← All companies ← MGR Manual MGRC → ← MGR Capital Markets & Asset Management MGRD →
MGRB, Affiliated Managers Group, Inc.
An asset manager, paid a fee on the money it runs for other people.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Assets under management and the fee rate on them. What decides it: net flows in or out, the market's move on the assets already there (the firm rises and falls with the indices it invests in), the drift toward cheaper passive products, and the operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Operating margin has run at the high end of fee-business margins across the record (median 43%, above 25% in 7 of 10 years), the economics of a business that takes a cut without carrying the risk. It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near 17%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →28% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States72%$1.5B
- United Kingdom25%$527M
- Other3%$61M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 47.1% | 48.1% | 21.3% | 4.2% | 18.5% | 38.5% | 69.5% | 47.7% | 34.0% | 48.2% | 52.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| 21.5% | 29.9% | 10.2% | 0.7% | 10.0% | 23.4% | 49.2% | 32.7% | 25.1% | 34.5% | 35.5% | Net marginNet mgn |
| $473M | $690M | $244M | $16M | $202M | $566M | $1.1B | $673M | $512M | $717M | $755M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 33% | 8% | 43% | 16% | 29% | 31% | 24% | 22% | 26% | 28% | 29% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $920M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $862M | $929M | $967M | $1.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 13% | 18% | 7% | 1% | 7% | 20% | 35% | 19% | 15% | 22% | 24% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | 17% | 5% | −2% | 7% | 20% | 35% | 19% | 15% | 22% | 24% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $8.7B | $8.7B | $8.2B | $7.7B | $7.9B | $8.9B | $8.9B | $9.1B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $9.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $431M | $440M | $566M | $540M | $1.0B | $909M | $429M | $814M | $950M | $586M | $509M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $3.6B | $3.8B | $3.5B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.2B | $3.6B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $3.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 57.0M | 58.6M | 53.8M | 50.6M | 46.7M | 44.8M | 49.0M | 42.2M | 36.1M | 33.0M | 27.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $38.50 | $39.33 | $44.21 | $44.26 | $43.42 | $53.85 | $47.54 | $48.76 | $56.53 | $62.86 | $77.19 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $8.29 | $11.77 | $4.53 | $0.31 | $4.33 | $12.63 | $23.39 | $15.95 | $14.17 | $21.72 | $27.44 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $18.07 | $19.66 | $20.85 | $18.17 | $21.43 | $27.92 | $21.29 | $20.42 | $25.73 | $29.31 | $38.37 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.77 | $1.20 | $1.29 | $0.36 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.04 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $63.50 | $65.23 | $64.26 | $58.05 | $59.52 | $62.20 | $65.92 | $85.02 | $92.67 | $98.13 | $112.36 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.6%/yr | +7.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +5.5%/yr | +6.5%/yr |
| EPS | +11.3%/yr | +38.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | — | −39.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −7.0%/yr | +0.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.0%/yr | +10.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Operating margin 53.4%Wide fee margin (≥30%)Operating income $1.1B ÷ revenue $2.1BIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.
- Net margin 34.5%WideNet income $717M ÷ revenue $2.1B
What this means
What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.
- Return on equity 22%StrongNet income $717M ÷ equity $3.2BIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The market for highly skilled professionals in the investment management industry is highly competitive, particularly in alternative strategies, and further technological advancements, including with respect to AI, could result in increased demand and competition for individuals with certain specialized skills and tech…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Sep 30, 2013Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$509M
- Receivables$871M
- Accounts payable$388M
- Other current liabilities$195M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Horgen | $9.1M | $50.6M | $1.3B |
| 2022 | Mr. Horgen | $13.7M | $12.8M | $1.0B |
| 2023 | Mr. Horgen | $14.6M | $4.7M | $862M |
| 2024 | Mr. Horgen | $13.0M | $33.5M | $929M |
| 2025 | Mr. Horgen | $16.3M | $56.0M | $967M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$112M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Op. margin | Net margin | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| JHGJanus Henderson Group plc | $3.1B | 25.0% | 18.8% | 10% |
| OWLBlue Owl Capital | $2.9B | 14.3% | 2.7% | 4% |
| HLIHoulihan Lokey | $2.6B | 20.5% | 16.1% | 18% |
| MORNMorningstar Inc. | $2.4B | 17.4% | 15.2% | 17% |
| MGRBAffiliated Managers Group, Inc. | $2.1B | 42.8% | 24.3% | 17% |
| STEPStepStone Group | $2.0B | 25.0% | 4.0% | 18% |
| FHIFederated Hermes | $1.8B | 28.4% | 20.0% | 26% |
| PJTPJT Partners | $1.7B | 16.0% | 8.0% | 72% |
| Group median | — | 22.8% | 15.6% | 18% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Affiliated Managers Group, Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Affiliated Managers Group, Inc. earns about $970M on its 46.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 46.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $1.1B on 26M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $2.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 28M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($8M) runs well above depreciation ($130M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MGR its page in the Manual MGRC →
Industry order: ← MGR the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter MGRD →