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MLKN, MillerKnoll Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive Cyclical

MillerKnoll is a collective of dynamic brands that comes together to design the world we live in.

From the spaces we make that help us live and work better, to how we manufacture our products, to the ways we solve challenges facing our customers and global community, design is our tool for creating positive impact.

Researches, designs, manufactures and distributes interior furnishings for use in various environments including residential, office, healthcare and educational settings, and provides related services that support organizations and individuals all over the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MLKN · MillerKnoll Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.7B

+1.1% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.8B 5-yr avg $3.6B

Gross margin 39% 5-yr avg 37%

Operating margin 5.3% 5-yr avg 3.9%

ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 11%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 4.6% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −1.5% and 9.4% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 5 of 8 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

29% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States71%$2.6B
International29%$1.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMFeb 2026
											Income statement
$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$3.9B	$4.1B	$3.6B	$3.7B	$3.8B	RevenueRevenue
39%	38%	37%	36%	37%	39%	34%	35%	39%	39%	39%	Gross marginGross mgn
26%	26%	26%	25%	26%	26%	31%	28%	31%	31%	31%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$212M	$191M	$179M	$204M	($38M)	$233M	$40M	$122M	$167M	$51M	$202M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.3%	8.4%	7.5%	7.9%	−1.5%	9.4%	1.0%	3.0%	4.6%	1.4%	5.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$137M	$124M	$128M	$161M	($9M)	$175M	($27M)	$42M	$82M	($37M)	$11M	Net incomeNet inc.
30%	31%	25%	20%	—	22%	—	10%	15%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$210M	$202M	$167M	$216M	$222M	$332M	($12M)	$163M	$352M	$209M	$206M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$53M	$59M	$67M	$72M	$80M	$87M	$191M	$155M	$155M	$141M	$146M	DepreciationDeprec.
$9M	$11M	($36M)	($24M)	$148M	$62M	($207M)	($55M)	$94M	$74M	$20M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$85M	$87M	$71M	$86M	$69M	$60M	$95M	$83M	$78M	$108M	$123M	CapexCapex
3.8%	3.8%	3.0%	3.3%	2.8%	2.4%	2.4%	2.0%	2.2%	2.9%	3.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$157M	$143M	$96M	$131M	$153M	$273M	($107M)	$80M	$274M	$102M	$83M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.9%	6.3%	4.0%	5.1%	6.1%	11.1%	−2.7%	1.9%	7.5%	2.8%	2.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$125M	$115M	$96M	$131M	$153M	$273M	($107M)	$80M	$274M	$102M	$83M	Free cash flowFCF
5.5%	5.0%	4.0%	5.1%	6.1%	11.1%	−2.7%	1.9%	7.5%	2.8%	2.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$4M	$0	$0	$0	$111M	$0	$1.1B	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$35M	$39M	$42M	$46M	$36M	$35M	$55M	$57M	$56M	$52M	$51M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$14M	$24M	$47M	$48M	$27M	$900K	$16M	$16M	$138M	$85M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
22%	19%	18%	19%	-4%	25%	—	4%	6%	—	4%	ROICROIC
26%	21%	19%	22%	-1%	20%	-2%	3%	6%	-3%	1%	Return on equityROE
19%	14%	13%	16%	−7%	16%	−6%	−1%	2%	−7%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$92M	$105M	$213M	$168M	$454M	$396M	$230M	$224M	$230M	$194M	$183M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$211M	$187M	$217M	$218M	$180M	$205M	$349M	$334M	$308M	$350M	$320M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$128M	$152M	$162M	$184M	$197M	$229M	$587M	$487M	$429M	$448M	$492M	InventoryInvent.
$166M	$148M	$171M	$178M	$129M	$178M	$355M	$270M	$241M	$271M	$264M	Accounts payablePayables
$174M	$191M	$208M	$225M	$249M	$255M	$581M	$552M	$496M	$526M	$548M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$481M	$492M	$645M	$661M	$917M	$907M	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$390M	$386M	$414M	$446M	$470M	$477M	$877M	$703M	$698M	$704M	$682M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×	1.3×	1.6×	1.5×	2.0×	1.9×	1.5×	1.7×	1.5×	1.6×	1.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$305M	$305M	$304M	$304M	$346M	$364M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$4.5B	$4.3B	$4.0B	$4.0B	$4.0B	Total assetsAssets
$222M	$210M	$286M	$285M	$591M	$277M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Total debtDebt
$130M	$105M	$73M	$117M	$137M	($119M)	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
13.7×	12.6×	13.3×	16.8×	-3.0×	16.7×	1.1×	1.7×	2.2×	0.7×	2.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$524M	$588M	$665M	$719M	$652M	$861M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%	0.8%	0.5%	0.6%	0.9%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$600K	—	—	—	$126M	$126M	$126M	$126M	—	$92M	$92M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
60.5M	60.6M	60.3M	59.4M	58.9M	59.4M	73.2M	76.0M	74.0M	69.0M	69.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$37.42	$37.62	$39.48	$43.23	$42.20	$41.51	$53.94	$53.76	$49.06	$53.20	$54.98	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.26	$2.05	$2.12	$2.70	$-0.15	$2.94	$-0.37	$0.55	$1.11	$-0.53	$0.16	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.60	$2.36	$1.59	$2.20	$2.59	$4.59	$-1.46	$1.05	$3.70	$1.47	$1.20	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.07	$1.90	$1.59	$2.20	$2.59	$4.59	$-1.46	$1.05	$3.70	$1.47	$1.20	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.58	$0.65	$0.70	$0.77	$0.62	$0.58	$0.74	$0.75	$0.75	$0.75	$0.74	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.41	$1.44	$1.17	$1.44	$1.17	$1.01	$1.29	$1.10	$1.06	$1.56	$1.78	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.66	$9.70	$11.02	$12.11	$11.07	$14.49	$19.51	$18.84	$18.73	$18.50	$19.33	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.0%/yr	+4.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−6.1%/yr	−10.7%/yr
Dividends / share	+3.0%/yr	+3.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+1.2%/yr	+5.9%/yr
Book value / share	+8.8%/yr	+10.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

69Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

6%low FY2020

Gross margin

39%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

11.2×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$102Mowner earningsvs.($37M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $37M loss into $102M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($37M)	$82M	$42M	($27M)	$175M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$141M	+$155M	+$155M	+$191M	+$87M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$32M	+$21M	+$20M	+$31M	+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$74M	+$94M	−$55M	−$207M	+$62M
Cash from operations	$209M	$352M	$163M	($12M)	$332M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$108M	−$78M	−$83M	−$95M	−$60M
Owner earnings	$102M	$274M	$80M	($107M)	$273M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	8%	2%	-3%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $32M), owner earnings is nearer $70M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $51M ÷ interest expense $77M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 23.3× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $194M + ST investments $9M − debt $1.4B

What this means
Netting $203M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 23.3× a year's operating profit (27.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 63d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 35 + DIO 73 − DPO 44 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 18%

High through the cycle

8-yr median, range -4%–25%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–11%; latest $102M = operating cash $209M − maintenance capex $108M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32M of SBC) leaves $70M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $209M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($37M) · cash from operations $209M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 134%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $137M ÷ Owner Earnings $102M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $102M of Owner Earnings, $137M (134%) went back to shareholders, $52M dividends, $85M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $32M stock comp, the real buyback was about $53M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.77×

Harvesting

Capex $108M ÷ depreciation $141M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.58×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs $405M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −77%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.43/share (latest year $-0.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 8% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 3% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −2%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −1.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B

Cash & short-term investments$183M
Receivables$320M
Inventory$492M
Other current assets$126M

Current liabilities$682M

Debt due within a year$23M
Accounts payable$264M
Other current liabilities$395M

Current ratio1.64×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$440Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$23M due · $183M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Feb 28, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($55M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$704M$482M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.9B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$90Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$16M

'27$24M

'28$27M

'29$612M

'30$658M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$16Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$40Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$658Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$1.3Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $1.4B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Feb 28, 2026$183M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$102M

Together, against $16M due next year17.8×

Cash on hand as of Feb 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $285M against the $16M due in the twelve months after the May 31, 2025 schedule: 18 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s May 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$88M

'27$95M

'28$88M

'29$79M

'30$68M

later$180M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$88Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$598Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$485Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.4B

Lease obligations (present value)$485M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.9B, of which the leases are 26%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s May 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$822M · 40%
Dividends$452M · 22%
Buybacks$415M · 20%
Retained (debt / cash)$373M · 18%

Returned to owners$867M
67% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $452M as dividends and $415M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $91M.
Average price paid for buybacks$27.87
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 15M shares were bought for $415M, about $27.87 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $22.95 (2024) to $41.54 (2022); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $22.95 ($138M).
Net change in share count14.2%
The diluted count rose from 61M to 69M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.75/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity90%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $822M of capital spent building

$595M written down across 6 years (2016, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 49% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Andi R. Owen	$6.4M	$16.8M	$273M
2022	Andi R. Owen	$5.0M	−$2.0M	($107M)
2023	Andi R. Owen	$5.8M	−$337k	$80M
2024	Andi R. Owen	$9.0M	$11.3M	$274M
2025	Andi R. Owen	$6.4M	$1.9M	$102M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio88:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$32M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 63% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MillerKnoll Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

5 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.1% vs 5.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.8% early in the record and 4.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.2%
Diluted shares grew 14.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $415M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$222M → $1.3B
Debt rose from $222M to $1.3B while owner earnings went from about $132M to $152M — about 1.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 21% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $339M to $812M while revenue grew 68%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 21% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $988M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LEGLeggett & Platt Incorporated	$4.1B	21%	10.0%	13%	7%
MLKNMillerKnoll Inc.	$3.7B	37%	6.1%	18%	6%
HNIHNI Corporation	$2.8B	37%	5.7%	13%	7%
LZBLa-Z-Boy Incorporated	$2.1B	42%	7.7%	18%	7%
CODICompass Diversified Holdings	$1.9B	37%	2.3%	2%	4%
ETDEthan Allen Interiors Inc.	$615M	57%	10.7%	13%	7%
FLXSFlexsteel Industries Inc.	$441M	20%	4.1%	8%	3%
XMAXXMAX Inc.	$17M	22%	-30.7%	-18%	-15%
Group median	—	37%	5.9%	13%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MillerKnoll Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, MillerKnoll Inc. earns about $206M on its 5.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($206M) Net of stock comp (−$29M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($98M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+5%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $83M on 68M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-26; net debt $1.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($123M) runs well above depreciation ($146M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $98M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MLKN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MillerKnoll Inc. (MLKN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MLKN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MLI its page in the Manual MLM →

Industry order: ← MELI the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter MMS →