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CODI, Compass Diversified Holdings
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The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by 5.11 Tactical (29%) and Sterno Products (16%), with 7 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 59% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 2.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.1% and 7.1% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest 5.11 Tactical at 29%.
- 5.11 Tactical29%$552M
- Sterno Products16%$306M
- Altor16%$303M
- Boa10%$190M
- Arnold8%$151M
- The Honey Pot7%$140M
- Other12%$232M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $978M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| 33% | 36% | 35% | 36% | 37% | 38% | 37% | 40% | 42% | 43% | 44% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 22% | 26% | 24% | 24% | 25% | 24% | 25% | 30% | 33% | 35% | 35% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $19M | $25M | $57M | $26M | $78M | $123M | $44M | ($69M) | ($15M) | $11M | $6M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.9% | 2.4% | 4.2% | 2.1% | 5.4% | 7.1% | 2.5% | −4.1% | −0.8% | 0.6% | 0.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $55M | $28M | ($6M) | $302M | $23M | $115M | ($59M) | $109M | ($209M) | ($226M) | ($227M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 15% | — | — | 3% | 37% | 12% | — | 7% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $111M | $82M | $114M | $85M | $149M | $134M | ($47M) | $17M | ($151M) | ($7M) | $46M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $89M | $87M | $95M | $87M | $103M | $112M | $116M | $134M | $143M | $143M | $143M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($32M) | ($33M) | $25M | ($304M) | $23M | ($93M) | ($103M) | ($226M) | ($85M) | $77M | $127M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $24M | $38M | $41M | $27M | $29M | $33M | $60M | $55M | $57M | $44M | $36M | CapexCapex |
| 2.5% | 3.8% | 3.0% | 2.1% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 3.4% | 3.3% | 3.2% | 2.4% | 2.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $87M | $43M | $73M | $58M | $119M | $101M | ($107M) | ($38M) | ($208M) | ($51M) | $10M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 8.9% | 4.3% | 5.4% | 4.6% | 8.2% | 5.9% | −6.1% | −2.3% | −11.6% | −2.7% | 0.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $87M | $43M | $73M | $58M | $119M | $101M | ($107M) | ($38M) | ($208M) | ($51M) | $10M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 8.9% | 4.3% | 5.4% | 4.6% | 8.2% | 5.9% | −6.1% | −2.3% | −11.6% | −2.7% | 0.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $536M | $159M | $495M | $0 | $667M | $357M | $569M | $0 | $518M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $9M | $10M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 1% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 5% | — | -2% | -0% | — | — | ROICROIC |
| 6% | 3% | -1% | 27% | 2% | 10% | -6% | 12% | -31% | -51% | -57% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $40M | $40M | $49M | $100M | $60M | $161M | $87M | $46M | $60M | $68M | $61M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $181M | $215M | $206M | $191M | $207M | $278M | $197M | $189M | $207M | $203M | $190M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $213M | $247M | $307M | $317M | $351M | $566M | $481M | $582M | $571M | $404M | $375M | InventoryInvent. |
| $62M | $85M | $77M | $70M | $92M | $124M | $81M | $71M | $103M | $96M | $72M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $333M | $377M | $436M | $439M | $466M | $719M | $597M | $700M | $675M | $511M | $494M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $453M | $527M | $681M | $644M | $708M | $1.1B | $926M | $988M | $965M | $845M | $904M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $203M | $212M | $259M | $209M | $295M | $362M | $390M | $461M | $2.4B | $350M | $339M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.2× | 2.5× | 2.6× | 3.1× | 2.4× | 2.9× | 2.4× | 2.1× | 0.4× | 2.4× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $492M | $372M | $471M | $339M | $733M | $586M | $589M | $774M | $896M | $895M | $831M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.3B | $3.0B | $3.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| $557M | $590M | $1.1B | $400M | $899M | $1.3B | $1.3B | $3.3B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $518M | $550M | $1.1B | $300M | $839M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $3.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.8× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 0.4× | 1.7× | 2.1× | 0.5× | -0.6× | -0.1× | 0.1× | 0.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $856M | $873M | $859M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $944M | $930M | $679M | $442M | $401M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| $16M | $15M | — | $33M | — | — | $26M | $89M | $8M | — | — | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 54.6M | 59.9M | 59.9M | 59.9M | 63.2M | 65.4M | 70.7M | 72.1M | 75.5M | 75.2M | 75.2M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $17.92 | $16.74 | $22.66 | $21.09 | $22.92 | $26.37 | $24.84 | $23.44 | $23.70 | $24.90 | $24.54 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.00 | $0.47 | $-0.10 | $5.04 | $0.36 | $1.75 | $-0.84 | $1.51 | $-2.77 | $-3.01 | $-3.02 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.60 | $0.72 | $1.23 | $0.96 | $1.89 | $1.54 | $-1.51 | $-0.53 | $-2.75 | $-0.68 | $0.13 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.60 | $0.72 | $1.23 | $0.96 | $1.89 | $1.54 | $-1.51 | $-0.53 | $-2.75 | $-0.68 | $0.13 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.44 | $0.64 | $0.68 | $0.45 | $0.47 | $0.51 | $0.85 | $0.76 | $0.75 | $0.59 | $0.48 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $15.69 | $14.58 | $14.35 | $18.62 | $17.42 | $17.01 | $13.35 | $12.90 | $8.99 | $5.88 | $5.33 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.7%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.3%/yr | +4.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | −10.3%/yr | −19.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $226M loss into ($51M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($226M) | ($209M) | $109M | ($59M) | $115M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$143M | +$143M | +$134M | +$116M | +$112M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$77M | −$85M | −$226M | −$103M | −$93M |
| Cash from operations | ($7M) | ($151M) | $17M | ($47M) | $134M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$44M | −$57M | −$55M | −$60M | −$33M |
| Owner earnings | ($51M) | ($208M) | ($38M) | ($107M) | $101M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -3% | -12% | -2% | -6% | 6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“The Company calculated the total aggregate amount of excess management fees paid as a result of the restatement of the financial statements as $50.4 million.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $11M ÷ interest expense $175M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.8B · 162.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $68M − debt $1.9B
What this means
Netting $68M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 162.9× a year's operating profit (169.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 40 + DIO 139 − DPO 33 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -2%–5%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -12%–9%; latest ($51M) = operating cash ($7M) − maintenance capex $44MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($55M).
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($226M) · cash from operations ($7M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.31×HarvestingCapex $44M ÷ depreciation $143M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $496M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −524%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.45/share (latest year $-3.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −1% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2023 · −4.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$61M
- Receivables$190M
- Inventory$375M
- Other current assets$278M
- Debt due within a year$41M
- Accounts payable$72M
- Other current liabilities$226M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $487M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$409M · 84%
- Buybacks$19M · 4%
- Retained (debt / cash)$59M · 12%
- Returned to owners$19M
24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $19M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.3B and cash and short-term investments rose $21M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$21.04
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $19M, about $21.04 each.
- Net change in share count37.8%
The diluted count rose from 55M to 75M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−150%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($111M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $167M, so each retained $1 gave back about 1.50 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$188M written down across 6 years (2016, 2017, 2019, 2022, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$4M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 38% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Compass Diversified Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−5.5% vs 6.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.2% early in the record and −5.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.8%
Diluted shares grew 37.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $19M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$557M → $1.9B
Debt rose from $557M to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about $68M to ($99M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $374M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Financial Conglomerates
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LEGLeggett & Platt Incorporated | $4.1B | 21% | 10.0% | 13% | 7% |
| MLKNMillerKnoll Inc. | $3.7B | 37% | 6.1% | 18% | 6% |
| HNIHNI Corporation | $2.8B | 37% | 5.7% | 13% | 7% |
| LZBLa-Z-Boy Incorporated | $2.1B | 42% | 7.7% | 18% | 7% |
| CODICompass Diversified Holdings | $1.9B | 37% | 2.3% | 2% | 4% |
| ETDEthan Allen Interiors Inc. | $615M | 57% | 10.7% | 13% | 7% |
| FLXSFlexsteel Industries Inc. | $441M | 20% | 4.1% | 8% | 3% |
| XMAXXMAX Inc. | $17M | 22% | -30.7% | -18% | -15% |
| Group median | — | 37% | 5.9% | 13% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Compass Diversified Holdings has delivered.
Through the cycle, Compass Diversified Holdings earns about $83M on its 4.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $10M on 75M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← COCO its page in the Manual COF →
Industry order: ← CNNE the Financial Conglomerates chapter INV →