Owner Scorecard


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LEG, Leggett & Platt Incorporated

Household Durables capital-intensive Cyclical

Leggett & Platt, Incorporated is an international diversified manufacturer that conceives, designs, and produces a wide range of engineered components and products found in many homes and automobiles.

Today, we support our customers' product needs from raw materials to components to finished mattresses and foundations and provide distribution and fulfillment capabilities.

Our industry-leading innerspring and specialty foam technologies, innovative product development, and vertical integration allow us to create value for our customers at each step, from raw material to end consumer.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LEG · Leggett & Platt Incorporated
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.1B
−7.5% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.0B 5-yr avg $4.7B
Gross margin 18% 5-yr avg 19%
Operating margin 8.7% 5-yr avg 3.8%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Bedding Products (38%), Furniture Flooring and Textile Products (34%) and Specialized Products (28%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −10% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Bedding Products at 38%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Bedding Products38%$1.6B
  • Furniture Flooring And Textile Products34%$1.4B
  • Specialized Products28%$1.1B
By geographyUnited States59%Europe15%China10%Canada7%Mexico5%Other3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$4.1B$3.9B$4.3B$4.8B$4.3B$5.1B$5.1B$4.7B$4.4B$4.1B$4.0BRevenueRevenue
31%22%21%22%21%20%19%18%17%18%18%Gross marginGross mgn
10%10%10%10%10%8%8%10%12%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$545M$475M$445M$494M$411M$598M$489M($85M)($423M)$363M$345MOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.2%12.0%10.4%10.4%9.6%11.8%9.5%−1.8%−9.7%8.9%8.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$386M$293M$306M$314M$253M$402M$310M($137M)($512M)$235M$225MNet incomeNet inc.
24%32%20%22%23%23%23%19%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$553M$444M$440M$668M$603M$271M$441M$497M$306M$338M$275MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$115M$126M$136M$192M$189M$187M$180M$180M$112M$105M$103MDepreciationDeprec.
$14M($11M)($37M)$129M$131M($353M)($78M)$427M$678M($22M)($75M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$124M$159M$160M$143M$66M$107M$100M$114M$82M$57M$68MCapexCapex
3.0%4.0%3.7%3.0%1.5%2.1%1.9%2.4%1.9%1.4%1.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$429M$284M$281M$525M$536M$165M$341M$383M$224M$281M$207MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.4%7.2%6.6%11.0%12.5%3.2%6.6%8.1%5.1%6.9%5.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$429M$284M$281M$525M$536M$165M$341M$383M$224M$281M$207MFree cash flowFCF
10.4%7.2%6.6%11.0%12.5%3.2%6.6%8.1%5.1%6.9%5.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$30M$39M$109M$1.3B$0$153M$83M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$177M$186M$194M$205M$212M$218M$229M$239M$136M$27M$27MDividends paidDiv. paid
$198M$158M$112M$16M$11M$10M$60M$6M$5M$2MBuybacksBuybacks
23%17%17%12%11%14%11%-2%-15%15%12%ROICROIC
35%25%26%24%18%24%19%-10%-74%23%22%Return on equityROE
19%9%10%8%3%11%5%−28%−94%20%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$282M$526M$268M$248M$349M$362M$317M$366M$350M$587M$511MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$451M$522M$545M$564M$535M$620M$609M$565M$503M$434M$487MReceivablesReceiv.
$520M$571M$634M$637M$692M$993M$908M$820M$723M$623M$663MInventoryInvent.
$351M$430M$465M$463M$552M$614M$518M$536M$498M$467M$468MAccounts payablePayables
$619M$663M$714M$738M$675M$999M$998M$848M$728M$590M$683MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.8B$1.5B$1.5B$1.7B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$707M$976M$816M$928M$1.0B$1.3B$968M$1.3B$846M$775M$749MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×1.8×1.9×1.7×1.6×1.5×2.0×1.5×2.0×2.2×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$791M$822M$834M$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$794M$751M$748MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.0B$3.6B$3.4B$4.9B$4.8B$5.3B$5.2B$4.6B$3.7B$3.5B$3.5BTotal assetsAssets
$960M$1.3B$1.2B$2.1B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1B$2.0B$1.9B$1.5B$1.9BTotal debtDebt
$678M$726M$901M$1.9B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.6B$1.5B$910M$1.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
14.0×10.9×7.3×5.4×5.0×7.8×5.7×-1.0×-4.9×5.0×5.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6B$1.3B$689M$1.0B$1.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%0.9%0.8%0.7%0.7%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.5%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$4M$1M$25M$676MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
140M137M135M135M136M137M137M136M137M140M141MShares out (diluted)Shares
$29.47$28.72$31.58$35.10$31.50$37.11$37.70$34.67$31.93$29.03$28.02Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.76$2.13$2.26$2.32$1.86$2.94$2.27$-1.00$-3.73$1.69$1.59EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.06$2.07$2.08$3.88$3.95$1.20$2.50$2.81$1.63$2.01$1.47Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.06$2.07$2.08$3.88$3.95$1.20$2.50$2.81$1.63$2.01$1.47Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.27$1.35$1.43$1.51$1.56$1.60$1.68$1.76$0.99$0.19$0.19Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.89$1.16$1.18$1.06$0.49$0.78$0.73$0.83$0.59$0.41$0.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.80$8.67$8.56$9.69$10.48$12.06$12.02$9.78$5.02$7.32$7.37Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.2%/yr−1.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−4.6%/yr−12.6%/yr
EPS−5.3%/yr−2.0%/yr
Dividends / share−18.9%/yr−34.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−8.2%/yr−3.4%/yr
Book value / share−0.7%/yr−6.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
140Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
15%low FY2024
Gross margin
18%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.2×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$281Mowner earningsvs.$235Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $235M of profit into $281M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$235M
Owner earnings$281M · 7% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$235M($512M)($137M)$310M$402M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$105M+$112M+$180M+$180M+$187M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$20M+$27M+$28M+$30M+$34M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$22M+$678M+$427M−$78M−$353M
Cash from operations$338M$306M$497M$441M$271M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$57M−$82M−$114M−$100M−$107M
Owner earnings$281M$224M$383M$341M$165M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%5%8%7%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer $261M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $363M ÷ interest expense $73M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 3.6× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $587M − debt $1.9B
    What this means

    Netting $587M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 3.6× a year's operating profit (5.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 39 + DIO 69 − DPO 51 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -15%–23%; 13% latest = NOPAT $295M ÷ invested capital $2.3B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–13%; latest $281M = operating cash $338M − maintenance capex $57M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $261M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $338M ÷ net income $235M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $29M ÷ Owner Earnings $281M
    What this means

    Of $281M Owner Earnings, $29M (10%) went back to shareholders, $27M dividends, $2M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($20M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.55×
    Harvesting
    Capex $57M ÷ depreciation $105M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.25×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $969M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −142%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.01/share (latest year $1.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to −1% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −9.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$511M
  • Receivables$487M
  • Inventory$663M
  • Other current assets$86M
Current liabilities$749M
  • Debt due within a year$2M
  • Accounts payable$468M
  • Other current liabilities$279M
Current ratio2.33×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.45×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.68×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$998Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2M due · $511M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−10.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$204Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$150M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$500M
'28$0
'29$500M
'30$0
later$500M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$500Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$500Min 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.1B · 24%
  • Dividends$1.8B · 40%
  • Buybacks$578M · 13%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.0B · 23%
  • Returned to owners$2.4B

    70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.8B as dividends and $578M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $942M and cash and short-term investments rose $229M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $578M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.7%

    The diluted count barely moved (140M to 141M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.19/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 19% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$843M24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity74%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

$706M written down across 4 years (2016, 2017, 2020, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 42% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Glassman$9.2M$7.0M$165M
2022Mr. Dolloff$7.6M$3.6M$341M
2023Mr. Dolloff$7.3M$3.4M$383M
2024Mr. Glassman$9.9M$4.5M$224M
2024Mr. J. Mitchell Dolloff$5.7M$920k$224M
2025Mr. Glassman$10.9M$11.6M$281M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$20M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Leggett & Platt Incorporated is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.7% vs 8.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.1% early in the record and 6.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$960M → $1.9B

    Debt rose from $960M to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about $331M to $296M — about 2.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.4 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $1.9B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$277M · 7% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “We serve a broad suite of customers, with our largest customer representing approximately 7% of our trade sales in 2025.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Household Durables

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LEGLeggett & Platt Incorporated$4.1B21%10.0%13%7%
MLKNMillerKnoll Inc.$3.7B37%6.1%18%6%
HNIHNI Corporation$2.8B37%5.7%13%7%
LZBLa-Z-Boy Incorporated$2.1B42%7.7%18%7%
CODICompass Diversified Holdings$1.9B37%2.3%2%4%
ETDEthan Allen Interiors Inc.$615M57%10.7%13%7%
FLXSFlexsteel Industries Inc.$441M20%4.1%8%3%
XMAXXMAX Inc.$17M22%-30.7%-18%-15%
Group median37%5.9%13%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Leggett & Platt Incorporated has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Leggett & Platt Incorporated earns about $287M on its 7.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $207M on 136M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 141M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($68M) runs well above depreciation ($103M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $218M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Leggett & Platt Incorporated (LEG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LEG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LECO its page in the Manual LEGH →

Industry order: ← HELE the Household Durables chapter LZB →