Owner Scorecard


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MO, Altria Group Inc.

Tobacco consumer brand

Altria sells tobacco to adult smokers in the United States. Most of the money comes from cigarettes, with Marlboro as the centerpiece, and the rest from oral tobacco such as moist snuff and nicotine pouches. It makes its money by owning brands people ask for by name and moving them through wholesale distributors to retailers, at prices set well above what the product costs to make.

We have a leading portfolio of tobacco products for U.S. tobacco consumers age 21+.

Horizon is responsible for the U.S. marketing and commercialization of heated tobacco stick ("HTS") products owned by either party.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MO · Altria Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$23.3B
−3.1% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $23.4B 5-yr avg $24.6B
Gross margin 76% 5-yr avg 74%
Operating margin 47.2% 5-yr avg 45.7%
ROIC 47% 5-yr avg 46%
Owner-earnings margin 37% 5-yr avg 35%
Free cash flow margin 37% 5-yr avg 35%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Smokeable Products (88%) and Oral Tobacco (12%).
What moves the needle
The whole case rests on one question: can the brands raise price faster than the smoker count falls? Cigarette volumes drain away as a matter of course, so the test of the franchise is whether brand loyalty lets Altria push price through, year after year, without driving the smoker to a cheaper pack — and whether the smoke-free products it is permitted to sell can ever stand in for the profit a cigarette throws off. Keep the bad case in view: one buyer takes a large slice of sales, and tax, regulation, and litigation sit permanently on top of the business. The margins, the return on capital, and the debt load in the record below show how much cushion there is when those pressures bear down.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 38%, above 15% in 8 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 32% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Smokeable Products is 88% of revenue, with Oral Tobacco the other meaningful segment at 12%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Smokeable Products88%$20.5B
  • Oral Tobacco12%$2.8B
  • Other0%$5M
  • E-Vapor0%($13M)

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$25.7B$25.6B$25.4B$25.1B$26.2B$26.0B$25.1B$24.5B$24.0B$23.3B$23.4BRevenueRevenue
70%71%71%72%70%73%74%75%75%76%76%Gross marginGross mgn
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$8.8B$9.6B$9.1B$10.3B$10.9B$11.6B$11.9B$11.5B$11.2B$9.9B$11.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
34.0%37.5%35.9%41.1%41.6%44.4%47.5%47.2%46.8%42.5%47.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$14.2B$10.2B$7.0B($1.3B)$4.5B$2.5B$5.8B$8.1B$11.3B$6.9B$8.1BNet incomeNet inc.
35%-4%25%35%35%22%26%18%26%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.8B$4.9B$8.4B$7.8B$8.4B$8.4B$8.3B$9.3B$8.8B$9.3B$8.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$204M$209M$227M$226M$257M$244M$226M$272M$286M$266M$251MDepreciationDeprec.
($10.6B)($5.5B)$1.2B$8.9B$3.7B$5.7B$2.3B$885M($2.8B)$2.1B$590MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$189M$199M$238M$246M$231M$169M$205M$196M$142M$216M$271MCapexCapex
0.7%0.8%0.9%1.0%0.9%0.6%0.8%0.8%0.6%0.9%1.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3.6B$4.7B$8.2B$7.6B$8.2B$8.2B$8.1B$9.1B$8.6B$9.1B$8.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.1%18.4%32.1%30.2%31.2%31.7%32.1%37.1%35.9%39.0%36.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3.6B$4.7B$8.2B$7.6B$8.2B$8.2B$8.1B$9.1B$8.6B$9.1B$8.6BFree cash flowFCF
14.1%18.4%32.1%30.2%31.2%31.7%32.1%37.1%35.9%39.0%36.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$45M$415M$15M$0$0$2.8B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$4.5B$4.8B$5.4B$6.1B$6.3B$6.4B$6.6B$6.8B$6.8B$7.0B$7.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
$1.0B$2.9B$1.7B$845M$0$1.7B$1.8B$1.0B$3.4B$1.0BBuybacksBuybacks
26%34%26%26%50%45%47%41%47%ROICROIC
112%66%47%-21%157%Return on equityROE
76%35%10%−118%−64%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4.6B$1.3B$1.3B$2.1B$4.9B$4.5B$4.0B$3.7B$3.1B$4.5B$3.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$151M$142M$142M$152M$137M$47M$48M$71M$177M$263M$284MReceivablesReceiv.
$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BInventoryInvent.
$425M$374M$399M$325M$380M$449M$552M$582M$700M$750M$701MAccounts payablePayables
$1.8B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$1.7B$792M$676M$704M$557M$583M$729MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$7.3B$4.3B$4.3B$4.8B$7.1B$6.1B$7.2B$5.6B$4.5B$5.9B$5.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$7.4B$6.8B$21.2B$8.2B$9.1B$8.6B$8.6B$11.3B$8.8B$9.2B$8.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.6×0.2×0.6×0.8×0.7×0.8×0.5×0.5×0.6×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.3B$5.3B$5.2B$5.2B$5.2B$5.2B$5.2B$6.8B$6.9B$5.8B$5.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$45.9B$43.2B$55.5B$49.3B$47.4B$39.5B$37.0B$38.6B$35.2B$35.0B$34.6BTotal assetsAssets
$13.9B$13.9B$13.0B$28.0B$29.5B$28.0B$26.7B$26.2B$24.9B$25.7B$24.6BTotal debtDebt
$9.3B$12.6B$11.7B$25.9B$24.5B$23.5B$22.6B$22.5B$21.8B$21.2B$21.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
11.6×13.0×13.1×7.8×8.9×9.7×10.6×10.0×10.0×8.4×9.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$12.8B$15.4B$14.8B$6.2B$2.8B($1.6B)($4.0B)($3.5B)($2.2B)($3.5B)($3.2B)Shareholders’ equityEquity
$111M$74M$1.2B$285MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
1.95B1.92B1.89B1.87B1.86B1.84B1.80B1.78B1.72B1.68B1.67BShares out (diluted)Shares
$13.19$13.31$13.43$13.43$14.07$14.10$13.91$13.78$13.98$13.83$14.02Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.29$5.32$3.69$-0.69$2.40$1.34$3.20$4.58$6.56$4.13$4.81EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.86$2.45$4.32$4.06$4.39$4.46$4.46$5.12$5.01$5.39$5.15Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.86$2.45$4.32$4.06$4.39$4.46$4.46$5.12$5.01$5.39$5.15Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.31$2.50$2.87$3.25$3.38$3.49$3.66$3.81$3.98$4.14$4.19Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.10$0.10$0.13$0.13$0.12$0.09$0.11$0.11$0.08$0.13$0.16Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.54$8.00$7.83$3.33$1.53$-0.87$-2.20$-1.99$-1.30$-2.08$-1.92Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.5%/yr−0.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.5%/yr+4.2%/yr
EPS−6.1%/yr+11.4%/yr
Dividends / share+6.7%/yr+4.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.2%/yr+0.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income-11.9%
    “Operating income decreased $1,342 million (11.9%), due primarily to lower OCI (which includes the net impact of non-cash impairments of the e-vapor reporting unit goodwill and definite-lived intangible assets in our e-vapor products segment in 2025 and a non-cash impairment of the Skoal trademark in our oral tobacco product segment in 2024), partially offset by lower general corporate expenses.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.7Bpeak FY2016
ROIC
41%low FY2018
Gross margin
76%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.3×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$9.1Bowner earningsvs.$6.9Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $6.9B of profit into $9.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$6.9B
Owner earnings$9.1B · 39% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$6.9B$11.3B$8.1B$5.8B$2.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$266M+$286M+$272M+$226M+$244M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$2.1B−$2.8B+$885M+$2.3B+$5.7B
Cash from operations$9.3B$8.8B$9.3B$8.3B$8.4B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$216M−$142M−$196M−$205M−$169M
Owner earnings$9.1B$8.6B$9.1B$8.1B$8.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue39%36%37%32%32%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Restated past financials
“We have restated prior period retail share performance data and estimated industry volume to reflect the inclusion of synthetic oral nicotine pouch products.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $9.9B ÷ interest expense $1.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $21.2B · 2.1× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $4.5B − debt $25.7B
    What this means

    Netting $4.5B of cash and short-term investments against $25.7B of debt leaves $21.2B owed, about 2.1× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 4 + DIO 70 − DPO 49 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 26%–50%; 41% latest = NOPAT $7.3B ÷ invested capital $17.7B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 41% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 14%–39%; latest $9.1B = operating cash $9.3B − maintenance capex $216M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 39% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $9.3B ÷ net income $6.9B

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $8.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.1B
    What this means

    Of $9.1B Owner Earnings, $8.0B (88%) went back to shareholders, $7.0B dividends, $1.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.81×
    Maintaining
    Capex $216M ÷ depreciation $266M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $23.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.65×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $25.7B vs ($3.2B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −16%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.26/share (latest year $4.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 36% → 45% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 36% early to 45% lately, median 42% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 34.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$3.5B
  • Receivables$284M
  • Inventory$1.1B
  • Other current assets$241M
Current liabilities$8.4B
  • Debt due within a year$542M
  • Accounts payable$701M
  • Other current liabilities$7.2B
Current ratio0.62×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.48×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($3.2B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$542M due · $3.5B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($20.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($32.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$24.6Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.6B
'27$1.2B
'28$1.0B
'29$1.9B
'30$1.3B
later$19.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.6Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.9Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$25.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$3.5B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$9.1B
Together, against $1.6B due next year8.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $12.6B against the $1.6B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 8.0 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $77.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$2.0B · 3%
  • Dividends$60.7B · 79%
  • Buybacks$15.4B · 20%
  • Returned to owners$76.1B

    101% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $60.7B as dividends and $15.4B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$53.10

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 289M shares were bought for $15.4B, about $53.10 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $43.96 (2023) to $70.11 (2017); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $46.26 ($3.4B).

  • Net change in share count−14.3%

    The diluted count fell from 1952M to 1673M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$4.14/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$17.7B50% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.0B of capital spent building

$1.3B written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 42% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021William F. Gifford, Jr$12.6M$14.9M$8.2B
2022William F. Gifford, Jr$16.2M$18.1M$8.1B
2023William F. Gifford, Jr$18.5M$14.4M$9.1B
2024William F. Gifford, Jr$26.8M$24.9M$8.6B
2025William F. Gifford, Jr$24.6M$27.7M$9.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

    Inverting the record

    Invert: instead of why Altria Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

    None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

    Each test came back clean
    • Is it less profitable than it was?
    • Did the share count rise anyway?
    • Did debt outgrow the business?
    • Did reported profit become cash?
    • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
    • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

    Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

    What an owner would ask, FY2025

    read the 10-K →
    • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
      Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates

      each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

    The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

    Peers, nearest by economic model

    No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

    CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
    PMPhilip Morris International Inc$40.6B65%38.5%58%29%
    SYKStryker Corporation$25.1B64%18.3%10%15%
    KHCThe Kraft Heinz Company$24.9B34%12.8%3%11%
    DHRDanaher Corporation$24.6B57%19.0%7%24%
    MOAltria Group Inc.$23.3B72%42.0%38%32%
    SMCISuper Micro Computer Inc.$22.0B15%4.3%12%2%
    TTTrane Technologies plc$21.3B31%13.5%17%10%
    CLColgate-Palmolive Co.$20.4B60%21.9%41%17%
    Group median59%18.7%15%16%
    IV

    The price

    What a price has to assume.

    What the price implies

    reverse-DCF

    Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Altria Group Inc. has delivered.

    Altria Group Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

    $

    Through the cycle, Altria Group Inc. earns about $7.4B on its 31.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 39.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

    Base

    The assumptions

    9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

    Enter a price above to run it.

    Implied by the price
    Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr
    Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
    Owner-earnings yield
    P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
    P/B
    Graham’s price gate

    Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

    Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

    Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

    Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

    Free cash flow $8.6B on 1670M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $21.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($271M) runs well above depreciation ($251M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $8.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

    Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Altria Group Inc. (MO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MO, data as of 2026-07-09.

    Manual order: ← MNTN its page in the Manual MOD →

    Industry order: ← BTI the Tobacco chapter PM →