

72%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$500Mowner earningsvs.($71M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2022FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $71M loss into $500M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	($71M)	($129M)	($177M)	($345M)	($307M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$22M	+$12M	+$19M	+$16M	+$14M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$550M	+$494M	+$457M	+$381M	+$251M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$3M	−$226M	−$178M	−$65M	+$49M
Cash from operations	$505M	$150M	$121M	($13M)	$7M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$5M	−$12M	−$6M	−$7M	−$8M
Owner earnings	$500M	$138M	$115M	($20M)	($1M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$18M	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$500M	$121M	$115M	($20M)	($1M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	20%	7%	7%	-2%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $550M), owner earnings is nearer ($50M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -43.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($137M) ÷ interest expense $3M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$867M

Net cash

Cash $1.1B − debt $217M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $867M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 63d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 74 + DIO 0 − DPO 11 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -19%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -41%–-6%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($108M) ÷ invested capital $2.1B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 20%

High, recently turned positive

latest $500M = operating cash $505M − maintenance capex $5M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -8%)

Industry peers: median 21%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a -8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $550M of SBC) leaves ($50M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $505M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($71M) · cash from operations $505M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 80%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $400M ÷ Owner Earnings $500M

What this means
Of $500M Owner Earnings, $400M (80%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $400M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($550M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.22×

Harvesting

Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $22M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.65×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $217M vs $2.4B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.56/share (latest year $-0.88), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −49% → −10% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −49% early to −10% lately, median −35% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −6%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2017 · −60.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“The use of generative and agentic AI, relatively new and emerging technologies in the early stages of commercial use, exposes us to additional risks, such as damage to our reputation, competitive position, and business, legal and regulatory risks and additional costs.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.1B

Cash & short-term investments$1.0B
Receivables$387M
Other current assets$1.6B

Current liabilities$618M

Accounts payable$42M
Other current liabilities$577M

Current ratio4.95×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio4.95×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.68×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters5.0× → 4.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$2.3BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$247M$30M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$432Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $574M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$82M · 14%
Buybacks$401M · 70%
Retained (debt / cash)$91M · 16%

Returned to owners$401M
79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $401M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $967M.
Average price paid for buybacks$254.00
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $400M, about $254.00 each.
Net change in share count568.1%
The diluted count rose from 12M to 82M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	$10.6M	$17.7M	($1M)
2023	$13.2M	−$1.2M	($20M)
2024	$15.3M	$44.9M	$115M
2025	$15.8M	−$1.3M	$138M
2026	$52.8M	$52.2M	$500M
2026	$16.3M	$40.9M	$500M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio184:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$550M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 22% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MongoDB Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?568.1%
Diluted shares grew 568.1% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $401M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OKTAOkta Inc.	$2.9B	72%	-30.8%	-8%	7%
PTCPTC Inc.	$2.7B	79%	21.1%	10%	19%
ANSSAnsys Inc.	$2.5B	87%	31.7%	13%	30%
NTNXNutanix	$2.5B	79%	-26.6%	-190%	-1%
DBXDropbox	$2.5B	79%	1.5%	-1%	29%
MDBMongoDB Inc.	$2.5B	73%	-34.1%	-19%	-5%
TYLTyler Technologies	$2.3B	47%	14.9%	10%	21%
DTDynatrace	$2.0B	81%	8.7%	8%	27%
Group median	—	79%	5.1%	3%	20%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MongoDB Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($245M) Net of stock comp (−$556M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($592M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+108%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $591M on 80M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-27; net cash $819M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6M) runs well above depreciation ($23M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $592M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MDB against another business →

The owners of MDB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MongoDB Inc. (MDB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MDB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MD its page in the Manual MDGL →

Industry order: ← MBLY the Software chapter META →