Share count
813Mpeak FY2025
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MBLY, Mobileye Global Inc.
Mobileye is a leader in the development and deployment of advanced driver assistance systems and autonomous driving technologies and solutions.
We pioneered ADAS technology more than 25 years ago and have continuously expanded the scope of our ADAS offerings, while leading the evolution to autonomous driving solutions.
Our portfolio of solutions is built upon a comprehensive suite of purpose-built software and hardware technologies designed to provide the capabilities needed to make the future of ADAS and autonomous driving a reality.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
+14.5% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $1.2B
Gross margin 48%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −22% through the cycle on a 47% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 27% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →79% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- China21%$428M
- United States21%$416M
- Germany15%$297M
- South Korea10%$192M
- United Kingdom6%$117M
- Poland5%$110M
- Other17%$334M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $967M | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 39% | 47% | 49% | 50% | 45% | 48% | 48% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 3% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 46% | 39% | 42% | 43% | 65% | 61% | 60% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($213M) | ($57M) | ($37M) | ($33M) | ($3.2B) | ($440M) | ($4.2B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −22.0% | −4.1% | −2.0% | −1.6% | −195.0% | −23.2% | −209.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($196M) | ($75M) | ($82M) | ($27M) | ($3.1B) | ($392M) | ($4.1B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $271M | $599M | $546M | $394M | $400M | $602M | $568M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $13M | $17M | $23M | $39M | $62M | $74M | $76M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $369M | $560M | $431M | $130M | $3.1B | $643M | $4.3B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $91M | $143M | $111M | $98M | $81M | $79M | $95M | CapexCapex |
| 9.4% | 10.3% | 5.9% | 4.7% | 4.9% | 4.2% | 4.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $258M | $582M | $523M | $355M | $338M | $523M | $473M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 26.7% | 42.0% | 28.0% | 17.1% | 20.4% | 27.6% | 23.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $180M | $456M | $435M | $296M | $319M | $523M | $473M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 18.6% | 32.9% | 23.3% | 14.2% | 19.3% | 27.6% | 23.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $337M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -1% | -0% | -0% | -0% | -24% | -3% | -48% | ROICROIC |
| -1% | -0% | -1% | -0% | -26% | -3% | -50% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | −0% | −3% | −0% | −26% | — | −50% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $93M | $616M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $155M | $269M | $357M | $212M | $131M | $226M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $97M | $113M | $391M | $415M | $327M | $303M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $160M | $73M | $39M | $4M | $4M | $3M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $92M | $309M | $709M | $623M | $454M | $526M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $2.3B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $474M | $384M | $403M | $333M | $406M | $419M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 4.8× | 3.9× | 5.1× | 6.5× | 6.1× | 4.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $10.9B | $10.9B | $10.9B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $4.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $16.7B | $15.4B | $15.6B | $12.6B | $12.5B | $8.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| ($93M) | ($616M) | ($1.0B) | ($1.2B) | ($1.4B) | ($1.8B) | ($1.2B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $15.8B | $15.9B | $14.8B | $14.9B | $12.1B | $11.9B | $8.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 8.8% | 7.0% | 9.3% | 12.1% | 16.9% | 14.6% | 14.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 750M | 750M | 759M | 805M | 809M | 813M | 817M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.29 | $1.85 | $2.46 | $2.58 | $2.04 | $2.33 | $2.47 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.26 | $-0.10 | $-0.11 | $-0.03 | $-3.82 | $-0.48 | $-5.03 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.34 | $0.78 | $0.69 | $0.44 | $0.42 | $0.64 | $0.58 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.24 | $0.61 | $0.57 | $0.37 | $0.39 | $0.64 | $0.58 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.44 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.12 | $0.19 | $0.15 | $0.12 | $0.10 | $0.10 | $0.12 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $21.12 | $21.19 | $19.49 | $18.54 | $14.94 | $14.61 | $9.99 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.6%/yr | +12.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +13.3%/yr | +13.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −4.3%/yr | −4.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | −7.1%/yr | −7.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−3%low FY2024
Gross margin
48%low FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$523Mowner earningsvs.($392M)net incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2020FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $392M loss into $523M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($392M) | ($3.1B) | ($27M) | ($82M) | ($75M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$74M | +$62M | +$39M | +$23M | +$17M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$277M | +$279M | +$252M | +$174M | +$97M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$643M | +$3.1B | +$130M | +$431M | +$560M |
| Cash from operations | $602M | $400M | $394M | $546M | $599M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$79M | −$62M | −$39M | −$23M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $523M | $338M | $355M | $523M | $582M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$19M | −$59M | −$88M | −$126M |
| Free cash flow | $523M | $319M | $296M | $435M | $456M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 28% | 20% | 17% | 28% | 42% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $277M), owner earnings is nearer $246M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -18.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($440M) ÷ interest expense $24M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $1.8B − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $1.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 25 + DIO 121 − DPO 1 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- High through the cycle6-yr median margin, range 17%–42%; latest $523M = operating cash $602M − maintenance capex $79MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 28% of revenue this year, a 27% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $277M of SBC) leaves $246M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($392M) · cash from operations $602M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $100M ÷ Owner Earnings $523M
What this means
Of $523M Owner Earnings, $100M (19%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $100M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($277M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.07×MaintainingCapex $79M ÷ depreciation $74M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 6.10×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-4.79/share (latest year $-1.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $48.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −9% → −73% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −9% early to −73% lately, median −22% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −195.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Competition in the humanoid and Physical AI robotics market is intense and rapidly evolving, with a growing number of well-capitalized companies developing general-purpose bipedal robots and related autonomy stacks for industrial and warehouse use.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.0B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
- Receivables$226M
- Inventory$303M
- Other current assets$253M
Current liabilities$419M
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$416M
Current ratio4.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.03×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.89×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.6Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+27.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.8× → 4.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.4BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$62M$62M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$603M · 21%
- Dividends$337M · 12%
- Buybacks$100M · 4%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.8B · 63%
- Returned to owners$437M
17% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $337M as dividends and $100M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $1.1B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $100M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count8.9%
The diluted count rose from 750M to 817M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$9.4B75% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity69%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$745Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $603M of capital spent building
$2.7B written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Prof. Amnon Shashua | $45.2M | $74.8M | $523M |
| 2023 | Prof. Amnon Shashua | $15.2M | $86.9M | $355M |
| 2024 | Prof. Amnon Shashua | $15.1M | $44.4M | $338M |
| 2025 | Prof. Amnon Shashua | $16.6M | $30.2M | $523M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$277M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 15% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Mobileye Global Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?21.7% vs 32.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 32.2% early in the record and 21.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.9%
Diluted shares grew 8.9% over 2020–2025, even as the company spent $100M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PAYCPaycom Software | $2.1B | 84% | 28.8% | 37% | 24% |
| DTDynatrace | $2.0B | 81% | 8.7% | 8% | 27% |
| MBLYMobileye Global Inc. | $1.9B | 47% | -13.1% | -1% | 27% |
| UUnity Software | $1.8B | 76% | -36.8% | -15% | -6% |
| ACIWACI Worldwide Inc. | $1.8B | 51% | 14.8% | 7% | 13% |
| ESTCElastic | $1.7B | 74% | -20.9% | -54% | 2% |
| TDCTeradata Corporation | $1.7B | 57% | 8.3% | 47% | 16% |
| PATHUiPath | $1.6B | 83% | -18.2% | -14% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 75% | -2.4% | 3% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Mobileye Global Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Mobileye Global Inc. earns about $514M on its 27.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 27.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $473M on 244M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-15; net cash $1.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 817M, 234% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($95M) runs well above depreciation ($76M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $489M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Mobileye Global Inc. (MBLY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MBLY, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MBINN its page in the Manual MBOT →
Industry order: ← MANH the Software chapter MDB →