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MO, Altria Group Inc.
Altria sells tobacco to adult smokers in the United States. Most of the money comes from cigarettes, with Marlboro as the centerpiece, and the rest from oral tobacco such as moist snuff and nicotine pouches. It makes its money by owning brands people ask for by name and moving them through wholesale distributors to retailers, at prices set well above what the product costs to make.
We have a leading portfolio of tobacco products for U.S. tobacco consumers age 21+.
Horizon is responsible for the U.S. marketing and commercialization of heated tobacco stick ("HTS") products owned by either party.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Smokeable Products (88%) and Oral Tobacco (12%).
- What moves the needle
- The whole case rests on one question: can the brands raise price faster than the smoker count falls? Cigarette volumes drain away as a matter of course, so the test of the franchise is whether brand loyalty lets Altria push price through, year after year, without driving the smoker to a cheaper pack — and whether the smoke-free products it is permitted to sell can ever stand in for the profit a cigarette throws off. Keep the bad case in view: one buyer takes a large slice of sales, and tax, regulation, and litigation sit permanently on top of the business. The margins, the return on capital, and the debt load in the record below show how much cushion there is when those pressures bear down.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 38%, above 15% in 8 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 32% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Smokeable Products is 88% of revenue, with Oral Tobacco the other meaningful segment at 12%.
- Smokeable Products88%$20.5B
- Oral Tobacco12%$2.8B
- Other0%$5M
- E-Vapor0%($13M)
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $25.7B | $25.6B | $25.4B | $25.1B | $26.2B | $26.0B | $25.1B | $24.5B | $24.0B | $23.3B | $23.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 70% | 71% | 71% | 72% | 70% | 73% | 74% | 75% | 75% | 76% | 76% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $8.8B | $9.6B | $9.1B | $10.3B | $10.9B | $11.6B | $11.9B | $11.5B | $11.2B | $9.9B | $11.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 34.0% | 37.5% | 35.9% | 41.1% | 41.6% | 44.4% | 47.5% | 47.2% | 46.8% | 42.5% | 47.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $14.2B | $10.2B | $7.0B | ($1.3B) | $4.5B | $2.5B | $5.8B | $8.1B | $11.3B | $6.9B | $8.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 35% | -4% | 25% | — | 35% | 35% | 22% | 26% | 18% | 26% | 24% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $3.8B | $4.9B | $8.4B | $7.8B | $8.4B | $8.4B | $8.3B | $9.3B | $8.8B | $9.3B | $8.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $204M | $209M | $227M | $226M | $257M | $244M | $226M | $272M | $286M | $266M | $251M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($10.6B) | ($5.5B) | $1.2B | $8.9B | $3.7B | $5.7B | $2.3B | $885M | ($2.8B) | $2.1B | $590M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $189M | $199M | $238M | $246M | $231M | $169M | $205M | $196M | $142M | $216M | $271M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $3.6B | $4.7B | $8.2B | $7.6B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $8.1B | $9.1B | $8.6B | $9.1B | $8.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.1% | 18.4% | 32.1% | 30.2% | 31.2% | 31.7% | 32.1% | 37.1% | 35.9% | 39.0% | 36.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $3.6B | $4.7B | $8.2B | $7.6B | $8.2B | $8.2B | $8.1B | $9.1B | $8.6B | $9.1B | $8.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 14.1% | 18.4% | 32.1% | 30.2% | 31.2% | 31.7% | 32.1% | 37.1% | 35.9% | 39.0% | 36.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $45M | $415M | $15M | — | — | $0 | $0 | $2.8B | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $4.5B | $4.8B | $5.4B | $6.1B | $6.3B | $6.4B | $6.6B | $6.8B | $6.8B | $7.0B | $7.0B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $1.0B | $2.9B | $1.7B | $845M | $0 | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.0B | $3.4B | $1.0B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 26% | 34% | 26% | — | 26% | — | 50% | 45% | 47% | 41% | 47% | ROICROIC |
| 112% | 66% | 47% | -21% | 157% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| 76% | 35% | 10% | −118% | −64% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $4.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $2.1B | $4.9B | $4.5B | $4.0B | $3.7B | $3.1B | $4.5B | $3.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $151M | $142M | $142M | $152M | $137M | $47M | $48M | $71M | $177M | $263M | $284M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | InventoryInvent. |
| $425M | $374M | $399M | $325M | $380M | $449M | $552M | $582M | $700M | $750M | $701M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $792M | $676M | $704M | $557M | $583M | $729M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $7.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.8B | $7.1B | $6.1B | $7.2B | $5.6B | $4.5B | $5.9B | $5.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $7.4B | $6.8B | $21.2B | $8.2B | $9.1B | $8.6B | $8.6B | $11.3B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $8.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 0.6× | 0.2× | 0.6× | 0.8× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.5× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $5.2B | $5.2B | $5.2B | $5.2B | $6.8B | $6.9B | $5.8B | $5.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $45.9B | $43.2B | $55.5B | $49.3B | $47.4B | $39.5B | $37.0B | $38.6B | $35.2B | $35.0B | $34.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $13.9B | $13.9B | $13.0B | $28.0B | $29.5B | $28.0B | $26.7B | $26.2B | $24.9B | $25.7B | $24.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $9.3B | $12.6B | $11.7B | $25.9B | $24.5B | $23.5B | $22.6B | $22.5B | $21.8B | $21.2B | $21.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 11.6× | 13.0× | 13.1× | 7.8× | 8.9× | 9.7× | 10.6× | 10.0× | 10.0× | 8.4× | 9.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $12.8B | $15.4B | $14.8B | $6.2B | $2.8B | ($1.6B) | ($4.0B) | ($3.5B) | ($2.2B) | ($3.5B) | ($3.2B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | $111M | $74M | — | — | — | — | — | $1.2B | $285M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.95B | 1.92B | 1.89B | 1.87B | 1.86B | 1.84B | 1.80B | 1.78B | 1.72B | 1.68B | 1.67B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $13.19 | $13.31 | $13.43 | $13.43 | $14.07 | $14.10 | $13.91 | $13.78 | $13.98 | $13.83 | $14.02 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $7.29 | $5.32 | $3.69 | $-0.69 | $2.40 | $1.34 | $3.20 | $4.58 | $6.56 | $4.13 | $4.81 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.86 | $2.45 | $4.32 | $4.06 | $4.39 | $4.46 | $4.46 | $5.12 | $5.01 | $5.39 | $5.15 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.86 | $2.45 | $4.32 | $4.06 | $4.39 | $4.46 | $4.46 | $5.12 | $5.01 | $5.39 | $5.15 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.31 | $2.50 | $2.87 | $3.25 | $3.38 | $3.49 | $3.66 | $3.81 | $3.98 | $4.14 | $4.19 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.10 | $0.10 | $0.13 | $0.13 | $0.12 | $0.09 | $0.11 | $0.11 | $0.08 | $0.13 | $0.16 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $6.54 | $8.00 | $7.83 | $3.33 | $1.53 | $-0.87 | $-2.20 | $-1.99 | $-1.30 | $-2.08 | $-1.92 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.5%/yr | −0.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +12.5%/yr | +4.2%/yr |
| EPS | −6.1%/yr | +11.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +6.7%/yr | +4.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.2%/yr | +0.6%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Operating income-11.9%
“Operating income decreased $1,342 million (11.9%), due primarily to lower OCI (which includes the net impact of non-cash impairments of the e-vapor reporting unit goodwill and definite-lived intangible assets in our e-vapor products segment in 2025 and a non-cash impairment of the Skoal trademark in our oral tobacco product segment in 2024), partially offset by lower general corporate expenses.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $6.9B of profit into $9.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $6.9B | $11.3B | $8.1B | $5.8B | $2.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$266M | +$286M | +$272M | +$226M | +$244M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$2.1B | −$2.8B | +$885M | +$2.3B | +$5.7B |
| Cash from operations | $9.3B | $8.8B | $9.3B | $8.3B | $8.4B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$216M | −$142M | −$196M | −$205M | −$169M |
| Owner earnings | $9.1B | $8.6B | $9.1B | $8.1B | $8.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 39% | 36% | 37% | 32% | 32% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We have restated prior period retail share performance data and estimated industry volume to reflect the inclusion of synthetic oral nicotine pouch products.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $9.9B ÷ interest expense $1.2B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $21.2B · 2.1× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $4.5B − debt $25.7B
What this means
Netting $4.5B of cash and short-term investments against $25.7B of debt leaves $21.2B owed, about 2.1× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 4 + DIO 70 − DPO 49 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle8-yr median, range 26%–50%; 41% latest = NOPAT $7.3B ÷ invested capital $17.7BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 41% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 14%–39%; latest $9.1B = operating cash $9.3B − maintenance capex $216MIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 39% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $9.3B ÷ net income $6.9B
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $8.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.1B
What this means
Of $9.1B Owner Earnings, $8.0B (88%) went back to shareholders, $7.0B dividends, $1.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.81×MaintainingCapex $216M ÷ depreciation $266M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $23.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.65×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $25.7B vs ($3.2B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −16%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.26/share (latest year $4.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 36% → 45% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 36% early to 45% lately, median 42% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 34.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$3.5B
- Receivables$284M
- Inventory$1.1B
- Other current assets$241M
- Debt due within a year$542M
- Accounts payable$701M
- Other current liabilities$7.2B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $12.6B against the $1.6B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 8.0 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $77.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$2.0B · 3%
- Dividends$60.7B · 79%
- Buybacks$15.4B · 20%
- Returned to owners$76.1B
101% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $60.7B as dividends and $15.4B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$53.10
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 289M shares were bought for $15.4B, about $53.10 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $43.96 (2023) to $70.11 (2017); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $46.26 ($3.4B).
- Net change in share count−14.3%
The diluted count fell from 1952M to 1673M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$4.14/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$1.3B written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 42% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | William F. Gifford, Jr | $12.6M | $14.9M | $8.2B |
| 2022 | William F. Gifford, Jr | $16.2M | $18.1M | $8.1B |
| 2023 | William F. Gifford, Jr | $18.5M | $14.4M | $9.1B |
| 2024 | William F. Gifford, Jr | $26.8M | $24.9M | $8.6B |
| 2025 | William F. Gifford, Jr | $24.6M | $27.7M | $9.1B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Altria Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PMPhilip Morris International Inc | $40.6B | 65% | 38.5% | 58% | 29% |
| SYKStryker Corporation | $25.1B | 64% | 18.3% | 10% | 15% |
| KHCThe Kraft Heinz Company | $24.9B | 34% | 12.8% | 3% | 11% |
| DHRDanaher Corporation | $24.6B | 57% | 19.0% | 7% | 24% |
| MOAltria Group Inc. | $23.3B | 72% | 42.0% | 38% | 32% |
| SMCISuper Micro Computer Inc. | $22.0B | 15% | 4.3% | 12% | 2% |
| TTTrane Technologies plc | $21.3B | 31% | 13.5% | 17% | 10% |
| CLColgate-Palmolive Co. | $20.4B | 60% | 21.9% | 41% | 17% |
| Group median | — | 59% | 18.7% | 15% | 16% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Altria Group Inc. has delivered.
Altria Group Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Altria Group Inc. earns about $7.4B on its 31.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 39.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $8.6B on 1670M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $21.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($271M) runs well above depreciation ($251M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $8.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MNTN its page in the Manual MOD →
Industry order: ← BTI the Tobacco chapter PM →