Owner Scorecard


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META, Meta Platforms Inc.

Software asset-light Capital build-out

Meta runs a set of apps — Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Messenger — that let people connect, share, and find and build communities. The apps cost the user nothing; the money comes from selling advertisers the attention of those users, matched to them by what the company has learned about them. A small, separate arm builds virtual-reality headsets and AI glasses, but the audience and the advertising it carries are nearly the whole business.

Our products enable people to connect and share through mobile devices, personal computers, virtual reality (VR) headsets, and AI glasses.

We build technology that helps people connect and share, find and build communities, and grow businesses.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

Read in Notes: Weeds and Flowers, Jul 15, 2026

META · Meta Platforms Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$201.0B
+22.2% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $215.0B 5-yr avg $147.0B
Gross margin 82% 5-yr avg 81%
Operating margin 41.2% 5-yr avg 36.5%
ROIC 25% 5-yr avg 29%
Owner-earnings margin 48% 5-yr avg 43%
Free cash flow margin 22% 5-yr avg 28%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Family of Apps (99%) and Reality Labs (1%).
Situation
Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 35% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
The franchise turns on one question: do people keep coming back, and keep their attention here, when a rival app is one tap away? Network effects and switching costs are the test — watch engagement and the share of advertising dollars the apps draw for whether the audience is captive or merely passing through. Two forces pull the other way: regulators who can narrow the data targeting that makes each ad worth its price, and the heavy outlays on AI and headsets, which must earn a return rather than simply consume cash — note that the company carries net debt, not the war chest one might expect here. The record below holds the figures.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 25%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 45% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, Family of Apps, is also where the profit is made: 99% of revenue and 100% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Reality Labs ran a $19.2B operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Family of Apps99%$198.8B100% of profit
  • Reality Labs1%$2.2Bloss of $19.2B
By geographyUS & Canada39%Asia Pacific27%Europe23%Rest of World11%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$27.6B$40.7B$55.8B$70.7B$86.0B$117.9B$116.6B$134.9B$164.5B$201.0B$215.0BRevenueRevenue
86%87%83%82%81%81%78%81%82%82%82%Gross marginGross mgn
6%6%6%15%8%8%10%8%6%6%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
21%19%18%19%21%21%30%29%27%29%29%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$12.4B$20.2B$24.9B$24.0B$32.7B$46.8B$28.9B$46.8B$69.4B$83.3B$88.6BOperating incomeOp. inc.
45.0%49.7%44.6%33.9%38.0%39.6%24.8%34.7%42.2%41.4%41.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$10.2B$15.9B$22.1B$18.5B$29.1B$39.4B$23.2B$39.1B$62.4B$60.5B$70.6BNet incomeNet inc.
18%23%13%25%12%17%19%18%12%30%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$16.1B$24.2B$29.3B$36.3B$38.7B$57.7B$50.5B$71.1B$91.3B$115.8B$124.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.3B$3.0B$4.3B$5.7B$6.9B$8.0B$8.7B$11.2B$15.5B$18.6B$20.7BDepreciationDeprec.
$331M$1.5B($1.3B)$7.3B($3.8B)$1.2B$6.6B$6.8B($3.2B)$16.3B$10.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4.5B$6.7B$13.9B$15.1B$15.2B$18.7B$31.2B$27.0B$37.3B$69.7B$75.7BCapexCapex
16.2%16.6%24.9%21.4%17.6%15.8%26.7%20.0%22.6%34.7%35.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$13.8B$21.2B$25.0B$30.6B$31.9B$49.7B$41.8B$59.9B$75.8B$97.2B$103.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
49.8%52.1%44.7%43.2%37.1%42.2%35.8%44.4%46.1%48.4%48.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$11.6B$17.5B$15.4B$21.2B$23.6B$39.0B$19.3B$44.1B$54.1B$46.1B$48.3BFree cash flowFCF
42.0%43.0%27.5%30.0%27.4%33.1%16.5%32.7%32.9%22.9%22.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$5.1B$5.3B$5.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$2.0B$12.9B$4.2B$6.3B$44.5B$28.0B$19.8B$30.1B$26.2BBuybacksBuybacks
20%24%29%22%26%36%19%30%37%24%25%ROICROIC
17%21%26%18%23%32%18%26%34%28%29%Return on equityROE
18%26%31%25%27%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$29.4B$41.7B$10.0B$19.1B$17.6B$48.0B$40.7B$65.4B$77.8B$81.6B$81.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4.0B$5.8B$7.6B$9.5B$11.3B$14.0B$13.5B$16.2B$17.0B$19.8B$17.5BReceivablesReceiv.
$302M$380M$820M$1.4B$1.3B$4.1B$5.0B$4.8B$7.7B$8.9B$13.3BAccounts payablePayables
$3.7B$5.5B$6.8B$8.2B$10.0B$10.0B$8.5B$11.3B$9.3B$10.9B$4.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$34.4B$48.6B$50.5B$66.2B$75.7B$66.7B$59.5B$85.4B$100.0B$108.7B$109.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.9B$3.8B$7.0B$15.1B$15.0B$21.1B$27.0B$32.0B$33.6B$41.8B$46.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
12.0×12.9×7.2×4.4×5.1×3.2×2.2×2.7×3.0×2.6×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$18.1B$18.2B$18.3B$18.7B$19.1B$19.2B$20.3B$20.7B$20.7B$24.5B$24.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$65.0B$84.5B$97.3B$133.4B$159.3B$166.0B$185.7B$229.6B$276.1B$366.0B$395.3BTotal assetsAssets
$0$9.9B$18.4B$28.8B$58.7B$58.7BTotal debtDebt
($48.0B)($30.8B)($47.0B)($49.0B)($22.8B)($22.4B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1242.7×3367.2×2768.1×1199.3×2032.7×156.5×104.8×97.0×71.5×76.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$59.2B$74.3B$84.1B$101.1B$128.3B$124.9B$125.7B$153.2B$182.6B$217.2B$243.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
11.6%9.2%7.4%6.8%7.6%7.8%10.3%10.4%10.1%10.2%10.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
2.92B2.96B2.92B2.88B2.89B2.86B2.70B2.63B2.61B2.57B2.56BShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.45$13.75$19.12$24.58$29.77$41.25$43.16$51.31$62.93$78.08$83.84Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.49$5.39$7.57$6.43$10.09$13.77$8.59$14.87$23.86$23.49$27.53EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.71$7.17$8.54$10.63$11.04$17.39$15.47$22.80$29.01$37.76$40.28Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.97$5.91$5.26$7.38$8.17$13.64$7.14$16.76$20.69$17.91$18.82Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$1.94$2.07$2.08Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.54$2.28$4.76$5.25$5.25$6.54$11.54$10.29$14.25$27.07$29.54Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$20.24$25.15$28.80$35.14$44.42$43.68$46.53$58.26$69.87$84.40$95.04Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+26.4%/yr+21.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+26.0%/yr+27.9%/yr
EPS+23.6%/yr+18.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+37.6%/yr+38.8%/yr
Book value / share+17.2%/yr+13.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+22.2%
    “Total revenue for 2025 was $200.97 billion, an increase of 22% compared to 2024, due to an increase in advertising revenue.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Operating income+20.0%
    “Income from operations for 2025 was $83.28 billion, an increase of $13.90 billion, or 20%, compared to 2024, driven by an increase in advertising revenue, partially offset by an increase in costs and expenses.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
2.6Bpeak FY2017
ROIC
24%low FY2022
Gross margin
82%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$97.2Bowner earningsvs.$60.5Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $97.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $18.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put $51.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $46.1B.

Reported net income$60.5B
Owner earnings$97.2B · 48% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$60.5B$62.4B$39.1B$23.2B$39.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$18.6B+$15.5B+$11.2B+$8.7B+$8.0B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$20.4B+$16.7B+$14.0B+$12.0B+$9.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$16.3B−$3.2B+$6.8B+$6.6B+$1.2B
Cash from operations$115.8B$91.3B$71.1B$50.5B$57.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$18.6B−$15.5B−$11.2B−$8.7B−$8.0B
Owner earnings$97.2B$75.8B$59.9B$41.8B$49.7B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$51.1B−$21.8B−$15.9B−$22.5B−$10.7B
Free cash flow$46.1B$54.1B$44.1B$19.3B$39.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue48%46%44%36%42%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $18.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $51.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20.4B), owner earnings is nearer $76.8B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $83.3B ÷ interest expense $1.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $35.9B + ST investments $45.7B − debt $58.7B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $22.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 36 + DIO 0 − DPO 90 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 19%–37%; 24% latest = NOPAT $58.6B ÷ invested capital $240.1B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 24% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 36%–52%; latest $97.2B = operating cash $115.8B − maintenance capex $18.6B
    Industry peers: median 31%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 48% of revenue this year, a 44% median across 10 years. It chose to put $51.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $46.1B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20.4B of SBC) leaves $76.8B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $115.8B ÷ net income $60.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $31.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $97.2B
    What this means

    Of $97.2B Owner Earnings, $31.6B (32%) went back to shareholders, $5.3B dividends, $26.2B buybacks. Net of $20.4B stock comp, the real buyback was about $5.8B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 3.74×
    Expanding
    Capex $69.7B ÷ depreciation $18.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $201.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.60×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $58.7B vs $66.9B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +235%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $21.30/share (latest year $23.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $85.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 46% → 39% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 46% early to 39% lately, median 40% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +19%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 19% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 24.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Further, we face significant competition from other companies that are developing their own AI features and technologies, including competition from AI features and technologies that may be similar or superior to our technologies or more cost-effective to develop and deploy, or that otherwise achieve more timely or suc…”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$109.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$81.2B
  • Receivables$17.5B
  • Other current assets$11.1B
Current liabilities$46.8B
  • Accounts payable$13.3B
  • Other current liabilities$33.4B
Current ratio2.35×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.35×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.74×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$63.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+33.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.8× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$215.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($41.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$86.8B$28.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $85.1B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$721Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$2.8B
'28$1.5B
'29$1.0B
'30$5.0B
later$48.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$5.0Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$59.0Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$3.6B
'27$3.3B
'28$3.2B
'29$3.1B
'30$2.7B
later$19.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$3.6Ba fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$35.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$26.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$58.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$26.3B
Total fixed claims on the business$85.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $85.1B, of which the leases are 31%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $531.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$239.3B · 45%
  • Dividends$10.4B · 2%
  • Buybacks$174.0B · 33%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$107.4B · 20%
  • Returned to owners$184.4B

    41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $10.4B as dividends and $174.0B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$252.22

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 277M shares were bought for $69.9B, about $252.22 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $152.00 (2017) to $327.48 (2021), and 2021, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($44.5B).

  • Net change in share count−12.3%

    The diluted count fell from 2925M to 2564M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.07/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained42%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($136.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $57.7B, so each retained $1 added about 0.42 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mark Zuckerberg$26.8M$26.8M$49.7B
2022Mark Zuckerberg$27.1M$27.1M$41.8B
2023Mark Zuckerberg$24.4M$24.4M$59.9B
2024Mark Zuckerberg$27.2M$27.2M$75.8B
2025Mark Zuckerberg$25.1M$25.1M$97.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio65:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$20.4B

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Meta Platforms Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GOOGAlphabet Inc. Class C Capital Stock$402.8B57%26.4%21%31%
MSFTMicrosoft Corp.$281.7B68%39.3%28%36%
METAMeta Platforms Inc.$201.0B82%40.5%25%45%
ORCLOracle Corp.$67.4B97%32.2%16%32%
CRMSalesforce Inc.$41.5B74%3.7%3%22%
XYZBlock Inc.$24.2B34%-0.7%-1%4%
ADBEAdobe Inc.$23.8B87%32.2%33%39%
FLUTFlutter Entertainment plc$16.4B48%-0.4%-0%8%
Group median71%29.3%18%31%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Meta Platforms Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Meta Platforms Inc. earns about $89.6B on its 44.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 48.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $48.3B on 2534M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $22.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($75.7B) runs well above depreciation ($20.7B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $105.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Notes

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Meta Platforms Inc. (META), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/META, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MET its page in the Manual METC →

Industry order: ← MDB the Software chapter MGNI →