Owner Scorecard


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CODI, Compass Diversified Holdings

Financial Conglomerates capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclicalSerial acquirer

The Trust and the LLC were formed to acquire and manage a group of small and middle-market businesses headquartered in North America.

We offer investors a unique opportunity to own a diverse group of leading middle-market businesses in the branded-consumer and industrial sectors.

Our disciplined approach to our target markets provides opportunities to methodically acquire and manage attractive businesses that will create value for our shareholders.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CODI · Compass Diversified Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
+4.8% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.8B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Gross margin 44% 5-yr avg 40%
Operating margin 0.3% 5-yr avg 1.1%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg −3%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg −3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by 5.11 Tactical (29%) and Sterno Products (16%), with 7 more segments behind.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 59% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 37% and operating margin about 2.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.1% and 7.1% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest 5.11 Tactical at 29%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • 5.11 Tactical29%$552M
  • Sterno Products16%$306M
  • Altor16%$303M
  • Boa10%$190M
  • Arnold8%$151M
  • The Honey Pot7%$140M
  • Other12%$232M
By geographyUnited States77%Europe10%Asia Pacific8%Other International3%Mexico3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$978M$1.0B$1.4B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$1.8B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.8BRevenueRevenue
33%36%35%36%37%38%37%40%42%43%44%Gross marginGross mgn
22%26%24%24%25%24%25%30%33%35%35%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$19M$25M$57M$26M$78M$123M$44M($69M)($15M)$11M$6MOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.9%2.4%4.2%2.1%5.4%7.1%2.5%−4.1%−0.8%0.6%0.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$55M$28M($6M)$302M$23M$115M($59M)$109M($209M)($226M)($227M)Net incomeNet inc.
15%3%37%12%7%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$111M$82M$114M$85M$149M$134M($47M)$17M($151M)($7M)$46MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$89M$87M$95M$87M$103M$112M$116M$134M$143M$143M$143MDepreciationDeprec.
($32M)($33M)$25M($304M)$23M($93M)($103M)($226M)($85M)$77M$127MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$24M$38M$41M$27M$29M$33M$60M$55M$57M$44M$36MCapexCapex
2.5%3.8%3.0%2.1%2.0%1.9%3.4%3.3%3.2%2.4%2.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$87M$43M$73M$58M$119M$101M($107M)($38M)($208M)($51M)$10MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.9%4.3%5.4%4.6%8.2%5.9%−6.1%−2.3%−11.6%−2.7%0.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$87M$43M$73M$58M$119M$101M($107M)($38M)($208M)($51M)$10MFree cash flowFCF
8.9%4.3%5.4%4.6%8.2%5.9%−6.1%−2.3%−11.6%−2.7%0.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$536M$159M$495M$0$667M$357M$569M$0$518M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$9M$10M$0BuybacksBuybacks
1%2%1%2%3%5%-2%-0%ROICROIC
6%3%-1%27%2%10%-6%12%-31%-51%-57%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$40M$40M$49M$100M$60M$161M$87M$46M$60M$68M$61MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$181M$215M$206M$191M$207M$278M$197M$189M$207M$203M$190MReceivablesReceiv.
$213M$247M$307M$317M$351M$566M$481M$582M$571M$404M$375MInventoryInvent.
$62M$85M$77M$70M$92M$124M$81M$71M$103M$96M$72MAccounts payablePayables
$333M$377M$436M$439M$466M$719M$597M$700M$675M$511M$494MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$453M$527M$681M$644M$708M$1.1B$926M$988M$965M$845M$904MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$203M$212M$259M$209M$295M$362M$390M$461M$2.4B$350M$339MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×2.5×2.6×3.1×2.4×2.9×2.4×2.1×0.4×2.4×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$492M$372M$471M$339M$733M$586M$589M$774M$896M$895M$831MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B$1.8B$2.4B$1.9B$2.6B$3.1B$2.9B$3.4B$3.3B$3.0B$3.0BTotal assetsAssets
$557M$590M$1.1B$400M$899M$1.3B$1.3B$3.3B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9BTotal debtDebt
$518M$550M$1.1B$300M$839M$1.1B$1.2B$3.3B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.8×0.9×1.0×0.4×1.7×2.1×0.5×-0.6×-0.1×0.1×0.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$856M$873M$859M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$944M$930M$679M$442M$401MShareholders’ equityEquity
$16M$15M$33M$26M$89M$8MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
54.6M59.9M59.9M59.9M63.2M65.4M70.7M72.1M75.5M75.2M75.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$17.92$16.74$22.66$21.09$22.92$26.37$24.84$23.44$23.70$24.90$24.54Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.00$0.47$-0.10$5.04$0.36$1.75$-0.84$1.51$-2.77$-3.01$-3.02EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.60$0.72$1.23$0.96$1.89$1.54$-1.51$-0.53$-2.75$-0.68$0.13Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.60$0.72$1.23$0.96$1.89$1.54$-1.51$-0.53$-2.75$-0.68$0.13Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.44$0.64$0.68$0.45$0.47$0.51$0.85$0.76$0.75$0.59$0.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.69$14.58$14.35$18.62$17.42$17.01$13.35$12.90$8.99$5.88$5.33Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.7%/yr+1.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.3%/yr+4.8%/yr
Book value / share−10.3%/yr−19.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
75Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
−0%low FY2023
Gross margin
43%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
11.1×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($51M)owner earningsvs.($226M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2023

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $226M loss into ($51M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($226M)($209M)$109M($59M)$115M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$143M+$143M+$134M+$116M+$112M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$77M−$85M−$226M−$103M−$93M
Cash from operations($7M)($151M)$17M($47M)$134M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$44M−$57M−$55M−$60M−$33M
Owner earnings($51M)($208M)($38M)($107M)$101M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-3%-12%-2%-6%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Restated past financials
“The Company calculated the total aggregate amount of excess management fees paid as a result of the restatement of the financial statements as $50.4 million.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $11M ÷ interest expense $175M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.8B · 162.9× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $68M − debt $1.9B
    What this means

    Netting $68M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 162.9× a year's operating profit (169.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 40 + DIO 139 − DPO 33 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -2%–5%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -12%–9%; latest ($51M) = operating cash ($7M) − maintenance capex $44M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($55M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($226M) · cash from operations ($7M)

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.31×
    Harvesting
    Capex $44M ÷ depreciation $143M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $496M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −524%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.45/share (latest year $-3.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 6 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −1% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2023 · −4.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$904M
  • Cash & short-term investments$61M
  • Receivables$190M
  • Inventory$375M
  • Other current assets$278M
Current liabilities$339M
  • Debt due within a year$41M
  • Accounts payable$72M
  • Other current liabilities$226M
Current ratio2.67×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.56×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$565Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$41M due · $61M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−5.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$166M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $487M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$409M · 84%
  • Buybacks$19M · 4%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$59M · 12%
  • Returned to owners$19M

    24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $19M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.3B and cash and short-term investments rose $21M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$21.04

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $19M, about $21.04 each.

  • Net change in share count37.8%

    The diluted count rose from 55M to 75M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained−150%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($111M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $167M, so each retained $1 gave back about 1.50 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.8B59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$3.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $409M of capital spent building

$188M written down across 6 years (2016, 2017, 2019, 2022, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$4M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 38% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Compass Diversified Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−5.5% vs 6.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.2% early in the record and −5.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.8%

    Diluted shares grew 37.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $19M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$557M → $1.9B

    Debt rose from $557M to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about $68M to ($99M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $374M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Financial Conglomerates

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LEGLeggett & Platt Incorporated$4.1B21%10.0%13%7%
MLKNMillerKnoll Inc.$3.7B37%6.1%18%6%
HNIHNI Corporation$2.8B37%5.7%13%7%
LZBLa-Z-Boy Incorporated$2.1B42%7.7%18%7%
CODICompass Diversified Holdings$1.9B37%2.3%2%4%
ETDEthan Allen Interiors Inc.$615M57%10.7%13%7%
FLXSFlexsteel Industries Inc.$441M20%4.1%8%3%
XMAXXMAX Inc.$17M22%-30.7%-18%-15%
Group median37%5.9%13%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Compass Diversified Holdings has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Compass Diversified Holdings earns about $83M on its 4.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $10M on 75M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Compass Diversified Holdings (CODI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CODI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← COCO its page in the Manual COF →

Industry order: ← CNNE the Financial Conglomerates chapter INV →